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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the design of prices or incentives in dynamic settings
where customers are privately informed about their psychological biases, or agents
are privately informed about the technology.
Chapter 1 studies how firms set prices when their consumers have time-inconsistent
preferences and naive beliefs. Temptation goods, such as credit card-financed con-
sumption, are overvalued by consumers in the short run. It is typically assumed that
a monopolistic firm maximizes profit by pricing temptation goods above marginal
cost when consumer naivete is observable. However, market evidence contradicts this
result. This chapter explains the puzzle by the assumption that consumer naivete
is unobservable. Then it is optimal for a monopoly seller to offer a menu of options
that have prices both above and below marginal cost.
Chapter 2 studies a project manager deciding on workers’ workload assignments.
Workers face productivity shocks over time. Workers also tend to procrastinate,
although they prefer flexibility in production. Commitment of early production can
overcome procrastination. The optimal compensation scheme depends on whether
the manager’s objective is to maximize profit or welfare. It also depends on the
degree of workers’ procrastination. When the worker is a serious procrastinator, it
vi
is optimal for a profit-maximizing manager to monitor midterm output according to
a pass-fail criterion.
The final chapter studies an investor deciding on resource allocation and manage-
rial compensation. The manager privately observes time-varying project quality. A
signal that contains information about the evolution of future quality is also privately
available to the manager initially. When the manager reports a better initial signal,
the investor allocates more resources to the project in every period. Growth of the
project scale depends on how strongly the initial signal predicts future quality. How-
ever, the project with a better initial signal may grow more slowly and distortions
may persist indefinitely.
vii
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Chapter 1
Time Inconsistency and Naivete-Based
Price Discrimination
1.1 Introduction
Understanding market consequences of irrational consumer behavior is important.
In this paper, I study pricing anomalies for goods that are inconsistently valued over
time by consumers. Typical examples include credit cards and cell phones. It is
commonly believed that credit card users are tempted to spend more than planned.
An experiment conducted by Prelec and Simester (2001) shows that willingness to
pay increases up to 100% when consumers are instructed to use credit cards rather
than cash, and this willingness is unlikely to arise solely due to liquidity constraints.1
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) (hereafter, DM) also point out that cell phone
users have the impulse to spend more time than is long-run optimal on activities
associated with the phone. For this study, I define temptation goods as those goods
like credit cards and cell phones that are overvalued at the consumption stage relative
to the planning stage.2
1More evidence can be found in Feinberg (1986), Soman (1999), and Hirschman (1979).
2Similarly, I can define investment goods as those that are undervalued at the consumption stage
relative to the planning stage. A prominent example is the health club, with evidence provided by
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003, 2004). The analysis is symmetric and, for clarity, I focus on
temptation goods.
As conventional economic wisdom suggests, it is profit-maximizing for a monop-
olistic firm to set marginal price equal to marginal cost when charging upfront fees
is a viable option. However, temptation goods are usually priced much higher than
marginal cost, while some consumers pay below marginal cost. This observation is
illustrated in the following examples.
Credit cards. A typical credit card contract begins with a zero-interest-rate pe-
riod, during which consumers choose how much credit to utilize. After that, credit
card issuers charge an interest rate on outstanding balances, exceeding the prime rate
by as much as 10 percentage points. Direct evidence in support of above-marginal-
cost pricing is provided in Ausubel (1991), indicating that credit card debt resells
on the private market at a 20 percent premium. This implies the interest rate on
credit card debt, net of default and operating cost, is 20 percent higher than the
cost of capital. Interestingly, the high interest rate does not apply to all consumers.
Those who cannot pay off the debt by the due date are charged interest for any credit
usage. But consumers with no outstanding balance can borrow at no cost for up to
55 days, and enjoy extra benefits like car rental insurance and cash back offered by
the issuers.
Cell phones. Some large cell phone companies in the United States offer data
roaming plans that allow users to pay an upfront fee to continue using their domes-
tic data plans when traveling abroad. Users enrolled in the plan essentially pay zero
marginal price for international data usage, assuming they have sufficient monthly
data allowance at home. But users not enrolled in the plan are subject to an ex-
traordinarily high pay-per-use rate at $2.05/MB. The marginal cost of data roaming
for the home provider is the wholesale price charged by the remote provider.
DM use consumers’ self-control incapacity to explain the above-marginal-cost
2
pricing phenomenon. They assume that consumers have quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing utility and hence care more about immediate gratification. In their definition,
leisure goods like credit cards and mobile phones feature short-run benefits and
long-run costs. DM show that, irrespective of whether the consumer is sophisticated
(i.e., fully aware of the self-control problem) or naive (i.e., underestimates the self-
control problem), it is profit-maximizing for the firm to price temptation goods above
marginal cost in two-part tariffs, as long as consumer types are perfectly observable.
However, the fact that some consumers pay below marginal cost is left unex-
plained. Standard price discrimination models cannot reconcile overpricing and un-
derpricing. For example, the classic result of screening consumers’ private willingness
to pay only predicts that optimal prices are weakly above marginal cost. To be mroe
specific, it suggests that consumers with the highest willingness to pay should re-
ceive the efficient quantity, meaning that they should be charged at the marginal
cost. Those with lower willingness to pay should receive a rationed quantity, which
is implemented by a price above marginal cost.
To account for the coexistence of above- and below-marginal-cost pricing, I build
on DM’s framework but consider a more realistic assumption, i.e., the firm cannot
perfectly observe consumer naivete. Because sophisticated consumers can foresee
future usage, they pay in advance to avoid high consumption costs. Naive consumers,
on the contrary, are more likely to postpone payments and pay the premium.
In my model, a consumer can buy one unit of temptation good by signing a
contract beforehand with the firm. A fixed fee is paid at the planning stage when
consumer valuation is uncertain. An additional price is required if the consumer
decides to buy upon learning her realized valuation at the consumption stage. Time
inconsistency is captured by a distortion function that maps any planning-stage
3
valuation to a higher consumption-stage valuation. The sophisticated consumer is
fully aware of the distortion, whereas the naive consumer falsely believes her valuation
does not change over time. If the firm has perfect information on consumer types, my
model reproduces the optimality of above-marginal-cost pricing. But under imperfect
information, the firm distort prices to ensure incentive compatibility.
A key instrument in my analysis is the illusional surplus, defined as the incre-
ment in consumer utility due to unawareness of future overconsumption. I show
that under mild conditions it is profitable for the firm to screen consumer naivete
by offering a menu of contracts. The naive consumer self-selects the contract with a
high illusional surplus and is exploited from the ex ante perspective. The sophisti-
cated consumer chooses the contract corresponding to a low illusional surplus, and
information rent to the naive consumer is effectively curtailed. Given a well-behaved
illusional surplus function and other proper conditions, the sophisticated consumer
pays a below-marginal-cost price at the cost of a large upfront fee, while the payment
by the naive consumer is backloaded: she pays an above-marginal-cost price but a
small upfront fee.
I also consider several extensions. When the time-consistent consumer also exists
in the market, the two-sided deviation from marginal-cost pricing still holds, as long
as the probability of being sophisticated is small and that being naive is positive.
However, when the market is competitive with zero entry cost, the optimal prices go
back to the first-best level, both above marginal cost. This result highlights a new
benefit of competition, i.e., restoring the firm’s incentive to provide sophisticated
consumers a commitment device that suppresses their impulse to overconsume. In
a dynamic extension in which consumers can buy repeatedly from the firm, I show
that it can be profitable for the firm to impose additional commitment on the so-
4
phisticated consumer by charging a higher price conditional on more past purchases.
The gap between future prices contributes to limiting early-on consumption for the
sophisticated type and reducing information rent to the naive type.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper follows a growing body of literature in industrial organization that in-
vestigates firm’s strategic response to behavioral consumers, (see for example, DM;
Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Grubb 2009; Heidhues and Koszegi 2010, 2015; Yan, Xiao,
and Li 2014). An overview is provided by Ellison (2006).
Several papers justify deviations from marginal-cost pricing without screening.
The most closely related work is DM, which studies the first-best pricing in response
to time-inconsistent and possibly naive consumers. Grubb (2009) takes the monthly
cell phone plan as a leading example and investigates the optimality of three-part
tariffs with included quantities at zero price, followed by steep marginal charges.
In his model, consumers subject to projection bias overestimate demand when the
quantity is small and underestimate demand when the quantity is large. Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) examine advertising and pricing of primary and add-on goods,
like printers and printer cartridges. Their analysis shows that when consumers are
unaware or myopic of their demand for add-on goods, the profit-maximizing firm
should charge a low prices for the primary good, subsidized by a high price for the
add-on good.
Yan, Xiao, and Li (2014) study pricing in a screening model, but along a different
dimension of private information. They extend DM by assuming private consumer’s
willingness to pay, but all consumers are time-inconsistent and sophisticated. They
focus on the opposite of temptation goods, that is, goods that are undervalued in the
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consumption stage relative to the planning stage, such as health clubs. Under the
special case of uniform distribution, they verify the possibility of two-sided deviation
from marginal-cost pricing. However, as I discuss in Section 1.8, their approach
cannot resolve the below-marginal-cost pricing puzzle for temptation goods.
I also follow the branch of literature on contracting with time-inconsistent agents
(for example, Eliaz and Spiegler 2006, 2008; Esteban and Miyagawa 2006; Esteban,
Miyagawa, and Shum 2007; Galperti 2015). Koszegi (2014) provides an extensive
literature review. This sequence of papers studies the optimal form of screening
contracts under different specifications of time inconsistency. Compared to them,
my focus is to explain the observed systematic departure from marginal-cost pric-
ing. My approach to model time inconsistency is similar to those used by Eliaz
and Spiegler (2006) and Galperti (2015). In Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), shocks to
objective states are assumed away and the profit-maximizing contract for the so-
phisticated type always attains the first best. My model shows, with uncertainty
in intrinsic valuation, that the sophisticated consumer may overconsume given the
optimal contract. Galperti (2015) studies the optimal design of commitment de-
vices, assuming the agent type may be “time-consistent” or “time-inconsistent and
sophisticated.” One of my extensions shows that the existence of naive consumers is
indispensable to generate two-sided deviation from marginal-cost pricing.
Last but not least, I follow the general monopolistic screening literature (for
example, Myerson 1981; Maskin and Riley 1984; Mussa and Rosen 1987; Courty and
Li 2000, in particular). These papers consider rational agents with private preference,
whereas I study behavioral agents with unobservable degree of naivete.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 presents the basic model,
characterizes the optimal menu of contracts, and analyzes its properties. Section 1.8
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studys several extensions, including the existence of the time-consistent consumer,
market competition with zero entry cost, and repeated purchases of the consumer.
Section 1.9 discusses potential alternative explanations. Section 1.10 concludes.
1.3 The Basic Model
Consider a two-period model with one monopolistic firm and one consumer. Both
are risk neutral. We refer to the planning stage as Period 0 and the consumption
stage as Period 1. The consumer can buy one unit of temptation good from the firm
by signing a contract at the planning stage. How much the consumer values the good
depends on her state of consumption, indexed by v. Assume v is a random variable
that realizes in Period 1. v ∈ [v, v¯] ≡ V follows the cumulative distribution function
F (v) under common belief. The density function, denoted as f(v), is continuous
and positive on V . Time inconsistency is captured by the distortion function h(·),
with h(v) > v. Given any state v, the consumer values the good as v in Period 0
and h(v) in Period 1. We assume order is preserved under distortion, or equivalently
h′(v) > 0. In addition, assume h(v) is continuously differentiable for tractability.
Example 1.1. (1) Uniform distortion: h(v) = v + τ , where τ > 0. The quasi-
hyperbolic discounting3 specification in DM belongs to this case. To be more clear,
DM assumes temptation goods have constant long-run cost c and random short-run
benefit b. Before signing the contract, a consumer discounts future payoffs by the
long-run discount factor δ and gets b− δc in utility. But when facing the immediate
choice to consume or not, consumer utility becomes b−βδc, where β is the short-run
discount factor. It is equivalent to take v = b − δc and h(v) = v + δ(1 − β)c in our
setup.
3See Strotz (1956), Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Laibson (1997) for more discussion.
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Firm offers (L, p)
If h(v) ≥ p,
consumer consumes and pays p
If h(v) < p,
consumer does not consume
and pays 0
Consumer accepts
and pays L
Consumer rejects
and pays 0
v realizes
Period 0 Period 1
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the Model
(2) Proportional distortion: h(v) = αv, where α > 1 and v ≥ 0. Here α can be
viewed as a salience factor for current valuation. Akerlof (1991); Wu, Ramachan-
dran, and Krishnan (2013); and Galperti (2015) use this specification to model time
inconsistency.
For any given consumer type, the timeline is illustrated in Figure 1. In Period 0,
the firm offers a contract (L, p), where L is the upfront fee and p the price contingent
on purchase. If the consumer rejects the contract, she receives zero payoff from the
outside option. If the consumer accepts it, she pays L and continues to Period 1.
At the beginning of Period 1, the value of v is realized. The consumer observes her
current valuation h(v) and decides whether to consume. If h(v) ≥ p, she consumes
and pays p. If h(v) < p, she does not consume and receives zero continuation payoff
from the outside option.
The consumer type can be sophisticated or naive (indexed by s and n), with
probability γs and γn = 1− γs, respectively. The sophisticated type is fully aware of
her time inconsistency and hence perceives the distortion correctly. By taking into
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account future decisions, the sophisticated type forms expected utility in Period 0 as
Us(L, p) = −L+
∫ v¯
h−1(p)
(v − p) dF (v)
The naive type perceives a lower degree of distortion. For simplicity, I let the
naive type be fully unaware of time inconsistency, in which case the consumer believes
her valuation in Period 1 is the same as that in Period 0. Hence, the naive type
mispredicts that she will consume whenever v ≥ p, underestimating the likelihood
of consumption. The expected utility for the naive type in Period 0 is
Un(L, p) = −L+
∫ v¯
p
(v − p) dF (v)
The time-consistent firm knows each consumer type’s actual behavior. The ex-
pected profit from offering (Ls, ps) to the sophisticated type and (Ln, pn) to the naive
type is given by
Π((Lj, pj)j=s,n) = γs
[
Ls +
∫ v¯
h−1(ps)
(ps − a) dF (v)
]
+γn
[
Ln +
∫ v¯
h−1(pn)
(pn − a) dF (v)
]
a ∈ (0, E[v]) is the marginal production cost. I assume V is large enough that trade
may be inefficient ex post, i.e., v < a. If not, the optimal pricing strategy becomes
uninteresting because the firm can choose p to be anything below v, coupled with an
upfront fee E[v]− p to extract the full ex ante surplus.
The following shows how the model setup fits into our examples. I will discuss
more applicable industry examples toward the end of this section.
Example 1.2. (1) Credit card: L is the annual fee plus the interest that a user
forgoes by not fully utilizing the free credit initially. p is the subsequent interest rate
9
for using credit.
(2) Cell phone: The cell phone user travelling abroad pays upfront fee L for a
roaming plan, and p per megabyte of data.
To simplify analysis and interpretation, I introduce three functions:
T (p) =
∫ v¯
h−1(p)
(v − a) dF (v)
C(p) =
∫ v¯
h−1(p)
(v − p) dF (v)
I(p) =
∫ p
h−1(p)
(p− v) dF (v)
T (p) is the real total surplus, which represents the expected total surplus from
trade given the consumer’s actual behavior. It is easy to check that T (p) is single-
peaked at p = h(a). C(p) is the real consumer surplus because it is the share of T (p)
enjoyed by the consumer. I(p) is the illusional surplus, which captures the increment
in expected utility due to the naive consumer’s false belief. To see it more clearly,
I(p) is the difference between
∫ v¯
p
(v − p) dF (v) and C(p), with the former being the
full consumer surplus perceived by the naive type. It is worth noting that I(p) is
positive on V and zero elsewhere.
Now we can rewrite consumer utility and firm profit as
Us(Ls, ps) = −Ls + C(ps)
Un(Ln, pn) = −Ln + C(pn) + I(pn)
Π((Lj, pj)j=s,n) = γs (Ls + T (ps)− C(ps)) + γn (Ln + T (pn)− C(pn))
Taking one step back for a moment, we consider the case that there is no time
10
inconsistency. That is, h(v) = v. But then the illusional surplus disappears.
Us(L, p) = Un(L, p) = −L + C(p). The profit-maximizing firm can extract the full
surplus from the consumer by setting L = C(p). It follows that the profit-maximizing
price exactly equals the marginal cost a. This verifies the optimality of marginal-cost
pricing in two-part tariffs in a monopoly market. It serves as the very benchmark
of my model. The following studies the deviation from marginal-cost pricing when
the consumer is time-inconsistent and when the consumer’s unawareness of her time
inconsistency is unobservable.
1.4 The First-Best Contracts
Assume in this section that the firm can perfectly observe whether the consumer is
naive or sophisticated. The profit-maximization problem for the firm is to choose
(Ls, ps) and (Ln, pn) that solves
max Π((Lj, pj)j=s,n)
s.t. for j = s, n
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ 0 (IRj)
IRj is the participation constraint for type j, which requires that a type-j consumer
receives no less than the outside option from contracting with the firm.
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The first-best contracts are characterized by
pFBs = arg maxT (p)
pFBn = arg max [T (p) + I(p)]
LFBs = C(p
FB
s )
LFBn = C(p
FB
n ) + I(p
FB
n )
The firm chooses prices to maximize the total surplus and then extracts all by the
upfront fee. The optimization objective for pFBs and pFBn differ in a term I(p) because
the firm can additionally extract the illusional surplus when dealing with the naive
type.
Proposition 1.3. pFBs = h(a) > a and pFBn > a.
Proposition 1.3 shows the first-best prices for both types are higher than the
marginal cost. This result resembles the first-best pricing rule for temptation goods
in DM. Overpricing can be viewed as a commitment device for the sophisticated
consumer. The firm uses price h(a) to reduce her consumption incentive and extract
the efficient-level surplus. In the meantime, overpricing is an exploitation device for
the naive consumer. Since the naive consumer overconsumes relative to what she
anticipates, the firm makes a higher profit by charging a higher price.
It is also worth noting that pFBn may be lower or greater than h(a). In other
words, we are not sure whether the naive type consumes less than the sophisticated
type in the first-best setting. To have the naive type consumes less, we need the
illusional surplus I(p) to be larger for prices higher than h(a), which in turn requires
the probability of state v concentrates at higher levels and/or the degree of distortion
h(v)− v is greater for larger v.
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1.5 The Second-Best Contract
In this section, we assume the firm cannot observe consumer types. There are three
options available to the firm: First, it can forgo the illusional surplus and offer a
pooling contract to both types. Second, it can serve and price discriminate the two
types, subject to information rent. Third, the firm can get all extractable consumer
surplus from one type, while excluding the other. These options are all taken into
account in our contracting problem, formalized in the following.
By the revelation principle, the optimal menu of contracts can be restricted to
{(Lj, pj)}j=s,n. The profit-maximization problem is to choose (Ls, ps) and (Ln, pn)
that solves
max Π((Lj, pj)j=s,n)
s.t. for i, j = s, n
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ 0 (IRj)
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ Uj(Li, pi) (ICj)
Besides the participation constraints IRj, the firm also faces a set of incentive con-
straints ICj, which requires each type of consumer is no better off from choosing the
other type’s contract.
1.5.1 Characterization
The naive type is the high type in our model because she perceives higher utility
than the sophisticated type from any given contract. To see it more clearly, we have
Un(L, p) ≥ Us(L, p), due to Un(L, p) = Us(L, p) + I(p) and I(p) ≥ 0. Constraints
in the second-best problem can be reduced in the following way. First, IRn is not
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binding. The reasoning is as follows: We know at the optimum the naive type is
worse off from choosing the sophisticated type’s contract due to ICn, and even if she
does so, as being the high type, she is still better off than the sophisticated type.
Hence, the naive type gets higher utility than the sophisticated type from the optimal
menu. But because the sophisticated type does not quit due to IRs, the naive type
has no incentive to quit either. Second, ICn is binding; otherwise, increasing Ls
and Ln by the same amount would raise firm profit. Lastly, IRs is also binding;
otherwise, the firm could gain by increasing Ls.
The binding constraints IRs and ICn imply that Ls = C(ps) and Ln = C(pn) +
I(pn)− I(ps) at the optimum. Note that Ln is below the fully extractable consumer
surplus C(pn) + I(pn) by the amount I(ps). It implies the firm leaves surplus I(ps)
to the naive type.
Substituting Ls and Ln into the profit function and ignoring ICs, we obtain a
relaxed problem:
max Π(ps, pn) = γsT (ps) + γn [T (pn) + I(pn)− I(ps)]
In the objective, besides the expected real total surplus γsT (ps) + γnT (pn), the firm
gains γnI(pn) from exploiting naviete and pays rent γnI(ps) due to imperfect infor-
mation.
Solving the relaxed problem gives us a candidate for the optimal solution. Yet it
remains to check if ICs is satisfied. Because the expressions of Ls and Ln are given
at the optimum, we can easily show that ICs is equivalent to I(pn) ≥ I(ps). The
inequality says the naive type should be given weakly higher illusional surplus, and
its interpretation is that the profit gain from exploiting naivete should be no less than
the information rent to the naive type. It must be true; otherwise, the firm would be
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better off choosing a pooling contract. Therefore, the optimal menu coincides with
the solution to the relaxed problem, as summarized in Proposition 1.4.
Proposition 1.4. {(L∗n, p∗n), (L∗s, p∗s)} is the optimal menu of contracts, where
p∗s = arg max [γsT (p)− γnI(p)]
p∗n = arg max [T (p) + I(p)]
L∗s = C(p
∗
s)
L∗n = C(p
∗
n) + I(p
∗
n)− I(p∗s)
First, the optimal price for the naive type is first best. This is because the naive
type is the high type in our setting and the general no-distortion-at-the-top result
applies. Second, we should emphasize the optimal contracts need not be screening.
Whenever I(p∗n) = I(p∗s), we get a pooling outcome: it is optimal for the firm to offer
both types of consumer the contract (C(h(a)), h(a)). However, screening can increase
profit whenever the gain from exploiting naivete, I(p∗n), exceeds the information rent,
I(p∗s). It follows that screening strictly dominates pooling if and only if I(p∗n) > I(p∗s).
1.5.2 Properties
Proposition 1.5. It is optimal to serve both types of consumers.
If exclusion ever occurs, the sophisticated type will be excluded because she ap-
preciate any given contract less than the naive type. The firm gets the full extractable
surplus from the naive type by offering contract
(
C(pFBn ) + I(p
FB
n ), p
FB
n
)
. Consider
that instead of exclusion, the firm offers the sophisticated type a contract (C(v), v).
The naive type gets zero ex ante surplus from choosing this contract, and so she
has no incentive to do so. The sophisticated type has no incentive to choose the
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naive type’s contract either because it causes an expected loss −I(pFBn ) as she per-
ceives no illusion. However, the firm gets extra profit γs(E[v]− a) from serving the
sophisticated type.
Proposition 1.6. If I ′(h(a)) 6= 0 or I(h(a)) > γs
γn
[T (h(a))− E(v) + a], the optimal
contracts are separating.
Proposition 4 provides sufficient conditions for the optimal contracts to be sep-
arating. We take the price equal to h(a) as the benchmark, since it is the optimal
price when a pooling contract is enforced. Then we show it is profit-enhancing to de-
viate from offering the price h(a) under two conditions. The first condition is on the
monotonicity of I(·) at h(a). I ′(h(a)) 6= 0 implies that perturbing the price around
h(a) results in a first-order change in profit via the perception bias. Because the
profit from the sophisticated type γsT (ps)− γnI(ps) is decreasing in I(ps), and that
from the naive type γn(T (pn) + I(pn)) is increasing in I(pn), the firm can gain more
surplus by spreading ps and pn around h(a). The second condition is on the level
of I(·) at h(a). We should notice that, when offering a pooling contract, the firm
can at most extract the surplus that makes IRs binding. In other words, the firm
needs to forgo the illusional surplus from choosing the pooling outcome. But then it
is suboptimal when the illusional surplus is large. Under the second condition, we
can easily show the optimal pooling contract is dominated by a screening menu with
(C(v), v) designed for the sophisticated type and (C(h(a)) + I(h(a)), h(a)) for the
naive type. The second condition can be satisfied when γs is small. Intuitively, when
the probability of being sophisticated is low, the firm pays less information rent and
hence screening is more profitable.
To further characterize the optimal prices, I need to examine the single-crossing
property. In Figure 2, we plot consumer’s indifference curves in the p-L plane. Utility
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Figure 1.2: Single-Crossing Property
increases as one moves to the south. For a fixed utility level, the slope of indifference
curve for the naive type is given by ∂L
∂p
= − ∂Un/∂p
∂Un/∂L
= C ′(p) + I ′(p), and that for the
sophisticated type is ∂L
∂p
= − ∂Us/∂p
∂Us/∂L
= C ′(p). Thus if D′(p) > 0, the indifference curve
for the naive type has a greater slope, and vice versa. According to previous analysis,
ICn is binding, meaning (L∗s, p∗s) is the intersection of the two indifference curves.
ICs is nonbinding, and hence (L∗n, p∗n) lies above the sophisticated type’s indifference
curve. Since p∗n = pFBn > a, we need p∗s < p∗n to generate below-marginal-cost pricing.
As is obvious in Figure 2, it is desirable to have the optimal prices lie on the interval
of p where I ′(p) > 0. But I(p) cannot be always increasing. I impose the following
assumption instead.
Assumption 1.7. Suppose I(·) is single-peaked at z ∈ (v, h(v¯)).
Assumption 1.7 shows we can divide I(·) into two parts. It is increasing to the
left of z and decreasing to the right of z. The idea in the following proofs is to rule
out the optimality of prices above z, which in turn guarantees I(·) is increasing on
the relevant region. Assumption 1.7 can be satisfied in the following examples.
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Example 1.8. (1) h′(v) > 1 and F (h−1(v)) is weakly convex on (h(v), h(v¯)). In this
case, I ′(p) =
∫ p
h−1(p) (f(v)− f(h−1(p))) dv, which is positive on (v, v¯) by convexity of
F (h−1(v)). When p > v¯, I ′′(p) = 1
h′(h−1(p))
[
f(h−1(p))− f(h−1(p))
h′(h−1(p))
]
− ∂2F (h−1(p))
∂p
< 0.
Since I(p) eventually reaches zero, it is single-peaked at some z ∈ (v¯, h(v¯)).
A special case is h(v) = αv with α > 1 and v follows the uniform distribution.
When h(p) is proportional, any distribution of v with a convex CDF satisfies the
aforementioned condition. The feasible set of CDFs also extends to some nonconvex
cases, when h(p) is concave.
(2) h′(v) = 1, f(v) is single-peaked at η and concave on (h−1(η), h(η)). In this
case, I ′(p) =
∫ p
h−1(p) (f(v)− f(h−1(p))) dv, which is positive when p < η and negative
when p > h(η). Moreover, I ′′(p) =
∫ p
h−1(p) (f
′(v)− f ′(h−1(p))) dv < 0 on (η, h(η)),
since f(v) is concave on (h−1(η), h(η)). Thus I(·) is single-peaked at z ∈ (η, h(η)).
A special case is h(v) = v + τ with τ > 0 and v follows a truncated normal
distribution4. Denote µ as the mean of the original normal distribution. Then I(·)
is single-peaked at z ∈ (µ, µ+ τ).
Proposition 1.9. Under Assumption 1.7, if γs and a are small, then p∗s < a < p∗n
and L∗s > L∗n.
Proposition 1.9 is my main result. First, p∗n is above the marginal cost. In this
way, the firm can exploit a greater illusional surplus from the naive type, since T (p)
is single-peaked at h(a) and, under Assumption 1.7, I(p) is increasing below h(a).
Second, p∗s is below the marginal cost. Downward distortion of p∗s has two effects: on
the one hand, it creates social inefficiency due to overproduction; on the other hand,
it helps reduce the information rent, i.e., the associated illusional surplus. When a
is small, the first effect is weak. Moreover, a small γs implies that the first effect
4We use truncation to avoid getting into the limit of I(p) as p goes to infinity.
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has a lower weight relative to the second one. Overall, small γs and a makes the
first effect weak and the second effect strong. Thus it is beneficial for the firm to
offer a lower price to the sophisticated type, and it provides insufficient commitment
compared to the first best. As γs decreases, the firm cares less about the profit from
the sophisticated consumer and, therefore, the downward distortion can be so severe
that p∗s < a.5 Lastly, the naive type is charged a smaller upfront fee. To see why,
first note that the full consumer surplus perceived by the naive type C(p) + I(p) is
decreasing in p. Since p∗s < p∗n, the firm must make L∗s > L∗n to prevent the naive
type from choosing (L∗s, p∗s).
It is also worth noting that the average market price can be smaller than the
marginal cost as well. When p∗s is sufficiently low such that p∗s ≤ v, the sophisticated
type consumes with probability 1. But then the firm is indifferent in setting p∗s to
be anything below v, as long as the total payment of the sophisticated type equals
C(v). Hence, p∗s can be so small that the average price γsp∗s +γnp∗n is driven below a.
To study the impact of varying degrees of time inconsistency, I focus on two
classes of distortion functions and define a ranking of severity as below.
Definition 1.10. (i) Suppose the distortion functions are proportional. We say
h1(v) = α1v generates more severe time inconsistency than h2(v) = α2v if α1 > α2 >
1.
(ii) Suppose the distortion functions are uniform. We say h1(v) = v+τ1 generates
more severe time inconsistency than h2(v) = v + τ2 if τ1 > τ2 > 0.
Based on Definition 1.10, I impose Assumption 1.11 (see following) to regulate
our environment. It guarantees Assumption 1.7 is still satisfied if we vary the degree
of time inconsistency. From Example 1.8, we can immediately tell that Assumption
5We can show that when γs increases, p∗s moves toward pFBs and p∗n does not change.
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1.11 is stronger than Assumption 1.7. We also know the peak of I(·) is on (v¯, h(v¯))
in the first case and on (η, h(η)) in the second case of Assumption 1.11.
Assumption 1.11. Either one of the following cases is true: (i) h(v) is proportional
and F (v) is weakly convex on V ; (ii) h(v) is uniform, and f(v) is single-peaked at η
and concave on (h−1(η), h(η)).
Proposition 1.12. Suppose Assumption 1.11 is satisfied and γs, a are small. As
time inconsistency becomes more severe, p∗n increases and p∗s decreases.
In Proposition 1.12, I show that the severity of time inconsistency increases the
divergence of optimal prices in the regular environment. When time inconsistency
becomes more severe, the peaks of T (·) and I(·) both shift to the right. Hence, a
higher p∗n can increase real total surplus and illusional surplus simultaneously, which
in turn increases firm profit. p∗s is chosen to balance two competing forces. On
the one hand, as the degree of time inconsistency increases, so does the demand for
commitment. So the firm wants to raise p∗s to curtail the sophisticated consumer’s
incentive to overconsume. On the other hand, as the degree of time inconsistency
increases, it becomes more profitable to exploit consumer naivete. So the firm wants
to decrease p∗s to reduce information rent. When γs is small, the firm cares little
about the profit from the sophisticated type and hence the second force dominates.
As a result, p∗s is more severely downward distorted as exploiting illusional surplus
becomes increasingly important.
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1.6 Welfare Analysis
Choosing a welfare criterion is delicate in models involving time inconsistency. Fol-
lowing much of the literature6, I evaluate consumer welfare from a parental perspec-
tive. That is, I take consumer’s utility in Period 0 without illusion as her long-run
utility and use the long-run utility to measure consumer surplus. Formally, define
the consumer surplus for type j ∈ {s, n} as
CSj(Lj, pj) = −Lj + C(pj)
The social welfare is the sum of firm profit and expected consumer surplus, given by
W ((Lj, pj)j=s,n) = γsT (ps) + γnT (pn)
The efficient price maximizes the social welfare, given by pe = h(a).
We can compare the well-being of the consumer, the firm, and the society across
different settings. In the first-best environment, the consumer surplus (CSFBs , CSFBn ),
firm profit ΠFB and social welfare W FB are given by
CSFBs = 0
CSFBn = −I(p∗n) < 0
ΠFB = γsT (p
e) + γn [T (p
∗
n) + I(p
∗
n)]
W FB = γsT (p
e) + γnT (p
∗
n)
Those in the second-best environment are
6For example, Akerlof (1991), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Heid-
hues and Koszegi (2010), and Galperti (2015).
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CSSBs = 0
CSSBn = I(p
∗
s)− I(p∗n) < 0
ΠSB = γsT (p
∗
s) + γn [T (p
∗
n) + I(p
∗
n)− I(p∗s)]
W SB = γsT (p
∗
s) + γnT (p
∗
n)
Several remarks can be made from the comparison. First, the naive consumer
is exploited from the parental perspective. She receives a negative surplus in both
settings. Second, the firm’s second-best profit is smaller, as imperfect information
prevents it from extracting the full surplus from the naive consumer. Third, the
naive consumer is better off in the second-best environment from the parental per-
spective, since the information advantage gives her some rent. Lastly, from the
parental perspective, the social welfare is worse when there is private information,
since the sophisticated consumer is assigned an inefficient contract.
Proposition 1.13. Suppose Assumption 1.11 is satisfied and γs, a are small. As
time inconsistency becomes more severe, CSSBs is always zero, CSSBn decreases, ΠSB
increases, and W SB decreases.
Proposition 1.13 shows how severity of time inconsistency affects welfare. For
a higher degree of time inconsistency, the sophisticated consumer’s surplus is un-
changed as her participation constraint is always binding. Moreover, the firm ex-
ploits the naive consumer more heavily. But since the increase in firm profits cannot
compensate for the decrease in the naive consumer’s surplus, the social welfare de-
teriorates.
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1.7 Discussion
This section connects my result to more industry examples and discusses an alter-
native specification of the model.
1.7.1 Industry Examples
Video game. Video games are commonly viewed as temptation goods. Best Buy, the
largest US retailer in consumer electronics, offers a membership plan called “gamers
club unlocked.” The membership fee is $30 up front. It gives consumers 20% off on
new releases and many other benefits for two years. The typical retail price of a new
game is $60 and the wholesale price is $48, which leaves Best Buy a 20% margin.
But considering the handling and shipping cost, the membership consumers actually
pay below the marginal cost. The sophisticated consumer is well aware of her future
demand. Hence, she is more likely to enroll in the membership plan and pay a price
below marginal cost. The naive consumer underestimates future purchase, and is
more likely to pay the regular price above marginal cost.
Public transportation. Walking from one place to another costs immediate ef-
fort. So a present-biased traveller often uses public transportation more often than
planned. Although public transportation is usually operated by a public agency, the
budget concern gives it incentive to increase profit. In Boston, the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) offers weekly passes at $21.25. Within one
week from the day of purchase, the pass user can take subway or buses at the price
of $0. The regular price is $2.25 for the subway and $1.70 for the local bus. The
sophisticated traveller is more likely to buy transportation passes up front and ride
for free in the future. The naive traveller underestimates usage and pays a per-usage
fare above the marginal cost, estimated to be a small positive number.
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Hotel add-on. Consuming hotel add-ons such as the in-room WiFi, beverages and
meals can bring immediate convenience. Consumers may be tempted to incur such
consumption after arriving at the hotel. The naive consumer tends to pay the regular
add-on prices on site, usually much higher than market average prices. But the
sophisticated consumer may plan in advance. By joining the membership program
with upfront payment, she can enjoy complementary in-room WiFi, beverages, and
even free meals and free nights.
1.7.2 Uncertainty in Time Inconsistency
I have assumed that the consumer has intrinsic taste uncertainty. Time inconsis-
tency works as a distortion, mapping the objective distribution of consumer tastes
to a subjective one. Here we explore an alternative assumption: The consumer has
uncertainty in time inconsistency instead of the objective taste. In this case, the
presence of time inconsistency maps a fixed state of taste to a subjective distribution
of tastes.
To be more concrete, assume the consumer values the temptation good as u
in period 0 and tu in period 1. u > 0 is a constant greater than the marginal
production cost a. t ∈ [t, t¯] is a random variable following the CDF F (t). Moreover,
we take t ≥ 1 to model temptation. When t¯ = t = 1, we are in the benchmark
setting when time inconsistency is absent. The profit-maximizing price p can be
anything no larger than a, as long as the sum of p and the upfront fee L equals
u. Due to the indeterminancy of prices, we cannot use marginal-cost pricing as the
proper benchmark. Instead, we look at the quantity dimension and use the efficient
allocation as the benchmark. Note that implications from the model with intrinsic
taste uncertainty can be restated accordingly: The sophisticated consumer consumes
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efficiently in the first best but may overconsume in the second best.
Now we come back to the alternative specification and study the optimal alloca-
tion in the general case that t is nondegenerate to 1. In Period 0, the sophisticated
consumer is aware that she will consume whenever tu ≥ p. But the naive consumer
falsely predicts her future demand using current valuation. That is, the naive con-
sumer believes that she will only consume when u ≥ p. Given a two-part tariff
(L, p), the Period-0 expected utility is Us(L, p) = −L + (u − p)
(
1− F ( p
u
)
)
for the
sophisticated consumer, and Un(L, p) = −L+(u−p)1{u ≥ p} for the naive consumer.
The firm’s problem is to solve
max γs
[
Ls + (ps − a)
(
1− F (ps
u
)
)]
+ γn
[
Ln + (pn − a)
(
1− F (pn
u
)
)]
subject to IRj and ICj for j ∈ {s, n}. Following the same procedure as before, we
can solve that pn ≥ tu and Ln = 0.7 Moreover, ps can be anything no larger than
a, and Ls + ps must equal u. Hence, the sophisticated type consumes efficiently
in the second best, just as in the first best. The alternative uncertainty in time
inconsistency cannot generate distortion in the sophisticated type’s consumption.8
The fixed ex ante valuation makes committing the sophisticated type easier.
7Given the optimal solution, we actually find the naive type receives the same utility from
choosing (Ln, pn) and (Ls, ps). Implicitly, I assume the naive type chooses the contract that is
designed for her whenever she is indifferent. To make it more realistic, we can just let Ln be
slightly negative.
8Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) consider another alternative assumption on uncertainty. To put it
simply, they assume the consumer valuation changes over time from u to tu for sure, where u > 0
and t > 1 are both constant. But the naive consumer thinks there is a positive probability that
her valuation stays unchanged. Their result also shows that the sophisticated consumer consumes
efficiently in the second best.
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1.8 Extensions
1.8.1 The Time-Consistent Type
So far we only considered time-inconsistent consumers. The following shows that
when there are time-consistent consumers in the market, our separating equilibrium
still exists. Since the time-consistent type and the naive type share the same ex ante
utility, i.e., Un(L, p) = Uc(L, p), they end up choosing the same contract (Ln, pn).
Let γc be the probability of being time-consistent. The firm’s problem is
maxγs [Ls + T (ps)− C(ps)] + γn [Ln + I(pn)− I(ps)]
+ γc
[
Ln +
∫ v¯
p
(v − a)dF (v)− C(pn)− I(pn)
]
s.t. for i, j ∈ s, n
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ 0
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ Uj(Li, pi)
The last term in the objective function is the part of profit from dealing with the
time-consistent type. Similar to the characterization carried out in Section 2.2.1, we
can transform the problem into
max γsT (ps)− (1− γs)I(ps) + γn [T (pn) + I(pn)] + γc
∫ v¯
pn
(v − a)dF (v)
s.t.
I(pn) ≥ I(ps)
Since the last term
∫ v¯
pn
(v− a)dF (v) is maximized at pn = a and the middle term
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T (pn) + I(pn) is increasing when pn ≤ a, we must have the optimal pcn ∈ (a, z)
(the superscript c denotes that the time-consistent type is involved). Moreover, the
optimal pcs remains to be p∗s. Under the conditions in Proposition 5, pcs < a and
hence the constraint I(pcn) ≥ I(pcs) is satisfied. Although the presence of the time-
consistent type drives down pcn, we maintain the spread of marginal prices around
the marginal cost as long as γn > 0.
1.8.2 Competitive Market
My result relies on market power on the firm’s side. To see why, consider a com-
petitive market with zero entry cost. When a consumer is indifferent, I assume she
chooses the available firms with equal probability. The problem for each firm is given
as below.
max γsUs(Ls, ps) + γnUn(Ln, pn)
s.t. for all i, j ∈ {s, n}
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ Uj(Li, pi)
Uj(Lj, pj) ≥ 0
Π((Lj, pj)j=s,n) = 0
The firm’s objective is to maximize expected consumer surplus. The first and
second set of constraints require consumer’s incentive compatibility and individual
rationality, respectively. The last one is the zero-profit constraint for the firm.
First, I argue the optimal contracts do not involve cross subsidization because,
if the existing firms earn positive profit from one contract and negative profit from
the other, a new firm will enter and only offer the contract with positive profit. But
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then it violates the zero-profit constraint.
Next, I solve the optimal menu where each contract generates zero profit. That
is, −Lj +T (pj)−R(pj) = 0. Substituting Lj = R(pj)−T (pj) into the objective and
incentive constraints, the problem becomes
max γsT (ps) + γn [T (pn) + I(pn)]
s.t.
T (ps) ≥ T (pn)
T (pn) + I(pn) ≥ T (ps) + I(ps)
Obviously, pFBs and pFBn are the optimal solutions. Therefore, firms offer the
first-best prices under perfect competition.
1.8.3 Repeated Purchases
I now explore how the pricing result changes when the firm and the consumer interact
repeatedly. Some evidence from the credit card and cell phone market indicates the
low-price consumer may make payments based on past usage. For example, the
credit card issuer offers grace periods conditional on zero outstanding balance. If
the sophisticated consumer revolves her balance from the current grace period, she
loses the next grace period and is subject to a high APR. If she pays off the balance
by the end of the current grace period, the consumer gets an automatically renewed
grace period. In the cell phone example, AT&T specifies that if international data
usage exceeds 50% of total data usage for two consecutive months, the daily pass
feature may be removed.
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Consider a three-period model, where activities in Period 0 and 1 are exactly
the same as before. In Period 2, the consumer chooses again whether to consume,
conditional on observed current valuation. Assume valuations are i.i.d. over time.
In the dynamic setting, the firm can tune prices based on consumption history. So
we expand the contract as x ≡ (L, p, p1, p0), where L is the upfront fee, p is the price
in Period 1, p1 is the price in Period 2 if consumption occurred in the past, and
p0 is the price in Period 2 if consumption did not occur. The subscript of Period-2
prices stands for the quantity of past consumption. In addition, assume the consumer
retains the outside option within each period.
Analyzing the consumer utility of a certain contract relies on backward induc-
tion. Given contract x, the continuation utility for the sophisticated type following
“consume” in Period 1 is C(p1) and that following “not consume” in Period 1 is C(p0).
When making decisions in Period 1, the sophisticated type evaluates the return of
“consume”, h(v) + C(p1) − p, against the return of “not consume,” C(p0). Thus she
consumes if and only if v > h−1(p −∆s(p1, p0)), where ∆s(p1, p0) = C(p1) − C(p0).
The sophisticated consumer forms expected utility in Period 0 with correct belief,
given by
Us(x) =− L+ C(p0) +
∫ v¯
h−1(p−∆s(p1,p0))
[v − p+ ∆s(p1, p0)] dF (v)
=− L+ C(p0) + C(p−∆s(p1, p0))
Here, C(p0) can be interpreted as the expected base return in Period 1, while
C(p−∆s(p1, p0)) captures the expected premium return from choosing “consume.”
The naive consumer is unaware of the distortion h(·) and falsely perceives the
continuation utility as C(p1)+I(p1) if she consumes in Period 1, and as C(p0)+I(p0)
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if she does not consume. Standing at Period 0, the naive consumer falsely predicts
she will consume in Period 1 whenever v > p − ∆n(p1, p0), where ∆n(p1, p0) =
V1n(p1)− V0n(p0). The naive consumer’s expected utility in Period 0 is
Un(x) =− L+ C(p0) + I(p0) +
∫ v¯
p−∆n(p1,p0)
[v − p+ ∆n(p1, p0)] dF (v)
=− L+ C(p0) + I(p0) + C(p−∆n(p1, p0)) + I(p−∆n(p1, p0))
Similar to the previous interpretation, C(p0) + I(p0) and C(p − ∆n(p1, p0)) +
I(p−∆n(p1, p0)) represent the expected base return and premium return in Period
1 respectively. In contrast to the sophisticated type, the naive type perceives an
illusional surplus. If I(p1) > I(p0), we interpret the gap of Period-2 prices as an
additional commitment device, as it further limits Period-1 consumption. Formally,
we define the additional control on Period-1 consumption as Φ(p1, p0) = I(p1)−I(p0).
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to a menu of contracts
{xs, xn}, with xj intended for type j. Conditional on past usage k, the firm’s Period-
2 profit from type j is denoted by Πkj = T (pkj) − R(pkj), where k ∈ {0, 1} and
j ∈ {s, n}. Assuming the naive type does not learn about her naivete over time9 and
the firm knows each consumer’s actual behavior, expected profit in Period 0 is given
9If the naive type learns over time, the contract for the sophisticatd type is unaffacted. This is
because her contract is distorted relative to the first best to reduce the information rent in period
0.
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by
Π(xs, xn)
=γs
{
Ls + Π0s +
∫ v¯
h−1(ps−∆s)
[ps − a+ Π1s − Π0s] dF (v)
}
+ γn
{
Ln + Π0n +
∫ v¯
h−1(pn−∆n)
[pn − a+ Π1n − Π0n] dF (v)
}
where ∆j(p1j, p0j) is written in short as ∆j, for j ∈ {s, n}, to simplify notation.
The firm’s problem can be formalized as
max Π(xs, xn)
s.t. for i, j = s, n
Uj(xj) ≥ 0 (IRrj)
Uj(xj) ≥ Uj(xi) (ICrj )
The constraints are the usual individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints. This problem notably has the same structure as the static setting. I can
show IRrs and ICrn must be binding (see Appendix A for details) and get a relaxed
problem by ignoring the other constraints.
I define a new contract as zj = (yj, p1j, p0j), where yj = pj−∆j, j ∈ {s, n}. Then
there is a one-to-one correspondence between zj and xj. The relaxed problem is to
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choose the optimal {zrs , zrn} that solves
maxΠ(zs, zn)
=γsgT (zs)− γn[gI(zs) + g(zs)]
+ γn {gT (zn) + gI(zn)}
where
gT (z) = T (y) + T (p1)[1− F (h−1(y))] + T (p0)F (h−1(y))
gI(z) = I(y) + I(p1)[1− F (h−1(y))] + I(p0)F (h−1(y))
g(z) = C(y − Φs) + I(y − Φs)− C(y)− I(y)− Φs[1− F (h−1(y))]
and Φ(p1j, p0j) is written in short as Φj for j ∈ {s, n}.
gT and gI represent, respectively, the real total surplus and illusional surplus,
aggregated from three static contracts. Because gI + g equals the full information
rent, we can think of g as the dynamic information rent, which captures the impact
of repeated interaction. In the expression of g(zs), C(ys − Φs) + I(ys − Φs) is the
naive type’s expected premium return from choosing (Ls, ps), while C(ys) + I(ys) +
Φs[1 − F (h−1(ys))] is that only taking into account the direct effect of Φs on the
naive consumer’s expected return, via changing price payment. Thus g(zs) reflects
the indirect effect of Φs on the naive consumer’s expected return, via changing the
probability of Period-1 consumption. In this sense, g(zs) captures the role of Φs as
the additional control device at the utility level.
g, unlike gI , can be negative, hence making it less costly for the firm to screen
consumer naivete. In fact, g must be non-positive at the optimum because the con-
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tract with ps = p1s = p0s = p∗s already maximizes γsgT (zs)− γngI(zs), yet generates
g(zs) = 0. Intuitively, since the naive type is unaware of her time inconsistency, she
appreciates the additional commitment less relative to the sophsiticated type at the
optimum.
Proposition 1.14. Suppose Assumption 1.7 is satisfied, and γs and a are small.
The optimal menu {xrs, xrn} is characterized as follows:
(i) prn = pr1n = pr0n = p∗n > h(a).
(ii) If p∗s ≤ v, then prs = pr1s = pr0s = p∗s.
(iii) If p∗s > v, pr0s < p∗s < pr1s ≤ h(a).
Comparing the problem zrn = arg max gT (zn)+gI(zn) to the static problem, we can
immediately reach Proposition 1.14(i). When the static problem of solving p∗s takes a
corner solution, Proposition 1.14(ii) says the optimal contract for sophisticated type
in dynamic setting offers constant prices also at the corner. However, Proposition
1.14(iii) shows when p∗s is interior, the optimal contract for sophisticated type should
charge a higher price if the consumer has consumed before, compared to that if she
has not consumed. It suggests the firm can use history-dependent prices to better
commit the sophisticated type, at reduced information rent to the naive type.
1.9 Potential Alternative Explanations
This section explores alternative explanations of the coexistence of below- and above-
marginal-cost pricing in a menu of tariffs.
1.9.1 Consumer Unawareness
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Heidhues and Koszegi (2015) consider that some
consumers are not aware of the additional price when making purchase decisions.
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Consequently, firms have an incentive to lower transparent prices below cost but
charge high hidden prices. But for the industry examples I considered, pricing sched-
ules are usually linear and hence easy to comprehend. Even credit card agreements
carry the price information in a standardized format, ever since the implementation
of the 1988 Truth in Lending Act. A 2012 survey in Federal Reserve Bullentin shows
that among cardholders who sometimes paid in full, 92 percent were aware of their
annual percentage rates under the narrow definition.10 Therefore, credit card users
should expect borrowing is costly ex ante.
1.9.2 Private Willingness to Pay for Time-Inconsistent Consumers
Li, Xiao, and Yan (2014) assume consumers are all time-inconsistent and sophis-
ticated, but differ in their willingness to pay. They show the price for investment
goods is below the marginal cost for high-valuation users and above the marginal cost
for low-valuation users. The intuition is that high-valuation users pay the first-best
price, which is below the marginal cost as in DM, due to “no distortion at the top.”
The low-valuation users receive a downward-distorted quantity, which can be im-
plemented by above-marginal-cost prices. My model focuses on screening consumer
naivete of time inconsistency. This unconventional dimension of heterogeneity is
nonnegligible for the health club industry. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003) show
that membership users on average save $7 per expected visit by switching to short-
term passes, which suggests naive estimation of future demand. More importantly,
applying their theory to temptation goods can only generate overpricing, since the
first-best price is already above marginal cost.
10Consumer Experiences with Credit Cards. Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 2013.
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1.9.3 Overconfidence in Prediction Precision
Grubb (2009) examines the optimality of a three-part tariff, which consists of a
fixed fee, an included allowance of units for which the marginal price is zero, and
a high marginal price for additional usage. In his model, overconfident consumers
overestimate the likelihood of low future demand and are willing to overpay for them
ex ante in exchange for the allowance. At the same time, they underestimate the
likelihood of high future demand. When high demand occurs, they are overcharged
with high marginal prices. I provide an alternative channel that explains underpricing
in a tariff. The key difference is in consumer beliefs and the sophisticated consumer’s
demand for a commitment device. To test the explanatory power of the two models,
we can design an experiment as follows. First, we add a better commitment device
to the menu (for example, a pay-as-you-go plan with reasonable per-minute prices).
Then, in my model, consumers originally paying large allowances will switch to the
new plan. But those consumers in Grubb’s model may not have the incentive to
do so. Another difference is that, in Grubb (2009), the per-minute price inevitably
jumps to a high level as quantity increases. Hence, it cannot explain the offering of
unlimited cellphone plans, which is possible in my screening mechanism.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper has shown that when consumers are time-inconsistent and possibly naive,
it can be profitable for the firm to screen against consumer naivete. Since the naive
consumer views future utilization of any contract in a rosier way, the firm can exploit
naivete by providing an inefficient contract associated with a high illusional surplus,
but a low real consumer surplus. The contract chosen by the sophisticated consumer
is also inefficient and associated with a low illusional surplus because the firm wants
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to make it unattractive for the naive consumer.
My model partly explains the pricing anomaly that prices below and above
marginal cost can simultaneously exist in a single market of temptation goods. In
particular, it can be profitable for temptation good producers to charge the sophis-
ticated consumer a price below marginal cost with a large upfront fee, and the naive
consumer a price above marginal cost with a small upfront fee. Consequently, the
naive consumer is exploited and the sophisticated consumer overconsumes. This is in
sharp contrast to DM’s prediction on the first-best pricing. In the first-best setting
where consumer type is perfectly observable, it is optimal for the firm to set prices
above marginal cost regardless of consumer naivete, and overpricing, which helps cur-
tail the impulse to overconsume, serves as a commitment device to the sophisticated
consumer.
Under the condition that the consumer has nonzero probability of being naive
and relatively small probability of being sophisticated, the two-sided deviation from
marginal-cost pricing continues to hold if we consider the time-consistent consumer
as a possible type. But my result does rely on some market power. When the
market is competitive with zero entry cost, the optimal prices go back to the first
best. Hence, it highlights the role of competition in incentivizing firms to provide
the proper commitment device, when consumers’ intrinsic valuation is uncertain. In
the dynamic extension, I show that the firm can provide less expensive commitment
via history-contingent prices. My results provide new insights on commitment and
exploitation issues related to time inconsistency.
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1.11 Appendices
1.11.1 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.3. The monotonicity of T (p) immediately implies pFBs =
h(a) ≥ a. Whether pFBn is above the marginal cost relies on the monotonicity of
T (p) + I(p). For any p ≤ 0, T (p) + I(p) = Ev − a > 0. For any 0 < p < a,
T ′(p) + I ′(p)
=F (p)− F (h−1(p))− (p− a) f(h
−1(p))
h′(h−1(p))
≥0
Moreover, T ′(p) + I ′(p) > 0 when p = a. Thus we must have pFBn > a. 
Proof of Proposition 1.4. It is sufficient to show I(p∗n) ≥ I(p∗s). By comparing
the two objectives
p∗s = arg max [γs (T (p) + I(p))− I(p)]
p∗n = arg max [T (p) + I(p)]
the desired inequality follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 1.9. First, we want to show p∗s < h(a). By the interme-
diate value theorem, there exists t > h(a) such that T (t) = T (v) = E[v]− a.
(1) p∗s /∈ [t, +∞): p∗s ≥ t is dominated by p∗s = v, since I(v) = 0.
(2) p∗s ∈ (−∞, h(a)): Since a is small, h(a) < z. Let p1 = h(a). There exists
p2 > p1 such that I(p1) = I(p2). Then p1 dominates any p ∈ (p1, p2) following
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the monotonicity of T (p) and I(p). If p2 ≥ t, together with p∗s < t, we must have
p∗s < h(a).
If p2 < t, then there exists p3 < p1 such that T (p2) = T (p3), and p4 > p2 such
that I(p3) = I(p4). p3 obviously dominates any p ∈ (p2, p4). If p4 ≥ t, together
with p∗s < t, we must have p∗s < h(a). Otherwise, we can repeat the above steps to
recursively eliminate suboptimal p∗s.
If there exists a finite N such that pN ≥ t, then p∗s < h(a). Otherwise, I(pn)
converges to some constant I∗ as n goes to infinity. Let pˆ > h(a) be such that
I(pˆ) = I∗. To guarantee p∗s < h(a), we only need γsT (v) > γsT (p) − γnI(p) for all
p ∈ [pˆ, t). It suffices to have γs <
(
1 + T (pˆ)−T (v)
I(t)
)−1
. Therefore, when γs and a are
small, p∗s < h(a).
Second, we want to show a < p∗n. It follows immediately from Propositon 1.4,
since we already know a < pFBn = p∗n. In fact, we must have h(a) < p∗n, since
T (p) + I(p) is increasing on [a, h(a)] and T ′(h(a)) + I ′(h(a)) = I ′(h(a)) > 0.
Third, since C(p) + I(p) is decreasing and p∗s < p∗n, L∗s − L∗n = C(p∗s) + I(p∗s) −
C(p∗n)− I(p∗n) > 0.
Finally, we want to show p∗s < a for small γs. p∗s is increasing in γs for small γs,
since the function γs [T (p) + I(p)]−I(p) is supermodular in (p; γs) on [v, h(a)]×[0, 1].
p∗s is also continuous in γs for small γs, by the maximum theorem. When γs = 0,
p∗s = v. Therefore, p∗s < a when γs is small. 
Proof of Proposition 1.12. Based on Assumption 1.11, we discuss in two cases.
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Case 1: Suppose h(v) = αv with α > 1 and F (h−1(v)) is weakly convex on
(h(v), h(v¯)). Recall that the objectives of p∗n and p∗s.
∂2(T + I)
∂p∂α
=
2p− a
α2
f(
p
α
) +
p(p− a)
α3
f ′(
p
α
)
By convexity of F ( v
α
), ∂
2(T+I)
∂p∂α
> 0 for p ∈ (a, αv¯). Since p∗n ∈ (αa, αv¯), it is increasing
in α.
∂2(γsT − γnI)
∂p∂α
=
1
α2
f(
p
α
)
[
2p
α
− γsa− 2γnp
]
+
p
α3
f ′(
p
α
)
[ p
α
− γsa− γnp
]
When γs is small, ∂
2(γsT−γnI)
∂p∂α
< 0, which implies p∗s is decreasing in α.
Case 2: Suppose h(v) = v + τ with τ > 0, and f(v) is single-peaked at η and
concave on (h−1(η), h(η)).
∂2(T + I)
∂p∂τ
= f(p− τ) + (p− a)f ′(p− τ)
By the single peak assumption, ∂
2(T+I)
∂p∂τ
> 0 for p ∈ (a, η + τ). Since p∗n ∈ (a+ τ, z),
it is increasing in τ .
∂2(γsT − γnI)
∂p∂τ
= γsf(p− τ) + [γs(p− a)− τ ] f ′(p− τ)
When γs is small, ∂
2(γsT−γnI)
∂p∂τ
< 0 for p < a+ τ < η+ τ . Since a+ τ < z, we have
p∗s < a+ τ from Proposition 1.9. Thus p∗s is decreasing in τ . 
Proof of Proposition 1.13. Let h be the benchmark distortion function, and
h˜ be the more severe one. Define the preimage e = h−1(p) and e˜ = h˜−1(p). Thus
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the preimage corresponding to optimal prices as e∗j = h−1(p∗j) and e˜∗j = h˜−1(p˜∗j),
j ∈ {s, n}. Also define the counterpart of real total surplus and illusional surplus
using preimage as Te(e) =
∫ v¯
e
(v−a)dF (v), Ie(e) = ∫ e
h(e)
(v−h(e))dF (v) and I˜e(e) =∫ e
h˜(e)
(v−h˜(e))dF (v). Then e∗s = arg max
e
γsTe(e)−γnIe(e) and e˜∗s = arg max
e˜
γsTe(e˜)−
γnI˜e(e˜).
Moreover,
[I˜e(e)− Ie(e)]′ = I˜ ′(p)dp
de˜
− I ′(p)dp
de
= I˜ ′(p)h˜′(e)− I ′(p)h′(e)
≥ I˜ ′(p)h′(e)− I ′(p)h′(e)
Based on Assumption 1.11, we discuss the relative magintude of I˜ ′(p) vs. I ′(p)
in two case.
Case 1: Suppose h(v) = αv with α > 1 and F (h−1(v)) is weakly convex on
(h(v), h(v¯)). ∂2I
∂p∂α
=
(
1− 1
α
)
p
α2
[
2f( p
α
) + p
α
f ′( p
α
)
]
> 0 for p > 0. Thus [I˜e(e) −
Ie(e)]′ > 0 for e > 0.
Case 2: Suppose h(v) = v + τ with τ > 0, and f(v) is single-peaked at η and
concave on (h−1(η), h(η)). ∂2I
∂p∂τ
= τf ′(p − τ) > 0 for p < η + τ . Since a + τ < z,
we have p∗s < a + τ from Proposition 1.9. But then p∗s < a + τ < z < η + τ . Thus
[I˜e(e)− Ie(e)]′ > 0 for e < η.
In sum, we have [I˜e(e)− Ie(e)]′ > 0 for the relevant set to pick p∗s. It follows that
e˜∗s ≤ e∗s.
Similarly, e∗n = arg max
e
Te(e) + Ie(e) and e˜∗n = arg max
e˜
Te(e˜) + I˜e(e˜). [I˜e(e) −
Ie(e)]′ > 0 for the relevant set to pick p∗n as well. So we must have e˜∗n > e∗n.
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In the second-best setting, binding IRs implies CSSBs = C˜S
SB
s = 0. From Propo-
sition 1.9, e∗s < e∗n. Then we obtain a ranking as e˜∗s ≤ e∗s < e∗n < e˜∗n.
C˜S
SB
n = I˜e(e˜
∗
s)− I˜e(e˜∗n)
< I˜e(e∗s)− I˜e(e∗n)
≤ Ie(e∗s)− Ie(e∗n)
= CSSBn
where the first inequality holds as I˜e(·) is increasing below e˜∗n, the second inequality
is due to [I˜e(e)− Ie(e)]′ > 0 on the interval that covers (e˜∗s, e˜∗n). Therefore, C˜S
SB
n <
CSSBn .
Π˜SB = γsTe(e˜
∗
s) + γn
[
Te(e˜∗n) + I˜e(e˜
∗
n)− I˜e(e˜∗s)
]
≥ γsTe(e∗s) + γn
[
Te(e∗n) + I˜e(e
∗
n)− I˜(e∗s)
]
> γsTe(e
∗
s) + γn [Te(e
∗
n) + I(e
∗
n)− I(e∗s)]
= ΠSB
where the first inequality is due to the optimality of e˜∗s and e˜∗n, the second inequality
is due to [I˜e(e)− Ie(e)]′ > 0. Therefore, Π˜SB > ΠSB.
By Proposition 1.9, p∗s < h(a) < p∗n. Thus e˜s ≤ es < a < en < e˜n. By the
monotonicity of Te(e), we have W˜ SB < W SB. 
Lemma 1.15. Φs(pr1s, pr0s) ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.15. Suppose the optimal zrs = (yrs , pr1s, pr0s) generates
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Φs(p
r
1s, p
r
0s) < 0. With slight abuse of notation, let g(z) = g(ys,Φs).
∂g(ys,Φs)
∂Φs
= F (h−1(ys))− F (ys − Φs) ≤ 0 if Φs ≤ 0
Consider another contract z˜s = (yrs , p∗s, p∗s). Obviously, Φs(p∗s, p∗s) = 0 and by
monotonicity g(z˜s) ≤ g(zrs). But γsgT (z˜s)−γngI(z˜s) is higher than γsgT (zrs)−γngI(zrs),
from the definition of p∗s. But then the firm gets higher profit from z˜s than zrs , a
contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1.14. (ii) If p∗s ≤ v, then wlog zrs = (p∗s, p∗s, p∗s). To see
why, recall that ∂g(ys,Φs)
∂Φs
= F (h−1(ys)) − F (ys − Φs). If ys > h(v), then g(ys,Φs) is
minimized at Φs = ys − h−1(ys), with its minimum being −I(ys). But then
γsgT (zs)− γn[gI(zs) + g(zs)]
≤γsgT (zs)− γn[gI(zs)− I(ys)]
=γsT (ys) + [γsT (p1)− γnI(p1)][1− F (h−1(ys))] + [γsT (p0)− γnI(p0)]F (h−1(ys))
<γsgT (z
r
s)− γn[gI(zrs) + g(zrs)]
The last inequality holds because p∗s = arg max γsT (p) − γnI(p) and, when p∗s ≤ v,
I(p∗s) = 0. It implies any contract for the sophisticated type involving ys > h(v) is
dominated by zrs . Therefore, it is only possible that ys ≤ h(v).
Given ys ≤ h(v), g(ys,Φs) is constant for Φs ≥ 0. Due to Lemma 1.15 and
p∗s = arg max γsT (p)− γnI(p), it is optimal to set Φs = 0 by choosing zrs . Besides zrs ,
any contract with ps, p1s, p0s ≤ v is also optimal.
Lrn < L
r
s follows from the binding ICn and p∗n > p∗s.
(iii) The proof consists of several steps.
42
(1) Φs(pr1s, pr0s) > 0.
By Lemma 1.15, it is enough to show Φs = 0 is suboptimal. Suppose Φs = 0,
then the optimal solution is pr0s = pr1s = yr = p∗s. Since p∗s ∈ (v, h(v¯)) is an interior
optimizer, γsT ′(p∗s) = γnI ′(p∗s). In the following, we want to check if pr0s = p∗s is
optimal, given pr1s = yr = p∗s.
Taking derivative of γsgT (zs)− γn[gI(zs) + g(zs)] with respect to p0s and evaluate
at pr0s = pr1s = yr = p∗s, we have
γsT
′(p∗s)F (h
−1(p∗s))− γnI ′(p∗s)F (p∗s)
=γnI
′(p∗s)[F (h
−1(p∗s))− F (p∗s)]
<0
But a downward deviation of pr0s strictly increases profit. Therefore, Φs(pr1s, pr0s) >
0.
(2) pr1s, pr0s ≤ h(a).
Given any ys and p1s,
pr0s = arg max γsT (p0s)F (h
−1(ys))− γn[gI(z) + g(z)]
∂[gI(z) + g(z)]
∂p0s
= I ′(p0s)F (ys − Φs)
Under Assumption 1.7, pr0s ≤ h(a) following similar proof of Proposition 5. Sim-
ilarly, we can show pr1s ≤ h(a).
(3) pr0s < pr1s.
By Assumption 1.7, I(p) is nondecreasing when p ≤ h(a). Since p1s, p0s ≤ h(a)
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and Φs(pr1s, pr0s) > 0, we must have pr0s < pr1s.
(4) h−1(yrs) < yrs − Φs(pr1s, pr0s).
pr0s = arg max
 [γsT (p0s)− γnI(p0s)]F (h
−1(ys))
−γn [C(ys − Φs) + I(ys − Φs) + I(p0s)(1− F (h−1(ys)))]

pr1s = arg max
 [γsT (p1s)− γnI(p1s)](1− F (h
−1(ys)))
−γn [C(ys − Φs) + I(ys − Φs)− I(p1s)(1− F (h−1(ys)))]

∂
∂p0s
[C(ys − Φs) + I(ys − Φs) + I(p0s)(1− F (h−1(ys)))]
=I ′(p0s)[F (ys − Φs)− F (h−1(ys))]
∂
∂p1s
[C(ys − Φs) + I(ys − Φs)− I(p1s)(1− F (h−1(ys)))]
=I ′(p1s)[F (h−1(ys))− F (ys − Φs)]
Therefore, if h−1(yrs) ≥ yrs − Φs(pr1s, pr0s), we will get pr0s ≥ p∗s ≥ pr1s, which
contradicts (2) and (3).
(5) pr0s < p∗s < pr1s, which is immediately implied by (4).
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maxΠ(zs, zn)
=γsgT (zs)− γn[gI(zs) + g(zs)]
+ γn {gT (zn) + gI(zn)}
where
gT (z) = T (y) + T (p1)[1− F (h−1(y))] + T (p0)F (h−1(y))
gI(z) = I(y) + I(p1)(1− F (y)) + I(p0)F (y)
g(z) = C(y − Φs) + I(y − Φs)− C(y)− I(y)− Φs(1− F (y))
(6) Finally we need to show ICs is satisfied, which is equivalent to gI(zrs)+g(zrs) ≤
gI(z
r
n) + g(z
r
n) given binding ICn and IRs.
(a) If p∗s ≤ v, zrs = (p∗s, p∗s, p∗s) and zrn = (p∗n, p∗n, p∗n). Then we are back to the
static problem. ICs is obviously satisfied.
(b) Consider p∗s > v. zrn = (p∗n, p∗n, p∗n) implies g(zrn) = 0. Suppose for a contra-
diction that gI(zrs) + g(zrs) > gI(zrn) + g(zrn) = gI(zrn). Let p∗s = (p∗s, p∗s, p∗s) be the
contract offering a constant price p∗s. Then
γsgT (z
r
s)− γn[gI(zrs) + g(zrs)]
<γsgT (z
r
s)− γngI(zrn)
≤γsgT (p∗s)− γngI(p∗s)
It implies zrs is strictly dominated by p∗s in the relaxed problem, a contradiction.

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1.11.2 Appendix B
In this appendix, I show the two-part tariff is optimal from the mechanism design
perspective. By the revelation principle, we can consider the direct mechanism de-
noted by Γ =
(
L(θˆ0), p(θˆ0, θˆ1), q(θˆ0, θˆ1)
)
. At the beginning of Period 0, the consumer
is asked to report her type θ0 ∈ {s, n}. Conditional on her report θˆ0 ∈ {s, n}, the
firm charges L(θˆ0). If the consumer refuses to pay L(θˆ0), the contractual relationship
terminates and the consumer receives zero payoff from the outside option. Other-
wise, the contractual relationship extends to Period 1. At the beginning of Period 1,
the consumer privately observes her current valuation θ1 ≡ h(v) ∈ [h(v), h(v¯)] and
reports it as θˆ1 ∈ [v, h(v¯)]. Conditional on report history (θˆ0, θˆ1), the firm charges
p1(θˆ0, θˆ1). If the consumer refuses to pay p1(θˆ0, θˆ1), she gets zero payoff from the
outside option. Otherwise, she receives the good with probability q1(θˆ0, θˆ1).
Three points are noteworthy. First, the consumer’s report θˆ1 summarizes her
private information on Period-1 valuation h(v), rather than Period-0 valuation v.
This follows Galperti (2015) and provides an easy way to study the truth-telling
mechanism when the two types differ in perception of future behaviors. Second, the
message space for report θˆ1 is [v, h(v¯)]. This is the smallest space we can restrict
to without loss of generality. If the message space is smaller than [v, h(v¯)], then we
miss some states that may occur in the naive type’s mind. Lastly, due to Period-1
participation constraint, it is optimal for the firm to sequentially charge the consumer.
Type j’s Period-1 utility, conditional on current valuation θ1 and report history
(θˆ0, θˆ1), is given by
U1θ0(θˆ0, θˆ1; θ1) = θ1q(θˆ0, θˆ1)− p(θˆ0, θˆ1)
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If the consumer reports θ1 truthfully, her Period-1 utility is
U1θ0(θˆ0, θ1) = θ1q(θˆ0, θ1)− p(θˆ0, θ1)
Incentive compatibility in Period 1 requires the consumer has no incentive to
misreport her current valuation given truthful past report θ0:
U1θ0(θ0, θ1) ≥ U1θ0(θ0, θˆ1; θ1) ∀θˆ1, θ1 ∈ Θ, θˆ0, θ0 ∈ {s, n}
Individual rationality in Period 1 requires the consumer receive utility no less
than the outside option:
U1θ0(θ0, θ1) ≥ 0 ∀θ1 ∈ Θ, θ0 ∈ {s, n}
Type j’s utility in Period 0 conditional on reporting θˆ0 is given by
U0θ0(θˆ0) = −L(θˆ0) + Eθ0 [U1θ0(θˆ0, θ1)− (θ1 − h−1(θ1))q(θˆ0, θ1)1{θ0 = s}]
Incentive compatibility in Period 0 requires
U0θ0(θ0) ≥ U0θ0(θˆ0) ∀θˆ0, θ0 ∈ {s, n}
Individual rationality in Period 0 requires
U0θ0(θ0) ≥ 0 ∀θ0 ∈ {s, n}
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The firm solves the following mechanism design problem:
max γs {L(s) + Es[p(s, θ1)− aq(s, θ1)]}+ γn {L(n) + Es[p(n, θ1)− aq(n, θ1)}
s.t. ∀θˆ1, θ1 ∈ Θ, ∀θ0 ∈ {s, n}
U1θ0(θ0, θ1) ≥ U1θ0(θ0, θˆ1; θ1) (IC1)
U0θ0(θ0) ≥ U0θ0(θˆ0) (IC0θ0)
U1θ0(θ0, θ1) ≥ 0 (IR1)
U0θ0(θ0) ≥ 0 (IR0θ0)
q(θ0, θ1) ∈ [0, 1] (F)
Following the standard approach11, we have IC1 is satisfied if and only if (E)
∂U1θ0(θ0, θ1)/∂θ1 = q(θ0, θ1) and (M) q(θ0, θ1) is non-decreasing in θ1 for each θ0.
Taking integral of (E), we have
θ1q(θ0, θ1)− p(θ0, θ1) =
∫ θ1
v
q(θ0, θ˜1)dθ˜1 + U θ0
In particular, the sophsiticated consumer ex post gets
θ1q(s, θ1)− p(s, θ1) =
∫ θ1
h(v)
q(s, θ˜1)dθ˜1 + u
for any possible realization θ1 ∈ [h(v), h(v¯)], where the lower bound of surplus u =∫ h(v)
v
q(s, θ˜1)dθ˜1 + U s.
Moreover, U0n(θˆ0) ≥ U0s(θˆ0) for any report θˆ0, which implies the naive type
11See proofs in Courty and Li (2000), for example.
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remains to be the high type. Similar to previous analysis, we can show IC0n and
IR0s are binding, while IR0n is nonbinding. Thus
L(s) =Es[h
−1(θ1)q(s, θ1)− p(s, θ1)]
L(n) =L(s) + En[θ1q(n, θ1)− p(n, θ1)]
− En[θ1q(s, θ1)− p(s, θ1)]
Making use of the expressions for L(s) and L(n), we can obtain the relaxed
problem as follows:
maxγsEs[
(
h−1(θ1)− a
)
q(s, θ1)]
+ γn
{
Es[h
−1(θ1)q(s, θ1)− p(s, θ1)]− En[θ1q(s, θ1)− p(s, θ1)]
}
+ γn {En[θ1q(n, θ1)− p(n, θ1)] + Es[p(n, θ1)− aq(n, θ1)]}
Since p(θ0, θ1) = θ1q(θ0, θ1) −
∫ θ1
v
q(θ0, θ˜1)dθ˜1 − U θ0 , we can further simplify the
objective function. Because U θ0 does not affect firm profit, it can be set to zero
without loss. The firm chooses q(n, θ1) to solve
max
∫ h(v¯)
v
q(n, θ1) [(θ1 − a)fs(θ1)− (F (θ1)− Fs(θ1))] dθ1
and q(s, θ1) to solve
max
∫ h(v¯)
h(v)
[(
h−1(θ1)− γsa− γnθ1
)
fs(θ1) + γn (F (θ1)− Fs(θ1))
]
q(s, θ1)dθ1
−
∫ h(v)
v
γn (1− F (θ1)) q(s, θ1)dθ1
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As this is a linear program, the optimal quantity should take value 1 whenever the
coefficient is positive and take value 0 whenever the coefficient is negative. But note
that the original problem should also take into account the monotonicity condition
(M). As a result, the coefficient can only grow from 0 to 1 as θ1 increases. Given θ0,
the optimal solution q(θ0, θ1) must be a monotone step function of θ1 taking values
at 0 or 1. This is the typical “Bang-Bang” solution for a linear problem with fixed
quantity. Therefore, two-part tariffs are optimal. For more discussion, the reader
can refer to Myerson (1981).
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Chapter 2
Workforce Flexibility and Procrastination
Control
2.1 Introduction
Workforce flexibility, widely promoted in recent years, is about an employee and
an employer making changes to when, where and how a person will work to better
meet individual and business needs.1 According to a work-life survey2, over 70%
of employees at Bristol-Myers Squibb, a US pharmaceutical company, report that
they have access to flexible work options, either formal or informal. In early 2017,
the city council in Copenhagen agreed unanimously to provide all municipal workers
greater control over their schedules. Being productivity-enhancing and cost-effective,
greater flexibility in work arrangement is viewed as beneficial for both employer and
employee.
However, when workers are prone to procrastination, greater flexibility can harm
their work quality and personal well-being. Project-based businesses are particularly
susceptible to procrastination. Typical examples include information technology and
business process outsourcing (BPO). Managers working at BPO service providing
1Partners, Workplace flexibility: Advice, Training, Research, 2010
2Richman, Johnson and Noble, Business Impacts for Flexibility: An Imperative for Expansion,
Washington, DC: Corporate Voices for Working Families, 2011.
companies take projects from clients and assign the projects to high-skilled employ-
ees. Their key objective is to satisfy the clients’ requirements within the agreed time
frame. Wu, Ramachandran and Krishnan (2013) interviewed with a project man-
ager and found that employees tend to procrastinate when the deadline is far away.
Yet cramming during later stages of the project potentially causes mistakes. Given
that procrastination is not uncommon3, how should managers trade off workforce
flexibility with procrastination control?
We set up a principal-agent model to address this question. The worker (agent)
is assumed to be time-inconsistent and naive. He is unaware ex ante that he tends to
postpone production effort. The manager (principal) chooses how to allocate a given
amount of work intertemporally. Owing to environmental uncertainty, as reflected in
time-varying labor productivity privately learned by the worker, flexibility in work-
load allocation is desirable. But the worker is unable to commit to participation
at later dates. To deal with procrastination, the manager finds it optimal to seek
commitment to a minimum level of work in interim periods. Therefore, the optimal
contract trades off flexibility vs. commitment.
Our model features nonnegative transfers from the manager to the worker. Con-
ditional on the worker’s productivity, a contract specifies the way to allocate work
across time and the wage payment. Given productivity, if the intertemporal alloca-
tion indicated by the contract coincides that chosen by the worker who minimizes
ex post effort, the contract provides flexibility. If they differ and, in particular, the
contract requires higher early work, then the contract imposes commitment. The
commitment device is stronger if a higher output the contract demands.
First, we show that the optimal production and compensation scheme depends
3Harriott and Ferrari (1996) finds 20% survey-respondents report themselves as chronic pro-
crastinators.
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on the manager’s objective (profit vs. welfare maximization), as well as the degree
of the worker’s time inconsistency. When the worker is time-consistent, it is always
optimal to delegate the production decision to the worker, and the optimal compen-
sation only depends on final output. This is because a project can be completed at
the lowest cost, when the worker flexibly adjusts production based on private knowl-
edge of productivity. But when the worker is time-inconsistent, a welfare-maximizing
manager would want to overcome procrastionation by rewarding early production. In
contrast, when a profit-maximizing manager deals with a time-inconsistent worker,
it is optimal to fully delegate the production decision when time inconsistency is
mild, again out of cost-efficiency concerns. When time inconsistency is severe, the
profit-maximizing manager optimally requires a minimum level of output in the early
period, to control procrastination only for workers who are most unproductive ini-
tially.
Second, if the manager cares more about profit or the worker’s time inconsistency
becomes more severe, a larger set of initially unproductive workers will be pooled to
produce the required minimum output. This can be interpreted as “reduced flexibil-
ity at the bottom”. The reason is that when time inconsistency is more severe, the
manager needs to impose a wider range of commitment to workers, in order to guar-
antee project completion. Granting unproductive workers flexibility in production is
costly, since it requires higher compensation to prevent them from quitting. Hence,
when the manager cares more about profit, she expands the pooled group to reduce
cost.
We also discuss several alternative model specifications. First, our results do not
change for sophisticated workers as long as the project generates a large lump sum
return upon completion. Second, when the manager’s payoff is continuously additive
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in per-period output and time inconsistency is severe, the profit-maximizing contract
demands rigid yet low levels of early production, while late production is committed
to efficient levels and more responsive to productivity shocks. This is because the
manager can treat procrastination period by period when technology is time inde-
pendent. Here, early production helps to relieve the worker’s liquidity constraint and
the manager can extract the full expected surplus from late production. Lastly, when
the payoff for a completed project is not large enough, ceasing the project in interim
periods is efficient sometimes. But then commitment of early output causes social in-
efficiency. The profit-maximizing contract may become a weaker commitment device
as time inconsistency intensifies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss related literature
in Section 2.1.1. Section 2.2 presents the setup of our principal-agent model. Section
2.3 studies properties of the optimal contract, followed by additional discussions in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to the literature on time-inconsistent procrastination.
For example, Akerlof (1991), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2008) and
Wu, Ramachandran and Krishnan (2014). Among them, O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999b) and Wu, Ramachandran and Krishnan (2014) are in the principal-agent
setting. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) only considers the principal’s welfare-
maximizing incentive. Under a common belief in the task-cost distribution, the
efficient work schedule can be implemented by a wage scheme fast declining in the
time the project is completed. But we also consider the profit-maximizing incen-
tive for the principal and find it optimal to offer a constant wage as long as the
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project is completed by the final period. Another difference from O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999b) is that we allow the principal to contract on interim output. When
the worker is a serious procrastinator, it can be profit-maximizing to impose partial
deadlines.
Similar to us, Wu, Ramachandran and Krishnan (2014) are also concerned with
the management of a divisible project for a profit-maximizing manager. But they
assume the worker is associated with fixed productivity and hence the principal does
not demand flexibility. They restrict wage schemes to be linear in per-period output.
But we show that the optimal wage can be nonlinear in the midterm output. In
particular, the optimal wage jumps down to zero if the worker fails to meet the
interim requirement.
Somewhat related, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008) study procrastination on long-
term projects and show that a socially worse behavior can exist–people may begin a
project but fail to complete it. However, the optimal design of incentive provision is
not their concern.
While the aforementioned papers generate procrastination using time-inconsistent
preferences, Weinschenk (2016) studies procrastination generated via moral hazard
in teams. In his model, players may procrastinate to exploit future externalities of
team production. The team’s ability to write discriminatory contracts is important to
improve efficiency, but project deadlines are not beneficial. But we show that partial
deadlines can effectively combat procrastination generated by time inconsistency.
We also follow the literature on the optimal tradeoff of commitment vs flexibility.
Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) study the optimal commitment device with-
out tranfer. In their model, the agent is subject to private taste shocks, and has the
incentive to overconsume from the principal’s viewpoint. The principal can impose
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a set of choice alternatives, conditional on the agent’s reported taste. Because under
the fully separating allocation, the agent with the highest taste overconsumes relative
to what the principal would like. The optimal solution must involve bunching at the
top, i.e., a minimum-savings rule. Compared to them, we consider the optimal pro-
duction scheme with transfer. When the principal cares about efficiency, i.e., there is
a direct preference conflict between the principal and the agent as in Amador, Wern-
ing and Angeletos (2006), the efficient production scheme can be implemented by a
wage schedule increasing in interim output. More interestingly, when the principal
cares about profit and the agent has serious procrastination, partial deadlines paral-
lel to the minimum-savings rule are optimal. But when procrastination is mild, fully
delegating the intertemporal production decision to the agent is profit-maximizing.
Galperti (2015) investigates the optimal commitment devices with transfers while
screening agents’ degree of time inconsistency. His analysis shows that the range of
allocation is smaller for the time-inconsistent-and-sophisticated agent than that for
the time-consistent agent. Halac and Yared (2014, 2017) examine the tradeoff of
commitment and flexibility in capital budgeting and fiscal policy.
2.2 Model Setup
Consider a three-period principal-agent model, with time indexed as t = 0, 1, 2. At
period 0, the manager (principal, she) hires a worker (agent, he) to complete a long-
term project. At the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, the worker privately observes
his realized productivity θt. Assume θt is i.i.d. and follows the distribution F (θt) on
Θ = [θ, θ¯] with θ > 0. The expectation of θt is µ. Within each period t = 1, 2, the
worker can produce qt at cost θtc(qt). For tractability, assume c is twice continuously
differentiable, in addition to c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. When θt is low,
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we say the worker’s productivity is high, and vice versa. If the aggregate production
falls below a constant level q¯ (i.e., q1 + q2 < q¯), the project is uncompleted and
the manager gets zero payoff. Otherwise, the project is completed and the manager
receives a constant payoff V . Motivated by industry practices, we assume V is so
large that the project completed for sure.4 Given that q1 = q ∈ [0, q¯], we must have
q2 = q¯ − q.
Let wt be the worker’s wage compensation in period t. The worker is subject to
liquidity constraints, and hence the wage cannot be negative. Given a wage scheme
(w1, w2), the worker’s expected utility in Period 0 is E[w1− θ1c(q) +w2− θ2c(q¯− q)].
An important assumption in our model is that the worker can be time-inconsistent.
Specifically, the worker perceives a higher marginal disutility of current effort. Let
γ ≥ 1 capture his degree of time inconsistency. The higher γ is, the more time-
inconsistent the worker is. In Period 1, the worker’s utility becomes w1 − γθ1c(q) +
E[w2 − θ2c(q¯ − q)]. Hence, he wants to postpone effort spending to the next period.
The procrastination problem repeats in Period 2 and his period-2 utility is given
by w2 − γθ2c(q¯ − q). We assume the worker is naive about his time inconsistency.
Thus the worker only takes into account his current incentive to procrastinate, if
any, when making decisions. While this assumption seems extreme, it makes the
problem much more tractable. It is also without loss of behavioral foundation, as
argued by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b), much day-to-day procrastination seems
to be characterized by a large degree of naivete. Section 2.4.1 discusses how the
results will change if the worker is sophisticated.
Following the usual interpretation5, we take the worker’s preference in Period 0
4If a manager fails to deliver project outcomes to clients on time with satisfactory quality, the
negative reputation shock can be disastrous due intense competition in many industries. See Wu,
Ramachandran and Krishnan (2014) for more discussion.
5We choose the ex ante social welfare as our evaluation criterion, following much literature on
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as his long-run preference, which in turn is used for welfare evaluation.
Definition 2.1. The efficient production schedule qe(θ1) maximizes ex-ante social
welfare V −E[θ1c(q)+µc(q¯−q)]. And qe(θ1) is given by θ1c′(qe(θ1)) = µc′(q¯−qe(θ)).
The manager is time-consistent, and aware of the worker’s time inconsistency.
The expected payoff to the manager at Period 0 is
E [σ (V − [θ1c(q) + µc(q¯ − q)]) + (1− σ) (V − w1 − w2)]
where σ is the weight on welfare. When σ = 1, the manager is a pure welfare-
maximizer; when σ = 0, the manager is a pure profit-maximizer.
Additionally, we assume that the worker’s output within each period is not per-
fectly observable. The worker can hide any fraction of his output and present it
later without any cost. Therefore, the manager cannot directly control the actual
production, exacerbating asymmetric information. We use this assumption to rule
out the unrealistic outcome of a decreasing wage schedule in period-1 output.6 Let
y be the worker’s output observed by the manager in Period 1. But note that the
worker’s effort cost only depends on the actual output q.
2.3 The Optimal Contract
Our problem is to solve the optimal intertemporal workload allocation and compen-
sation scheme for the manager. Without loss of generality, we focus on the direct
time inconsistency. See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Heidhues and Koszegi (2010), Galperti
(2015) for example.
6The usual assumption of costless output burning is not enough to generate a nondecreasing
wage schedule in output. This is because, if the worker burns any output, he needs to produce
more to meet the aggregate level q¯. Thus, output burning is costly in an indirect way.
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truth-telling mechanism {y(θ1), (wt(θt))t=1,2}. θt is the history of reports from Pe-
riod 1 to t. The timeline is given as follows. At Period 0, the manager and the
worker sign the labor contract. At the beginning of Period 1, the worker observes
his realized productivity θ1, and reports θˆ1 to the manager. Conditional on his re-
port, the manager compensates the worker w1(θˆ1) and requires an observable output
y(θˆ1) by the end of Period 1. Because of free storage, the worker actually produces
q(θˆ1; θ1) ≥ y(θˆ1). Moving to Period 2, the worker observes his productivity θ2 and
reports θˆ2 to the manager. Conditional on his report, the manager compensates the
worker w2(θˆ1, θˆ2) and requires that the project be completed. If the worker fails to
comply with the manager’s requirement, he receives the continuation utility from his
outside option, normalized to zero.
In Period 2, The worker’s utility conditional on reporting (θˆ1, θˆ2) is given by
U2(θˆ1, θˆ2; θ2) = w2(θˆ1, θˆ2)− γθ2c(q¯ − q(θˆ1; θ1))
If he reports θ2 truthfully, his utility is U2(θˆ1, θ2) = w2(θˆ1, θ2)−γθ2c(q¯−q(θˆ1; θ1)).
Incentive compatibility in Period 2 requires that the worker has no incentive
to misreport θ2 given past report θˆ1. That is, U2(θˆ1, θ2) ≥ U2(θˆ1, θˆ2; θ2) for all
θˆ1, θˆ2, θ2 ∈ Θ.
In Period 1, the worker’s utility conditional on reporting θˆ1 is
U1(θˆ1; θ1) = w1(θˆ1)− γθ1c(q(θˆ1; θ1)) + E[w2(θˆ1, θ2)− µc(q¯ − q(θˆ1; θ1))]
If he reports θ1 truthfully, his utility is U1(θ1) = w1(θ1)−γθ1c(q(θ1))+E[w2(θ1, θ2)−
µc(q¯ − q(θ1))].
Incentive compatibility in Period 1 requires that the worker has no incentive to
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misreport θ1. Due to the unobservability of actual output, given realized θ1 and
reported θˆ1, the worker can deviate to any q(θˆ1; θ1) as long as q(θˆ1; θ1) ≥ y(θˆ1),
which weakly raises the benefit of not reporting θ1 truthfully. Taking into account
the worker’s freedom to choose any q(θˆ1; θ1) ≥ y(θˆ1), incentive compatibility requires
that reporting θˆ1 = θ1 maximizes U1(θˆ1; θ1), subject to q(θˆ1; θ1) ≥ y(θˆ1) for all θˆ1 ∈ Θ
.
Finally, the worker’s expected utility at Period 0 is
U0 = E [w1(θ1) + w2(θ1, θ2)− θ1c(q(θ1))− µc(q¯ − q(θ1))]
Besides the incentive constraints, the worker also faces a set of participation
constraints. Conditional on truthful reporting, we require the worker to be no better
off if he quits the project at any period: U2(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, U1(θ1) ≥ 0, U0 ≥ 0.
The manager’s problem can be formalized as below.
max−E [σ (θ1c(q(θ1)) + θ2c(q¯ − q(θ1))) + (1− σ) (w(θ1) + w2(θ1, θ2))]
s.t. for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ
U0 ≥ 0 (IR0)
U1(θ1) ≥ 0 (IR1)
U2(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0 (IR2)
θ1 = arg max
θˆ1
{U1(θˆ1; θ1) : q(θˆ; θ) ≥ y(θ)} (IC1)
θ2 = arg max
θˆ2
{U2(θ1, θˆ2; θ2)} (IC2)
where IRt is the participation constraint in period t, and ICt is the incentive con-
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straint in period t.
The problem can be considerably simplified in the following way:
(i) IR0 can be deleted, as it follows immediately from IR1.
(ii) IC2 is equivalent to w2(θˆ1, θ2) ≥ w2(θˆ1, θˆ2) for all θˆ1, θˆ2, θ2 ∈ Θ. Consequently,
we must have w2(θˆ1, θ2) constant in θ2. The scheme w2(θˆ1, θ2) can be simplified as
w2(θˆ1).
(iii) Following (ii), U2(θ1, θ2) is decreasing in θ2, so we can replace IR2 with
U2(θ1, θ¯) ≥ 0.
(iv) It is optimal for the manager to make wage payments only at the final
period. To see why, consider a sequence of nonnegative payments w1(θ1), w2(θ1).
Now take an alternative compensation scheme that pays zero in Period 1 and w1(θ1)+
w2(θ1) in Period 2 conditional on project completion. Because the project is always
completed on the equilibrium path, such an alternative scheme provides the same
incentive for truthful reporting of θ1, as the original scheme. However, the alternative
scheme relaxes the participation constraint in Period 2, without affecting any other
participation constraints. Thus the one-time payment at the final period weakly
dominates the sequential payments. In the following, we simplify our mechanism by
assuming w1(θ1) = 0 and w2(θ1) equals the total payment w(θ1).
Next, we want to treat the incentive constraint IC1. Denote qd(θ1) as the period-1
output when the worker minimizes effort. That is, qd(θ1) solves
max−θ1γc(q)− µc(q¯ − q)
Thus θ1γc′(qd(θ1)) = µc′(q¯ − qd(θ1)). Since the worker can hide output, in the
truth-telling direct mechanism, q(θ1) = qd(θ1) if y(θ1) ≤ qd(θ1). As a result, the
worker does not privately store any output in Period 1, if y(θ1) ≥ qd(θ1).
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Definition 2.2. A contract is storage-free if, (SF ) y(θ1) ≥ qd(θ1), the manager’s
required period-1 output is no less than that when the worker is free to choose.
Since, on the equilibrium path, the manager knows exactly the action taken by
the worker at each state θ1, she can transform any optimal contract to an equivalent
storage-free contract without loss.
Lemma 2.3. If an optimal contract exists, there is a storage-free contract that is
optimal.
In the following, we restrict attention to the optimal storage-free contract, with
y(θ1) ≥ qd(θ1) and the incentive constraint θ1 = arg maxU1(θˆ1; θ1). Lemma 2.4
shows that the we can replace IC1 with the monotonicity constraint on production
y(θ) and the envelope condition on the value function in Period 1, V (θ). Lemma
2.5 indicates that the worker’s worst utility in Period 2 is nonincreasing in θ1, in the
truth-telling direct mechanism.
Lemma 2.4. The period-1 incentive compatibility IC1 is equivalent to the monotonic-
ity condition (M) y(θ1) nonincreasing, plus the local incentive condition (ICFOC)
V ′(θ1) = −γc(y(θ1)).
Taking integral of ICFOC, we can immediately get w(θ1) =
∫ θ¯
θ1
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜ +
γθ1c(y(θ1)) + µc(q¯ − y(θ1)) + k.
Lemma 2.5. If M and ICFOC are satisfied, then the worker’s period-2 utility
U2(θ1, θ¯) is non-increasing in θ1.
By Lemma 2.5, IR2 is equivalent to w(θ¯) ≥ γθ¯c(q¯ − y(θ¯)), or equivalently (IR2)
k ≥ R(θ¯, y(θ¯)), by plugging the expression of w(θ¯). The expression of R(θ¯, y(θ¯)) is
given by
R(θ¯, y(θ¯)) ≡ (γθ¯ − µ)c(q¯ − y(θ¯))− γθ¯c(y(θ¯))
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R(θ¯, y(θ¯)) represents the difference between the highest production cost in Period
2 and 1. Besides that, we have IR1 is equivalent to (IR1) k ≥ 0. Finally, the
manager’s problem can be transformed into
max−E [σ[θ1c(y) + µc(q¯ − y)] + (1− σ)w(θ1)]
s.t.
y(θ1) ≥ qd(θ1) (SF)
k ≥ 0 (IR1)
k ≥ R(θ¯, y(θ¯)) (IR2)
y(θ1) is non-increasing (M)
w(θ1) =
∫ θ¯
θ1
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜+γθ1c(y(θ1)) + µc(q¯ − y(θ1)) + k (ICFOC)
Notably, the structure of this problem differs from a typical contracting prob-
lem in constraints SF and IR2. In the following, we first characterize the optimal
contract when IR2 does not bind, and then we identify under what condition IR2
binds. Lastly, we characterize the optimal contract when IR2 is binding.
2.3.1 Nonbinding IR2
We impose the following monotone hazard rate assumption throughout the paper.
It guarantees the monotonicity constraint M is satisfied.
Assumption 2.6. F (θ)
f(θ)
is nondecreasing.
Proposition 2.7 shows that when IR2 does not affect the manager’s decision, the
optimal contract yn(θ1) takes the interior solution subject to SF .
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Proposition 2.7. If IR2 is nonbinding, the optimal contract satisfies yn(θ1) =
max{qd(θ1), yint(θ1)}. yint(θ1) is given by
[
σθ1 + (1− σ)γ
(
θ1 +
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
)]
c′(yint(θ1)) = µc′(q¯ − yint(θ1)) (2.1)
and w(θ1) is given by ICFOC with k = 0.
Terms in the left-side bracket in (2.1) represent the worker’s virtual cost. Due
to asymmetric information, the virtue cost exceeds the actual one by (1− σ)γ F (θ1)
f(θ1)
,
leading to delay in production. Notice that the virtual cost increases in manager’s
weight on profit, given by 1 − σ, and the degree of time inconsistency, given by γ.
The reason is that the manager who cares more about profit would use the revealed
information against the worker, and hence the worker is less willing to tell the truth.
As to the worker with higher degree of time inconsistency, he has more incentive to
lie and hence delay effort. The interpretation of (2.1) is that the marginal cost of
producing one unit of output today should equal the marginal benefit of reducing
one unit of output tomorrow.
Corollary 2.8. With nonbinding IR2, the optimal contract has the following prop-
erties:
(i) For any σ ∈ [0, 1] and any γ ≥ 1, yn(θ1) is strictly decreasing and w is
nondecreasing in yn on [yn(θ¯), yn(θ)].
(ii) For σ = 1 and any γ ≥ 1, yn(θ1) = qe(θ1); w is strictly increasing in yn on
[yn(θ¯), yn(θ)] if γ > 1, and w is constant in yn on [yn(θ¯), yn(θ)] if γ = 1.
(iii) For σ = 0 and any γ ≥ 1, yn(θ1) = qd(θ1) and w is constant on [yn(θ¯), yn(θ)];
(iv) If σ decreases or γ increases, yn(θ1) is nonincreasing for any fixed θ1.
Corollary 2.8 examines the contract properties under different scenarios when
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IR2 is nonbinding. First, in general the manager postpones more work to Period
2 when productivity is lower in Period 1. Meanwhile, the compensation scheme
never penalizes early production. Second, if the manager is welfare-maximizing,
workload allocation is efficient. The manager delegates the production decision to
the worker when the worker is time-consistent, by offering a constant wage conditional
on project completion. In contrast, when the worker is a procrastinator, the manager
inspects progress at the midterm and rewards early production. Third, if the manager
only cares about profit, she offers a constant wage and delegates the intertemporal
production decision to the worker. The worker gains the full flexibility in allocating
workloads. Lastly, if the manager cares more about profit or time inconsistency gets
more severe, the minimum threshold at the midterm decreases and hence more work
is delayed.
2.3.2 Conditions for Binding IR2
Lemma 2.9. IR2 is binding if and only if the highest production cost in Period 2 in
greater than that in Period 1 (R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0) and the manager has profit concern
(σ < 1).
Lemma 2.9 shows the necessary and sufficient condition, under which IR2 is
binding. A special case is given by a purely welfare-maximizing manager, i.e., σ = 1.
In this case, IR2 never binds as the manager is willing to offer sufficiently large
compensation. When σ < 1, the manager is reluctant to make the compensation too
large due to profit concern.
When σ < 1, it is straightforward to see why IR2 is binding iff R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0.
First, we know from the set of constraints that either IR1 or IR2 must bind at
the optimum. Second, we can tell that IR2 binds if R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0 by comparing
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IR1 and IR2. The intuition behind the condition R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0 is as follows. In
our mechanism, the worker faces the same compensation w(θ1) across periods. If the
highest cost in Period 2 is greater than that in Period 1, as implied by R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0,
the worker is more constrained in Period 2 and hence IR2 binds. The symmetric
logic holds for nonbinding IR2. Corollary 2.10 translates Lemma 2.9 in terms of the
manager’s weight on welfare objective σ and the worker’s degree of time inconsistency
γ.
Corollary 2.10. IR2 binds if the manager cares about profit considerably (small σ)
or the worker has a large tendency to procrastinate (large γ).
2.3.3 Binding IR2
Now consider the scenario when IR2 is binding. We take the optimal control ap-
proach and restrict attention to finding a solution on the space that y(θ) is continuous
and piecewise continuously differentiable.
Proposition 2.11. If IR2 is binding, the optimal production schedule yb(θ1) takes
one of the following forms:
(i) yb(θ1) = yn(θ1) on [θ, θˆ] for some θˆ ∈ (θ, θ¯) and yb(θ1) = yn(θˆ) on [θˆ, θ¯];
(ii) yb(θ1) = yˆ on [θ, θ¯] for some yˆ ≤ yn(θ).
Proposition 2.11 shows that the optimal production can take two forms when
IR2 is binding. First, the optimal production schedule specifies a minimum quan-
tity for early output when productivity 1/θ is low. For high-productivity types, the
optimal period-1 output is increasing in productivity and equals the optimal produc-
tion schedule for nonbinding IR2. The increasing segment is to reduce information
rent for truthful reporting, while the pooling segment is to prevent the worker from
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procrastinating and later breaking the contract. Second, the worker produces a fixed
amount whatever his productivity. This an extreme form of the first case when the
pooling segment pertains to the entire type space. It happens when procrastination
is so severe that the manager wants to commit every type to some early output. Any
flexibility that can be used to reduce information rent is completely taken out.
Corollary 2.12. With binding IR2, the optimal contract has the following properties:
(i) For any σ < 1 and any γ ≥ 1, yb(θ1) is nonincreasing and w is nondecreasing
in yb on [yb(θ¯), yb(θ)].
(ii) For σ = 0, yb(θ1) = max{qd(θ1), min{y¯, qd(θ)} where y¯ is given by R(θ¯, y¯) =
0, and w is constant in yb.
(iii) If σ decreases or γ increases, the left endpoint of pooling interval θˆ decreases.
Corollary 2.12 discusses several properties of the optimal contract when IR2 is
binding. First, just like when IR2 is nonbinding, the manager in general postpones
more work to Period 2 when productivity is lower in Period 1, and the compensation
scheme never penalizes early production. Second, if the manager only cares about
profit, the principal offers a constant wage regardless of how much is produced in
Period 1. The production schedule starts pooling for all types whose period-2 high-
est cost exceeds their highest period-1 cost conditional on assigned early production.
And it delegates the production decision to the rest of types. Lastly, the pooling
segment expands if the manager cares more about profit or the degree of time incon-
sistency increases. When time inconsistency is more severe, initially unproductive
workers are more likely to leave the project incomplete, which in turn requires more
rigid production schedule. Moreover, when the manager cares more about profit, she
is more inclined to forgo state-contingent production, which brings a higher risk of
project incompletion.
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2.3.4 Global Properties
Previous discussions in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 are confined to specific cases depend-
ing on whether the worker has incentive to leave the project incomplete. Here we
explore global properties of the optimal contract using the result in Section 2.3.2.
Corollary 2.13 shows that when σ decreases or γ increases, the solution switches from
the case where IR2 is nonbinding to the case where IR2 is binding.
Corollary 2.13. If the manager cares about welfare considerably (large σ) or the
worker has a small tendency for procrastination (small γ), the optimal production
y1(θ1) = y
n
1 (θ1). If the manager cares about profit considerably (small σ) or the
worker has a large tendency for procrastination (large γ), the optimal production
y1(θ1) = y
b
1(θ1).
Together with Corollary 2.8(iv) and Corollary 2.12(iii), we know y1(θ1) has re-
duced flexibility for low-productivity types when σ decreases or γ increases. If the
manager maximizes welfare and the worker is time-consistent, then we are in the
case of nonbinding IR2. By Corollary 2.8(ii), the workload allocation decision is
delegated to the worker and a constant wage is paid conditional on project com-
pletion. If instead the worker is time-inconsistent, by Corollary 2.8(ii) again, the
early output schedule is increasing in productivity, implemented by a compensation
rewarding early output. Suppose now the manager only cares about profit. If the
worker is time-consistent or mildly time-inconsistent, then we are in the case of non-
binding IR2. By Corollary 2.8(iii), the workload allocation decision is delegated to
the worker and a constant wage is paid if the project is completed. However, if the
worker is severely time-inconsistent, we are in the case of binding IR2. By Corollary
2.12(ii), the optimal production schedule imposes a minimum early output and the
worker receives a constant wage if the project is completed.
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2.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the result changes under several alternative model
specifications.
2.4.1 The Sophisticated Agent
The worker in our model is naive about his future time inconsistency. In this section,
we show that when the worker is sophisticated, the optimal production and wage
schemes do not change for large V . A sophisticated worker is fully aware of his
future time inconsistency and takes it into account when making decisions. As a
consequence, the worker is willing to participate if his current utility and expected
future utility are both greater than the outside option. Formally, IR1 requires
w1(θ1)− γθ1c(q1(θ1)) + E[w2(θ1, θ2)− θ2c(q2(θ1, θ2))] ≥ 0
E[w2(θ1, θ2)− γθ2c(q2(θ1, θ2))] ≥ 0
IR0 requires
E[w1 + w2 − θ1c(q1)− θ2c(q2)] ≥ 0
E[w1 + w2 − γθ1c(q1)− θ2c(q2)] ≥ 0
E[w2(θ1, θ2)− γθ2c(q2(θ1, θ2))] ≥ 0
The worker’s incentive constraints are unchanged, because he continue to optimize
current utility when making reports.
If we adopt these constraints in the basic model, the results remain the same. This
is because we assume V is sufficiently large such that the project must be completed
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at the optimum. Thus the ex post participation constraints are satisfied even in the
worst scenario. The additional ex ante participation constraints are equivalent to
the average of these ex post constraints and hence must also be satisfied.
But note that if the project may be incomplete in some cases, the new set of con-
straints matters. The manager needs to give the sophisticated worker more surplus.
The optimal production and compensation schedules will also change, depending on
which constraints bind.
2.4.2 Continuously Additive Payoff in Output
This section studies the optimal management if the manager’s payoff is continuously
additive in output. To be more clear, let qt be the worker’s period-t production and
the manager’s direct payoff be V (q1, q2) = q1 + q2. All the other assumptions remain
the same as Section 2.2. The new specification of manager payoff changes our results
significantly, because procrastination in Period 1 no longer affects the production
technology in Period 2. We show that when time inconsistency is severe, the profit-
maximizing contract treats procrastination period by period. Early production is
rigid and below the efficient level. In comparison, late production is efficient and
more responsive to productivity shocks than early production. As procrastination
becomes more severe, the range of early production shrinks and its level decreases,
while late production is unaffected.
Redefine the efficient output as the maxmizer of V (q1, q2)−c(q1)−c(q2) or qet (θt) =
c′−1( 1
θt
) within this section. First, suppose the manager is welfare-maximizing. Fol-
lowing a similar proof to Proposition 2.7, we know that the efficient output can be
implemented by time-independent wage schedules.
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Second, suppose the manager is profit-maximizing. Her problem is to solve
maxE[q1(θ1) + q2(θ1, θ2)− w1(θ1)− w2(θ1, θ2)]
s.t. ICFOCs (2.2) (2.3), monotonicity constraint (2.4), and the feasibility constraint
(2.5) on wages:
w1(θ1) = γθ1c(q1) +
∫ θ¯
θ1
γc(q1(θ˜))dθ˜ − Ex[
∫ x¯
x
c(q2(θ1, x˜))dx˜] (2.2)
w2(θ1, x) = xc(q2(θ1, x)) +
∫ x¯
x
c(q2(θ1, x˜))dx˜ (2.3)
q1(·), q2(θ1, ·) are nonincreasing (2.4)
w1, w2 ≥ 0 (2.5)
Note that we replace the reported variable θ2 with x = γθ2 in the incentive con-
straints. The corresponding CDF used in the expectation operation in (2.2) therefore
becomes F˜ (x) = F (x
γ
). The transformation greatly simplifies our analysis. Even
though the worker is naive about his time inconsistency, in the transformed mecha-
nism, the worker still believes he will report truthfully in Period 2 when calculating
the period-1 expected utility.7
If the constraint w1 ≥ 0 is nonbinding, for any realized θ1, the manager’s objective
can be reduced to
max
q1,q2
q1 − γc(q1)
(
θ1 +
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
)
+ Ex[q2 − xc(q2(θ1, x))]
7See Galperti (2015) for more discussion.
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Denote the virtual type as t(θ1) = θ1 + F (θ1)f(θ1) . The optimal production is q
cn
1 (θ1) =
c′−1( 1
γt(θ1)
) and qcn2 (θ1, θ2) = qe2(θ2). The optimal wage schedule is given by the
expressions in (2.2) and (2.3). In this case, procrastination is treated period by
period, and productions are independent over time.
If w1 ≥ 0 is binding, the optimal production qcb1 is upward distorted relative to qcn1
and qcb2 is downward distorted relative to qcn2 , in order to relax the binding constraint.
But we know that w1 ≥ 0 is binding iff γθ¯c(qcn1 (θ¯))−Ex[
∫ x¯
x
c(q2(θ¯, x˜))dx˜] < 0. For
sufficiently severe time inconsistency, w1 ≥ 0 is always nonbinding and the profit-
maximizing production scheme is given by (qcn1 , qcn2 ).
2.4.3 Modest Payoff from Project Completion
We have assumed the payoff V is sufficiently large so that the project is always
completed. This section investigates the consequence of a modest payoff V . Then
it is possible that a worker starts the project, but fails to complete it. It causes
extra social cost, which reduces the manager’s incentive to commit early production.
Interestingly, when the degree of time inconsistency γ is larger, the profit-maximizing
contract may involve a weaker commitment device.
Redefine efficient production here as the optimal output assigned to a time-
consistent worker when the manager can observe the realized cost parameter θt.
Formally, the efficient period-1 output qe1(θ1) is given by θ1c′(qe1) = E[θ2 : V ≥
θ2c(q¯ − qe1)]c′(q¯ − qe1) and the efficient period-2 output qe2(θ1, θ2) = q¯ − qe1(θ1) iff
V ≥ θ2c(q¯ − qe1). Since the average cost coefficient µ ≥ E[θ2 : V ≥ θ2c(q¯ − qe1)],
qe1(θ1) is weakly lower than the efficient level in Definition 2.1.8 The manager can
achieve the efficient production with a period-1 wage schedule w1 decreasing in θ1
8Note that qe1(θ1) is not necessarily decreasing in V for a fixed θ1.
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and period-2 wage w2 = γV .
Now suppose the manager is profit-maximizing. The manager’s problem is maxV−
w1 − w2 s.t. the same constraints (2.2)–(2.5) as in Section 2.4.2. But q2(θ1, θ2) can
only take two possible values, q¯ − q1(θ1) or 0. The following analysis relies on the
backward induction.
Let θˆ1 be the cutoff threshold in Period 1, above which the project is terminated
immediately. Let θˆ2(θ1) be the cutoff cost in Period 2, given the period-1 cost is
θ1. Suppose the worker’s period-1 production schedule is q1(θ1). Since the period-2
output for θ2 < θˆ2(θ1) is constant in θ2, given by q¯ − q1(θ1), the compensation in
Period 2 is w2(θ1, θ2) = γθˆ2(θ1)c(q¯ − q1(θ1)) for any θ2 < θˆ2(θ1) and zero otherwise.
Next, we check the incentives in Period 1. According to (2.2),
w1(θ1) = γθ1c(q1(θ1))+
∫ θ¯
θ1
γc(q1(θ˜))dθ˜−γ
(
θˆ2(θ1)F (θˆ2(θ1))− E[θ2 : θ2 < θˆ2(θ1)]
)
c(q¯−q1(θ1))
Suppose the constraint w1 ≥ 0 is nonbinding. Given a realization of θ1, the
manager’s profit is
Π(θ1) = V · F (θˆ2(θ1))− γ
(
θ1 +
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
)
c(q1(θ1))− γE[θ2 : θ2 < θˆ2(θ1)]c(q¯ − q1(θ1))
The optimal q1(θ1) and θˆ2(θ1) are given by the first order conditions:
V = γθˆ2(θ1)c(q¯ − q1(θ1))
(
θ1 +
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
)
c′(q1(θ1)) = E[θ2 : θ2 < θˆ2(θ1)]c′(q¯ − q1(θ1))
θˆ1 is given by Π(θˆ1) = 0 evaluated using the optimal q1(θ1) and θˆ2(θ1) provided
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above.9 q1(θ1) may be upward distorted relative to the efficient level qe1(θ1). This
is because the manager has the incentive to shift toward more production, to en-
hance the probability of project completion. But as the tendency to procrastinate
γ becomes larger, q1 is more likely to be downward distorted, due to the increasing
social cost of half-completed projects. In sum, as γ increases, θˆ1, q1(θ1) and θˆ2(θ1)
all decreases.
If w1 ≥ 0 is binding, the manager adjusts q1(θ1), θˆ1 and θˆ2(θ1) towards the
direction that relaxes the constraint. That is, she chooses higher q1(θ1), θˆ1 and lower
θˆ2(θ1) relative to the nonbinding case.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study optimal project management with a time-inconsistent pro-
crastinating worker and uncertain labor productivity. To deal with time inconsis-
tency, the manager wants ensure early production by the worker. But to deal with
uncertain productivity, the manager desires flexibility in intertemporal workload al-
location. The optimal production schedule imposes a minimum level of midterm out-
put when time inconsistency is severe and when the manager is more profit-oriented.
However, the minimum requirement on early production is not always optimal. When
the manager cares enough about welfare, time-inconsistency is partly corrected with
a compensation scheme rewarding midterm output. In this case, an initially more
productive worker always produces more by the midterm. Another interesting case
is where, when the manager is profit-maximizing and time inconsistency is mild, the
production decision is completely delegated to the worker, and only a constant wage
is paid if the project is completed. Our result can be applied to the class of projects
9The monotonicity constraint can be satisfied if c
′
c is uniformly small and
c′′
c′ is uniformly large.
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where timely execution is crucial.
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2.6 Appendix
For the ease of notation, we replace θ1 with θ throughout the appendix.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Suppose the contract (y(θ), w(θ)) is optimal and y(θ) <
qd(θ) for some θ. Then we can fix the wage schedule and change the production
schedule to be y˜(θ) = max{y(θ), qd(θ)}. The new contract (y˜(θ), w(θ)) is storage-
free. Since, for all θ, the actual production in Period 1 is unchanged, the worker’s
utility under truthful reporting remains the same. So IR1 and IR2 are satisfied.
Moreover, IC1 is easier to satisfy, because the production threshold to mimic any
other type either increases or stays the same. In sum, under the storage-free contract,
all the constraints are satisfied and the manager’s payoff is unchanged. 
Proof of Lemma 2.4. (IC⇒ICFOC) Let U(θˆ; θ) be the worker’s utility with
true type θ and report θˆ. U(θˆ; θ) = w(θˆ) − γθc(q(θˆ; θ)) − µc(q¯ − q(θˆ; θ)). Then if
y(θˆ) > qd(θ), q(θˆ; θ) = y(θˆ); otherwise, q(θˆ; θ) = qd(θ).
Define the value function as V (θ) = U(θ; θ).
V ′(θ) =
∂U(θˆ; θ)
∂θ
|θˆ=θ =
(
lim
θ→θˆ
U(θˆ; θ)− U(θˆ; θˆ)
θ − θˆ
)
|θˆ=θ
Moreover,
U(θˆ; θ)− U(θˆ; θˆ)
=γθˆc(y(θˆ)) + µc(q¯ − y(θˆ))− γθc(q(θˆ; θ))− µc(q¯ − q(θˆ; θ))
Consider θˆ sufficiently close to θ. (i) If y(θˆ) > qd(θˆ), y(θˆ) > qd(θ) by continuity
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of qd. Thus q(θˆ; θ) = y(θˆ).
∂U(θˆ; θ)
∂θ
= lim
θ→θˆ
U(θˆ; θ)− U(θˆ; θˆ)
θ − θˆ
= lim
θ→θˆ
−γ(θ − θˆ)c(y(θˆ))
θ − θˆ
= −γc(y(θˆ))
V ′(θ) = −γc(y(θ)).
(ii) Suppose y(θˆ) = qd(θˆ). When θˆ < θ, y(θˆ) = qd(θˆ) > qd(θ) by monotonicity of
qd. Thus q(θˆ; θ) = y(θˆ). Similar to (i), V ′(θ) = −γc(y(θ)).
When θˆ > θ, y(θˆ) = qd(θˆ) < qd(θ) by monotonicity of qd.Thus q(θˆ; θ) = qd(θ).
∂U(θˆ; θ)
∂θ
= lim
θ→θˆ
U(θˆ; θ)− U(θˆ; θˆ)
θ − θˆ
= lim
θ→θˆ
γθˆc(qd(θˆ))− γθc(qd(θ))
θ − θˆ + limθ→θˆ µ
c(q¯ − qd(θˆ))− c(q¯ − qd(θ))
θ − θˆ
= −γc(qd(θˆ)) +
[
µc′(q¯ − qd(θˆ))− γθˆc′(qd(θˆ))
]
qd′(θˆ)
= −γc(y(θˆ))
where the third line follows from the characterization of qd. Therefore, V ′(θ) =
−γc(y(θ)).
(IC⇒M) Let θ′ > θ. We want to show y(θ′) ≤ y(θ). If qd(θ′) ≤ y(θ′) ≤ qd(θ), we
must have y(θ′) ≤ y(θ) as y(θ) ≥ qd(θ) in the storage-free contract.
Next, consider the case y(θ′) > qd(θ). Suppose for a contradiction that y(θ′) >
y(θ). By monotonicity of qd, qd(θ′) < qd(θ) ≤ y(θ) < y(θ′).
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ICθ,θ′ requires
w(θ)− γθc(y(θ))− µc(q¯ − y(θ)) ≥ w(θ′)− γθc(q(θ′; θ))− µc(q¯ − q(θ′; θ))
= w(θ′)− γθc(y(θ′))− µc(q¯ − y(θ′))
ICθ′,θ requires
w(θ′)− γθ′c(y(θ′))− µc(q¯ − y(θ′)) ≥ w(θ)− γθ′c(q(θ; θ′))− µc(q¯ − q(θ; θ′))
= w(θ)− γθ′c(y(θ))− µc(q¯ − y(θ))
Combining the two inequalities, we have y(θ) ≥ y(θ′), a contradiction. Therefore,
y(θ) is non-increasing.
(M + ICFOC⇒IC) Fix arbitrary θ, θ′. We want to show V (θ) ≥ U(θ′; θ), which,
by ICFOC, is equivalent to
∫ θ′
θ
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜
≥γθ′c(y(θ′)) + µc(q¯ − y(θ′))− γθc(q(θ′; θ))− µc(q¯ − q(θ′; θ))
If y(θ′) > qd(θ), then q(θ′; θ) = y(θ′) and RHS = γ(θ′ − θ)c(y(θ′)). The desired
inequality holds by M.
If y(θ′) ≤ qd(θ), then q(θ′; θ) = qd(θ). Moreover, by the intermediate value
theorem, there exists θ′′ ∈ [θ, θ′] such that y(θ′) = qd(θ′′).
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Then
RHS =γθ′′c(qd(θ′′)) + µc(q¯ − qd(θ′′))− γθc(qd(θ))− µc(q¯ − qd(θ))
+ γθ′c(y(θ′))− γθ′′c(y(θ′))
=
∫ θ′′
θ
{
γc(qd(θ˜)) +
[
γθ˜c′(qd(θ˜))− µc′(q¯ − qd(θ˜))
]
qd′(θ˜)
}
dθ˜
+
∫ θ′
θ′′
γc(y(θ′))dθ˜
=
∫ θ′′
θ
γc(qd(θ˜))dθ˜ +
∫ θ′
θ′′
γc(y(θ′))dθ˜
Due to M,
LHS =
∫ θ′
θ
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜
≥
∫ θ′′
θ
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜ +
∫ θ′
θ′′
γc(y(θ′))dθ˜
Therefore, V (θ)− V (θ′) ≥ U(θ′; θ)− V (θ′). 
Proof of Lemma 2.5. By ICFOC, w(θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜ + γθc(y(θ)) + µc(q¯ −
y(θ)) + k.
Take θ′ > θ. Since y(θ) is non-increasing, y(θ) ≥ y(θ′). It follows that
[
w(θ)− γθ¯c(q¯ − y(θ))]− [w(θ′)− γθ¯c(q¯ − y(θ′))]
=
∫ θ′
θ
γc(y(θ˜))dθ˜ + (γθ¯ − µ)[c(q¯ − y(θ′))− c(q¯ − y(θ))] + γ[θc(y(θ))− θ′c(y(θ′))]
≥(γθ¯ − µ)[c(q¯ − y(θ′))− c(q¯ − y(θ))] + γθ[c(y(θ))− c(y(θ′))]
≥0
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where the first inequality is due to the monotonicity of y. 
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Suppose IR2 is not binding. Then k = 0. Ignoring
M and substituting ICFOC into the objective, we obtain
max−
∫ θ¯
θ
{[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c(y) + µc(q¯ − y)
}
dF (θ)
s.t.
y(θ) ≥ qd(θ)(SF )
The solution is derived from pointwise maximization and satisfies
yn(θ) = max{qd(θ), yint(θ)}
where yint(θ) is given by
[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c′(yint(θ)) = µc′(q¯ − yint(θ))
Notice that yn(θ) is continuous. Together with monotone hazard rate and convex
cost, yint(θ) and qd(θ) are both decreasing. Therefore, yn(θ) is globally decreasing.

Proof of Corollary 2.8. (i) yn(θ) is strictly decreasing as yint(θ) and qd(θ)
are both strictly decreasing. By the implicit function theorem, yint(θ) and qd(θ)
are differentiable. Thus yn(θ) is differentiable a.e., and when its derivative exists,
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yn′(θ) < 0. By taking derivative directly,
w′(θ) = [γθc′(yn(θ))− µc′(q¯ − yn(θ))] yn′(θ)
When yn(θ) = qd(θ), γθc′(yn(θ)) − µc′(q¯ − yn(θ)) = 0. Thus w′(θ) = 0. When
yn(θ) = yint(θ), from the characterization of yint(θ) and qd(θ), we know that σθ +
(1− σ)γ
(
θ + F (θ)
f(θ)
)
< γθ. Thus w′(θ) ≤ 0.
(ii) For σ = 1, yn(θ) = ye(θ) obviously from characterization in Proposition 2.7.
Following the proof of (i), w′(θ) < 0 if γ > 1 and w′(θ) = 0 if γ = 1.
(iii) For σ = 0, yn(θ) = ye(θ) obviously from characterization in Proposition 2.7.
Following the proof of (i), w′(θ) = 0.
(iv) Obvious from the characterization of yint and qd. 
Proof of Lemma 2.9. (⇐) By contrapositive, it is enough to show IR2 not
binding implies R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) ≤ 0 or σ = 1.
Suppose σ ∈ [0, 1). Since IR2 is not binding, the solution to the problem with
IR2 remains to be (yn, w) given in Proposition 2.7. When the worker’s type is θ¯, his
payoff is
w(θ¯)− γθ¯c(q¯ − yn(θ¯)) = −R(θ¯, yn(θ¯))
Since IR2 is satisfied at θ¯, R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) ≤ 0.
(⇒) When σ = 1, IR2 is implied by IR1. So it cannot be binding.
If IR2 is binding, then σ ∈ [0, 1). Moreover, the solution to the problem without
IR2 must violate IR2. It follows that w(θ)− γθ¯c(q¯ − yn(θ)) < 0 for some θ ∈ [θ, θ¯].
By Lemma 2.5, R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0. 
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Proof of Corollary 2.10. (i) If σ increases, yn(θ¯) increases and R(θ¯, yn(θ¯))
decreases. By Lemma 2.9, it means IR2 only binds towards small σ.
(ii) If γ increases, yn(θ¯) decreases. Moreover, yn(θ¯) < q¯
2
from its characterization.
∂R
∂γ
= θ¯
[
c(q¯ − yn(θ¯))− c(y(θ¯))]− [(γθ¯ − µ)c′(q¯ − y(θ¯)) + γθ¯c′(yn(θ¯))] ∂yn(θ¯)
∂γ
> 0
Therefore, IR2 only binds towards large γ. 
The Problem of Binding IR2
Following the convention, we define that the value of y˙(θ) at a point of discontinuity
θ′ is equal to the left-hand limit of y˙(θ) as θ approaches θ′.
Substituting ICFOC and binding IR2 into the objective and IR1, we obtain
max−
∫ θ¯
θ
{[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c(y) + µc(q¯ − y)
}
dF (θ)−(1−σ)R(θ¯, y(θ¯))
s.t.
R(θ¯, y(θ¯)) ≥ 0 (IR1)
y˙(θ) ≤ 0 (M)
y(θ) ≥ qd(θ) (SF)
Take u(θ) ≡ y˙(θ) to be the control and y(θ) to be a state variable. The problem
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is transformed into
max−
∫ θ¯
θ
{[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c(y) + µc(q¯ − y)
}
dF (θ)−(1−σ)R(θ¯, y(θ¯))
s.t.
y˙(θ) = u(θ)
R(θ¯, y(θ¯)) ≥ 0 (IR1)
y˙(θ) ≤ 0 (M)
y(θ) ≥ qd(θ) (SF)
Define the Hamiltonian as
H = −
{[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c(y) + µc(q¯ − y)
}
f(θ) + η(θ)u(θ)
Define the Lagrangian as
L = H − v(θ)u(θ)
and the modified Lagrangian as
L¯ = H − v(θ)u(θ)− φ(θ) [u(θ)− q˙d(θ)]
Then there exists a non-decreasing function φ(θ) and a function η(θ) with one-
sided limits everywhere, such that the solution satisfies,
y˙(θ) = Hη = u(θ)
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Lu = 0 : v(θ) = Hu = η(θ)
φ(θ) is constant on any interval where y(θ) > qd(θ)
φ(θ) is continuous at all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] where y(θ) = qd(θ) and u(θ) is discontinuous
η(θ) + φ(θ) is continuous and has a derivative almost everywhere given by
η˙(θ) + φ˙(θ) = −L¯y =
{[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c′(y)− µc′(q¯ − y)
}
f(θ) (2.6)
transversality conditions:
η(θ) = 0 and (2.7)
η(θ¯) =
−(1− σ − λ)R(θ¯, y(θ¯))
∂y
= (1− σ − λ) [γθ¯c′(y(θ¯)) + (γθ¯ − µ)c′(q¯ − y(θ¯))]
complementary slackness conditions on IR1:
(γθ¯ − µ)c(q¯ − y(θ¯))− γθ¯c(y(θ¯)) ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0 and λ [(γθ¯ − µ)c(q¯ − y(θ¯))− γθ¯c(y(θ¯))] = 0
complementary slackness conditions on M:
v(θ) ≥ 0, u(θ) ≤ 0 and v(θ)u(θ) = 0 (2.8)
Note that because η(θ) = v(θ) for all θ, we must have η˙(θ) = v˙(θ).
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Lemma 2.14. On any interval where the optimal y(θ) is decreasing, y(θ) = yn(θ).
Proof of Lemma 2.14. We maintain the definition of yint as in Proposition
2.7. From (2.6),
[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c′(y) = µc′(q¯ − y) + v˙(θ) + φ˙(θ)
f(θ)
On any interval where y˙(θ) < 0, we must have v(θ) = 0. Therefore, v˙(θ) = 0. If
y(θ) > qd(θ), then φ˙(θ) = 0. Plugging in v˙(θ) = φ˙(θ) = 0 yields y(θ) = yint(θ). 
Lemma 2.15. If for some θˆ, y˙(θ) < 0, then y(θ) is decreasing on [θ, θˆ].
Proof of Lemma 2.15. Suppose for a contradiction that for some θ0, y(θ) is
decreasing above θ0 and constant below it. Then y(θ) > qd(θ) on (θ, θ0], since qd(θ)
is decreasing. It implies φ˙(θ) = 0 on (θ, θ0]. Moreover, by (2.6) and (2.8), v(θ−0 ) > 0
and v(θ+0 ) = 0. Hence v˙(θ0) < 0. We also know from (2.6) that on any interval where
y(θ) is constant, v˙(θ)+φ˙(θ)
f(θ)
must be increasing. Then v˙(θ) < 0 below θ0. It follows
that v(θ) > 0 for all θ < θ0, contradicting the boundary condition that v(θ) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.11. By Lemma 2.9, σ ∈ [0, 1) and R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0. By
(2.7) and v(θ) = η(θ), v(θ¯) = (1− σ − λ) [γθ¯c′(y(θ¯)) + (γθ¯ − µ)c′(q¯ − y(θ¯))].
Case 1: IR1 is not binding. I.e., λ = 0. Since σ < 1, v(θ¯) > 0 and y˙b(θ¯) = 0
by (2.8). There must be pooling of the types just below θ¯. From Lemma 2.14 and
2.15, there are two possibilities: either partial pooling of the most inefficient types,
or pooling on the entire interval [θ, θ¯].
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In the partial pooling case, yb(θ) = yn(θ) on [θ, θˆ] for some θˆ ∈ (θ, θ¯) and yb(θ) = yˆ
on (θˆ, θ¯]. By continuity, yˆ = yn(θˆ). Also for θ ∈ (θˆ, θ¯], φ˙(θ) = 0 as yn(θˆ) > qd(θ).
Since v(θˆ) = 0 and v(θ¯) = (1− σ)
[
γθ¯c′(yn(θˆ)) + (γθ¯ − µ)c′(q¯ − yn(θˆ))
]
, integrating
(2.6) from θˆ to θ¯ and substituting these boundary conditions generates
∫ θ¯
θˆ
{[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c′(yn(θˆ))− µc′(q¯ − yn(θˆ))
}
dF (θ)
=(1− σ)
[
γθ¯c′(yn(θˆ)) + (γθ¯ − µ)c′(q¯ − yn(θˆ))
]
Simplifying the equation yields
[
σE[θ : θ > θˆ]− (1− σ)γF (θˆ)θˆ
]
c′(yn(θˆ)) =
[
(1− σ)γθ¯ + (σ − F (θˆ))µ
]
c′(q¯− yn(θˆ))
Notice that (1− σ)γθ¯ + (σ − F (θˆ))µ is always positive and σE[θ : θ > θˆ]− (1−
σ)γF (θˆ)θˆ is decreasing in θˆ. Thus if θˆ exists, we must have θˆ ∈ [θ, θ0) where θ0
satisfies σE[θ : θ > θ0]− (1− σ)γF (θ0)θ0 = 0. Define
J(θˆ) ≡
[
σE[θ : θ > θˆ]− (1− σ)γF (θˆ)θˆ
]
c′(yn(θˆ))
−
[
(1− σ)γθ¯ + (σ − F (θˆ))µ
]
c′(q¯ − yn(θˆ))
Then
J ′(θˆ) =
[
σE[θ : θ > θˆ]− (1− σ)γF (θˆ)θˆ
]
c′′(yn(θˆ))yn′(θˆ)
+
[
(1− σ)γθ¯ + (σ − F (θˆ))µ
]
c′′(q¯ − yn(θˆ))yn′(θˆ)
It can be easily verified that J ′(θˆ) < 0 on [θ, θ0). Therefore, there is at most one
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θˆ. Since J(θ0) < 0, by the intermediate value theorem, θˆ exists whenever J(θ) ≥ 0.
From the characterization of yn, J(θ) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
σµ2 ≥ [(1− σ)γθ¯ + σµ][σ + (1− σ)γ]θ
Suppose θˆ exists. Let y¯ be the solution to R(θ¯, y¯) = 0. If yn(θˆ) ≤ y¯, then
k = R(θ¯, yn(θˆ)) ≥ 0. The solution is yb(θ) = yn(θ) on [θ, θˆ] and yb(θ) = yn(θˆ) on
(θˆ, θ¯]. If yn(θˆ) > y¯, the solution is provided in Case 2.
Suppose θˆ does not exist, then there is pooling on the entire interval [θ, θ¯]. Equiv-
alently, y(θ) = yˆ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯]. The manager solves
max−
∫ θ¯
θ
[[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c(yˆ) + µc(q¯ − yˆ)
]
dF (θ)
s.t.
yˆ ≥ qd(θ)
yˆ = max{qd(θ), yˆint}, where yˆint is given by [σµ+ (1− σ)γθ¯] c′(yˆint) = µc′(q¯ −
yˆint). If yˆ ≤ y¯, then R(θ¯, yˆ) ≥ 0. The solution is yb(θ) = yˆ on [θ, θ¯]. Otherwise, the
solution is provided in Case 2.
Case 2: IR1 is binding. I.e., λ > 0. Recall that y¯ is the solution to R(θ¯, y¯) = 0.
Then yb(θ¯) = y¯. Since IR2 is binding, R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0. R(θ¯, ·) is decreasing, and
hence y¯ > yn(θ¯).
Since
[
σθ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ + F (θ)
f(θ)
)]
c(y) + µc(q¯ − y) is convex in y and uniquely
minimized at yn(θ), we have
v˙(θ¯) + φ˙(θ¯)
f(θ¯)
=
[
σθ¯ + (1− σ)γ
(
θ¯ +
1
f(θ¯)
)]
c′(y¯)− µc′(q¯ − y¯) > 0
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Hence, v˙(θ¯) + φ˙(θ¯) > 0. Suppose φ˙(θ¯) > 0. Then y¯ = yb(θ¯) = qd(θ¯). But then
qd(θ¯) > yn(θ¯), a contradiction. Thus φ˙(θ¯) = 0 and v˙(θ¯) > 0.
Combined with v(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, we must have v(θ¯) > 0. By complementary
slackness on M, y˙b(θ¯) = 0. So there must be pooling of the types just below θ¯. From
Lemma 2.14 and 2.15, there are two possibilities: either partial pooling of the most
inefficient types, or pooling on the entire interval [θ, θ¯].
In the partial pooling case, yb(θ) = yn(θ) on [θ, θˆ] for some θˆ ∈ (θ, θ¯) and yb(θ) = y¯
on (θˆ, θ¯]. By continuity, y¯ = yn(θˆ). Thus θˆ is determined by
R(θ¯, yn(θˆ)) = 0
Since R(θ¯, ·) is decreasing and R(θ¯, yn(θ¯)) > 0, θˆ exists iff R(θ¯, yn(θ)) < 0 by the
intermediate value theorem. Note that yn(θ) = yint(θ) ≥ qd(θ) with equality only
when σ = 0.
If θˆ does not exist, then there is pooling on the entire interval [θ, θ¯]. The solution
is yb(θ) = yn(θ) on [θ, θ¯]. 
Proof of Corollary 2.12. (i) For any σ ∈ [0, 1) and any γ ≥ 1, this result is
obvious from Proposition 2.11 and Corollary 2.8(i).
(ii) Take σ = 0. Following the proof of Proposition 2.11, if IR1 is not binding,
there must be pooling on the entire interval [θ, θ¯]. If R(θ¯, qd(θ)) ≥ 0, the solution
is y(θ) = qd(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯]. Otherwise, IR1 is binding and the solution is
yb(θ) = yd(θ) on [θ, θˆ] and yb(θ) = yd(θˆ) on (θˆ, θ¯], where θˆ ∈ [θ, θ¯] is determined by
R(θ¯, yd(θˆ)) = 0 if it exists and θ otherwise.
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Whenever the derivative exists,
w′(θ) =
[
γθc′(yb(θ))− µc′(q¯ − yb(θ))] yb′(θ)
γθc′(yb(θ)) − µc′(q¯ − yb(θ)) = 0 on [θ, θˆ], while yb′(θ) = 0 on (θˆ, θ¯]. Therefore,
w′(θ) = 0 a.e.. w is constant in yb.
(iii) (a) Pick 0 ≤ σ < σ′ < 1. From the proof of Proposition 2.11, if IR1 is not
binding for either σ or σ′, J(θˆ(σ);σ) = J(θˆ(σ′);σ′) = 0. Since yn(θˆ;σ) is increasing
in σ, J(θˆ;σ) is increasing in σ. Plus J(θˆ;σ) is decreasing in θˆ over the interval
J(θˆ;σ) ≥ 0. We must have θˆ(σ) < θˆ(σ′).
If IR1 is not binding for σ and binding for σ′, J(θˆ(σ);σ) = J(α;σ′) = 0 and
yn(α;σ′) > y¯. Moreover, α > θˆ(σ) from above. We also know yn(θˆ(σ′);σ′) = y¯.
Thus, θˆ(σ′) > α > θˆ(σ).
If IR1 is binding for σ but not for σ′, J(θˆ(σ′);σ′) = 0 and y¯ ≥ yn(θˆ(σ′);σ′).
Moreover, yn(θˆ(σ);σ) = y¯. Since yn(θˆ;σ) is increasing in σ, yn(θˆ(σ);σ′) > y¯. But
then yn(θˆ(σ);σ′) > yn(θˆ(σ′);σ′), which implies θˆ(σ) < θˆ(σ′).
If IR1 is binding for both σ and σ′, then y¯ = yn(θˆ(σ);σ) = yn(θˆ(σ′);σ′). By the
monotonicity of yn again, yn(θˆ(σ);σ′) > yn(θˆ(σ′);σ′), which implies θˆ(σ) < θˆ(σ′).
(b) Pick 0 ≤ γ′ < γ < 1. From the proof of Proposition 2.11, if IR1 is not binding
for either γ or γ′, J(θˆ(γ); γ) = J(θˆ(γ′); γ′) = 0. Since yn(θˆ; γ) is decreasing in γ,
J(θˆ; γ) is decreasing in γ whenever positive. Plus J(θˆ; γ) is decreasing in θˆ whenever
positive. We must have θˆ(γ) < θˆ(γ′).
If IR1 is not binding for γ and binding for γ′, J(θˆ(γ); γ) = J(α; γ′) = 0 and
yn(α; γ′) > y¯. Moreover, α > θˆ(γ) from above. We also know yn(θˆ(γ′); γ′) = y¯.
Thus, θˆ(γ′) > α > θˆ(γ).
If IR1 is binding for γ but not for γ′, J(θˆ(γ′); γ′) = 0 and y¯ ≥ yn(θˆ(γ′); γ′).
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Moreover, yn(θˆ(γ); γ) = y¯. Since yn(θˆ; γ) is decreasing in γ, yn(θˆ(γ); γ′) > y¯. But
then yn(θˆ(γ); γ′) > yn(θˆ(γ′); γ′), which implies θˆ(γ) < θˆ(γ′).
If IR1 is binding for both γ and γ′, then y¯ = yn(θˆ(γ); γ) = yn(θˆ(γ′); γ′). By the
monotonicity of yn again, yn(θˆ(γ); γ′) > yn(θˆ(γ′); γ′), which implies θˆ(γ) < θˆ(γ′). 
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Chapter 3
Long-Term Capital Budgeting and Incentive
Mechanism
3.1 Introduction
How firms perform capital budgeting is an important question in corporate finance.
In practice, in identifying profitable investment projects, managers at the divi-
sion level are likely to possess superior information than the headquarters. At the
same time, managerial skills and actions affect divisional investment performance.
The joint design of internal capital allocation process and managerial compensation
scheme that helps resolving the adverse selection and moral hazard problem has
received a lot of attention in the corporate finance literature.
The existing literature on the join design of capital budgeting and incentive mech-
anism has been focusing largely on the static setting.1 But the internal capital al-
location problem in reality is dynamic in nature.2 In this paper, we explore the
1Formal dynamic analysis, including Malenko (2016) and Fu (2016), only appears until recently.
See related literature below.
2The empirical evidence provided by Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sautner (2013), who “open
the black box” of a large conglomerate firm, show that capital budgeting process is far from static.
The firm carefully plans its capital allocations: from the identification of potential investment
projects to their execution. The process repeats in each budgetary year, and managers who have
superior knowledge about the firm’s long-term projects have to report the status of the projects
under their management.
impact of persistent private information and attempt to clarify what insights devel-
oped in the static analysis can be brought to dynamic environments. We address
the following questions: (i) How should the headquarters accounts for time-varying
and persistent information in the design of capital budgeting process? (ii) Can the
resulting optimal allocation be implemented by incentive contracts? (iii) Does the
nature of private information affect incentive provisions and the optimal allocation?
To examine these questions, we develop a dynamic mechanism design model by
incorporating elements from the static capital allocation and moral hazard frame-
work of Bernado, Cai, and Luo (2001, 2004). Our model consists of a risk-neutral
headquarters and a risk-neutral division manager interacting repeatedly in contin-
uous time. The division manager operates a long-term investment project and the
headquarters invests capital in the division. The key agency frictions in the model
are that: (i) The manager exerts costly effort to run the project, and (ii) She pri-
vately observes the project types that evolve stochastically over time and an initial
signal that describes the prospect about the project. The signal represents either the
initial state of the project or a parameter that governs the evolution of the project
types. Thus, the novel element our model is the persistent private information that
captures how profitability of a project in a changing business environment evolve;
and our results have practical value in guiding the optimal design of internal capital
markets and compensation scheme in reality.
Besides corporate capital budgeting, our model can also be adapted to study
dynamic resource allocations in other settings. For example, we can consider the
investment decision by an institutional investor in a VC fund. Empirical evidence
suggests that VC managers have different abilities and the performance of a more
skilled manager is persistently higher. In particular, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and
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Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, and Stucke (2014) show that a VC firm typically manage
a sequence of funds, and the performance of one fund predicts the performance of
the subsequent fund. Other examples that our key insights broadly apply to include
the fund of funds and publishers with external developers. For the rest of the paper,
we stick to the context of capital budgeting.
The objective of the headquarters is to find a profit-maximizing mechanism that
elicits the division manager’s dynamic private information as well as maintains effort
incentives. Following the dynamic mechanism design approach proposed by Berge-
mann and Strack (2015) and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014), we first derive the
dynamic information rent equation that captures local incentive compatibility by
expanding their analytical steps using the effort concealment argument as in Laffont
and Tirole (1986). Intuitively, the more important the impact of the initial signal on
the future project types, the more information rents the headquarters has to leave
to the manager in order to induce truthful and obedient behaviors. Using the rep-
resentation of the dynamic information rent, we obtain the dynamic virtual surplus,
which is the expected discount profits less the dynamic information rent accrue to
the division manager. It serves as the objective function of the relaxed program.
Naturally, in choosing the optimal capital and effort allocation, the headquarters
faces a standard trade-off of rent extraction versus allocative distortion.
The mechanism design approach allows us to answer the questions posted above
and our main results are as follows. First, we characterize the optimal allocation in
closed-form. Under the assumption of full commitment of both contracting parties,
the headquarters fines tune the effort schedule to dynamically screen the division
manager’s types. The optimal capital and effort allocation is obtained by point-wise
maximizing the headquarters’ dynamic virtual surplus. Crucially, the allocation
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incorporates the long-term impact of the privately-observed initial signal through
its effect on the dynamic information rent. And the impact of the initial signal at
different point in time is summarized by a process called stochastic flow.
Second, we show that a linear incentive contract can implement the optimal allo-
cation under a few regularity conditions on the primitive stochastic processes. The
regularity guarantees that the optimal allocation satisfies an ex-post monotonicity
condition which suffices for verifying the global incentive compatibility. The linear
contract contains a bonus that provides truth-telling incentives for the manager to re-
port the initial signal and the project types at each point in time; and a performance-
based part that controls the unobserved effort problem. We interpret the division
manager’s share of project cash flows as pay-performance sensitivity. As the optimal
allocation is in closed-form, we are able to characterize the power of incentives ana-
lytically as well. Limited liability is satisfied as long as the manager bears significant
production cost.
Third, we show the optimal allocation can be implemented in a simple mechanism
with one-time report. In the mechanism, the headquarters asks the division manager
to report the initial signal at the beginning, and then asks the manager to choose
a tuple of capital, base salary and equity share from a menu each moment in time.
The relationship between capital and wage components is predetermined based on
the reported initial signal. The features of the mechanism include: First, the manager
only needs to communicate with the headquarters finitely many times, i.e., once at
the beginning. Second, all investment decisions and effort choices are delegated to
the manager. Third, the manager is assigned an unlimited capital account and the
key compensation features tied to the amount of capital spent by the manager.
Lastly, we explicitly derive the dynamics of capital and incentives and show that
94
they depend on the time-and state-variation of the impact of the initial signal. We
perform the analysis under a number of commonly-used stochastic processes, includ-
ing the arithmetic Brownian motion and the mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process. In addition, we analyze the case in which the type process follows the ge-
ometric Brownian motion in the appendix. In these Markovian examples, we take
either the initial value of the project type, the drift rate in the arithmetic Brownian
motion (ABM), or the long-run average in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process as
the initial signal. Depending on the nature of the initial signal, the stochastic flow
can be constant, decreasing, or increasing over the managerial tenure and project
horizon.
We provide several implications that can guide dynamic resource allocations in
practice and can be further tested against data. Our model can produce persistence
in investment and project performance, as well as positive response of investment
to past cash flows. In other dynamic agency models, for example Demarzo, He and
Wang (2012), the correlation between investment and past cash flows is generated
from defered compesation and inefficient liquidation. While our model has no liq-
uidation and compensation is settled period-by-period, the correlation results from
persistent private information. We also investigate the effect of a higher degree of
information persistence and the dynamic efficiency under different interpretations of
the managerial ability.
Related Theoretical Literature. Our paper makes three contributions. First,
we expand and enrich the capital budgeting analysis by studying the impact of dy-
namic private information on the joint design of capital budgeting process and man-
agerial compensation. The research on how agency problems shape internal capi-
tal allocations includes Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982), Antle and Eppen (1985),
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Holmstrom and Ricard i Costa (1986), Harris and Raviv (1996, 1998), Zhang (1997),
and Bernado, Cai and Luo (2001, 2004, BCL hereafter).3 The earlier works provide
static frameworks and focus on the optimality of capital rationing and the use of
spending limits. Our work specifically levers on BCL, which offer a tractable mecha-
nism design framework that includes adverse selection and moral hazard. We further
develop this framework in a changing world and show that spending limits, capital
rationing, and performance-based compensation should depend on the division man-
ager’s private information about the project prospect.
Our work is closely related to a few recent papers in dynamic capital budgeting.
Roper and Ruckes (2012) work with a two-period model with financial constraints.
Malenko (2016) builds on Harris and Raviv (1996, 1998) and models, in continuous-
time, the capital budgeting procedure between a headquarters, which possesses an
audit technology, and a manager with empire-building preferences. His main result is
that the optimal contract can be implemented by a “threshold budgeting mechanism”
which is an investment account held by the division. In a continuous-time model with
i.i.d. projects, Fu (2016) explores how a simple budgeting account can alleviate the
problem of capital diversion by the manager. Our model differs from Malenko (2016)
and Fu (2016) in terms of the production technology and agency frictions. In their
models, projects arrive stochastically over time and all projects are ex-ante identical.
Hence, their mechanisms are suitable for firms investing in a sequence of unrelated
projects. Our focus is on investment in long-term projects or short-term multi-stage
3In a recent paper, Almazan, Chen and Titman (2012) consider the “top-down” approach to
capital budgeting. In their model, the headquarters possessing private information regarding the
firm’s prospect over-invests to induce the division manager to take the most favorable action in the
good state. In contrast, our model features the “bottom-up” procedures, where division managers
request capital by reporting the prospects of their project. Moreover, our paper only focuses on
the internal capital allocation and we do not address the question regarding the benefits and costs
of using internal capital market. See Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), Stein (1997) and
Scharfstein and Stein (2000). See also Stein (2003) for a survey.
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projects that are correlated over time. Overall, our works are complementary and
provide a better picture of dynamic capital budgeting.
Second, our work integrates dynamic mechanism design. We introduce moral haz-
ard and variable project scales in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) and Bergemann
and Strack (2015). In the language of Garcia (2014), our headquarters is an active
principal that participates in the production process. Specifically, Pavan, Segal and
Toikka (2014) develop the most general treatment of discrete-time mechanism de-
sign problems.4 They provide a complete characterization of incentive compatibility
and show how impulse responses (stochastic flow in continuous time) enter the in-
formation rent equation. Bergemann and Strack (2015) provide a continuous-time
mechanism design analysis. Our solution method builds on them and extend their
approach by introducing moral hazard problems.5 Overall, we further explore the ap-
plicability of their methodology and evaluate the role of stochastic flows in delivering
the dynamic properties of the optimal allocation and incentive.
Lastly, our paper is also related to a growing literature on dynamic financial
contract. The seminal work by Sannikov (2008) provides a tractable martingale ap-
proach to solve dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time.6 Nevertheless,
it remains to be a challenge to apply the continuous-time recursive method in solv-
4This literature dates back to Baron and Besanko (1984) who study optimal regulation of a
monopolist in a multi-period adverse selection model. Subsequent works include Besanko (1985),
Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Eso and Szentes (2007), Krahmer and Strausz (2011),
Toikka and Skrzypacz (2014), and many others.
5In the environment with persistent private information, Garret and Pavan (2012) characterize
the optimal design of managerial turnover policy and show that a firm’s optimal retention decision
will become more permissive over time. Garrett and Pavan (2014) study the interaction of the
manager’s degree of risk aversion and the power of incentives. In contrast with these works, we
do not study retention decisions and managerial risk aversion. Instead, we focus on how internal
capital allocation is structured together with dynamic incentives.
6See, for example, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais et al. (2010), Williams (2011), and
DeMarzo et al. (2012) for recent contributions. For a literature survey and applications of the tool
in security design and corporate financing, see Sannikov (2013).
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ing contracting problems with persistent private information because the promised
utility is no longer a sufficient statistics for all past information. The optimal con-
tract needs to be written on multiple state variables and a specific utility function is
required to obtain tractability. (See Williams (2011)) In contrast, our work adopts
the Myersonian approach. The solution to the optimal contract can be obtained
by point-wise maximizing the principal’s dynamic virtual surplus, where each point
represents the initial private information and the current project type. As a conse-
quence, we can characterize the explicit dependence of the allocation on the states,
and the closed-form solution facilitates the derivations of analytical results.
3.2 The Model
Consider a continuous-time environment with time indexed by t. A firm consists of a
headquarters and a division. The headquarters (the principal) acts on behalf of the
shareholders of the firm and the division is run by a division manager (the agent),
who manages a long-term investment project. The headquarters hires and writes the
employment contract with the division manager. The operation of the investment
project requires both the skills of the division manager and capital invested by the
headquarters. As the key focus of the paper is on the internal capital market, we
assume that the headquarters is the only source of capital.
The headquarters and the division manager are risk-neutral and discount future
cash flows at rate r > 0. At each moment of time, the manager exerts unobservable
effort et and the headquarters allocates operating capital kt to the division. The
project produces cash flows at rate
pit = (αet + θt) kt (3.1)
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where θt represents the time-t quality of the project. The differential in θt poten-
tially comes from manager skills or innate project characteristics. The cash flows
specification (3.1) is an “AK” technology, with the technology level “A” depending on
the division manager’s effort choice and project quality endogenously. The monetary
cost of effort is given by h(et) = χ + 12e
2
t , where χ denotes the cost of indivertible
effort that maintains the basic operation of the division. Moreover, it costs the head-
quarters c(kt) = 12k
2
t when investing kt to the division. We assume quadratic costs
mainly for tractability.7 The parameter α > 0 reflects the marginal productivity of
effort.
Before signing the employment contract with the headquarters, the manager pri-
vately observes an initial signal ϑ ∈ Θ ≡ (ϑ, ϑ¯) regarding the project. The initial
signal is drawn from a common prior distribution G at time 0. The initial signal
ϑ, together with the time-t value Zt of a process of contemporaneous shocks (Zt)t≥0
with independent increments, determine the project quality θt at time t which is
privately observed by the manager. Specifically, the project quality is generated by
θt = φ(t, ϑ, Zt) (3.2)
where φ : R+×Θ×R→ R is an aggregator. Since the project quality is the manager’s
private information, we also refer (θt)≥0 as the type process of the manager. Note that
θt depends on (θs)s<t only through the cumulative shock Zt.8 Also, the formulation
7The headquarters is unconstrained in terms of funding, but investment is subject to diminishing
returns to scale. To see this, consider an equivalent formulation as follows: Denote it as the dollar
funding and set it = 12k
2
t . Then it dollars can set up kt =
√
2it units of capital.
8In our later analysis, we assume Ito’s process for the project type: dθt = µ(θt, t)dt+σ(θt, t)dZt,
where the process of contemporaneous shocks is taken to be the standard Brownian motion. Hence,
the project type is Markovian in nature. And whenever a unique strong solution to the stochastic
differential equation for the type evolution exists, we can take the aggregator to be the strong
solution. This can be done for commonly used examples including arithmetic Brownian motion,
geometric Brownian motion, and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. See Section 3.5 for details.
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allows the initial private information ϑ to be distinct from the initial type θ0: It
could be other parameters that govern the evolution of the project type (θt)≥0. For
example, if (θt)t≥0 is an arithmetic or a geometric Brownian motion, then θ0 is the
initial value of the process, but ϑ could be the initial value, the drift, or the volatility
of the process.
Following Bergemann and Strack (2015), we make a few technical assumptions
on the primitives. First, the distribution G has a density g and has a full support on
Θ. The associated inverse hazard rate ψ(ϑ) ≡ 1−G(ϑ)
g(ϑ)
is assumed to be decreasing in
ϑ. Second, the aggregator φ is twice differentiable in every direction and its partial
derivative with respect to the initial signal ϑ and the value of contemporaneous shock
z are denoted as
φϑ(t, ϑ, z) ≡ ∂φ(t, ϑ, z)
∂ϑ
; φz(t, ϑ, z) ≡ ∂φ(t, ϑ, z)
∂z
respectively. The process (φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt))t≥0 is referred as a generalized stochastic flow
process. It is the continuous-time analog of the impulse response functions defined in
the theory of discrete-time dynamic mechanism design. Essentially, the generalized
stochastic flow captures the effect on θt for an infinitesimal variation of the initial
signal ϑ, holding constant the cumulative shocks Zt.9 Thus, the process summarizes
the dynamic effect of a small change in initial private information on future project
types, and the object is critical in determining the optimal dynamic allocation.
For regularity, we assume that for both projects and for all values (t, ϑ, z), a
higher initial signal ϑ generates higher future types, φϑ(t, ϑ, z) ≥ 0. This amounts
to first-order stochastic dominance ranking of the distribution of θt in terms of the
initial signal ϑ. Moreover, a larger value of cumulative shocks Zt leads to higher
9For the general definition of impulse response functions, see Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014).
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types, φz(t, ϑ, z) > 0. Lastly, we assume the expected impact of the initial signal
on the future types grows at most exponentially: There exists a constant C > 0,
q ∈ (0, r) such that E [φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)] ≤ Ceqt for all t ≥ 0 and ϑ ∈ Θ.
At time 0, the headquarters offers a contract to the division manager. Both the
headquarters and the manager can fully commit to the contract. A contract speci-
fies wage compensations, capital allocations and recommended effort choices to the
manager. Therefore, each contract can be interpreted as a long-term capital budget-
ing mechanism, together with the managerial incentive scheme. By the revelation
principle, we can without loss of generality restrict attention to direction revelation
mechanisms. Formally, denote a mechanism as Γ = 〈(wt, et, kt)t≥0〉, where wt is the
wage compensation, et is the recommended effort choices, and kt is capital invested
at time t. All of them are functions of past reports of the initial signal ϑ and project
types (θs)s<t. In addition, wt is also a function of the past cash flows (pis)s<t.10 In
the rest of the paper, the term “allocation” refers to (et, kt)t≥0 part of the mechanism.
We restrict allocations to non-negative values.
At each point in time, given the past reports (ϑˆ, (θˆs)s<t) and past observed cash
flows (pis)s<t, the sequence of events that occur over a time interval [t, t+ dt) are:
1. The project type θt realizes and the manager privately observes it;
2. The manager reports the project type θˆt to the headquarters;
3. The headquarters allocates capital kt and recommends et to the manager;
4. The managers choose effort after observing the allocation;
10We assume both efforts and capitals are independent of past cash flows. The reason is that for
any type of the manager, she is able to generate the same distribution of cash flows in the division.
Hence cash flows are not informative enough for future effort decisions. We adopt this logic from
GP.
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5. Cash flows pit realize and the headquarters pays the manager promised wage
wt.
Given a mechanism Γ, we can now define the payoffs of the headquarters and the
manager. The headquarters expected discounted profits is given by
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(pit − c(kt)− wt)dt
]
(3.3)
and the division manager’s expected discounted payoff, conditional on her initial
signal ϑ, is given by
Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(wt − h(et))dt
]
(3.4)
As we restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms, the constraints facing the
headquarters in the optimal contracting problem are the incentive-compatibility and
participation constraint. We say that a mechanism Γ is incentive compatible if a
truthful and obedient strategy is an equilibrium strategy of the manager. In addi-
tion, we normalize the manager’s reservation utility to 0 so that Γ is individually
rational if it delivers non-negative payoffs to the manager at time 0. As a result,
the headquarters’s decision problem is to search for an incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanism that maximizes (3.3).11
11Although we are not imposing limited liability constraint, the typical option of “selling the firm”
to the manager in our risk-neutral framework is suboptimal to the principal. This is because the
manager’s private information has persistent effects in the future and generates a surplus. The head-
quarters is better off introducing distortions in the allocations and designing the profit-maximizing
mechanism to extract some of these rents. Nevertheless, our optimal mechanism remains imple-
mentable with limited liability under the suitable and reasonable modification of the environment.
See Section 3.4.3 for discussions.
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3.3 Symmetric Information: The Efficient Mechanism
We first examine an economic environment with symmetric information. In this
environment, the project types and the effort choices are observable and verifiable. In
particular, the headquarters chooses a contract to maximize the expected discounted
profits (3.3) subject only to the participation constraint. The participation constraint
is obviously binding at the optimum and the resulting first-best contract is the one
that maximizes the following ex-ante social surplus
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(pit − c(kt)− h(et))dt
]
(3.5)
The ex-ante social surplus is the expected discounted sum of the firm’s total cash
flows less the manager’s disutility of efforts and all the capital expenditures. The
efficient mechanism is described as follows.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose 1 > α2. The efficient mechanism specifies that for all t,
and θt,
kFBt (θt) =
θt
1− α2 ; e
FB
t (θt) =
αθt
1− α2
The wages are set such that individually rational constraints are binding.
In the efficient mechanism, both the capital investment and effort choice are
increasing in the project type. This is because both the cash flows and the marginal
value of capital investment are increasing in the project type. Moreover, as effort
and capital are a complement, when more capital is allocated to the division or
when more effort is provided, complementarity reinforces each other and calls for a
higher allocation. Therefore, complementarity has to be small enough, that is 1 > α,
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to ensure the solution satisfies the second-order condition for maximization. We
maintain this parametric assumption in the rest of the paper.
The efficient mechanism is dynamic in nature. By the aggregator (3.2), the
current type θt depends on past types through the shocks Zt. Interestingly, the
efficient allocation also depends on the initial signal ϑ through the aggregator (3.2).
Holding the shocks Zt and time t constant, a better project (higher ϑ) receives a
larger investment because φϑ ≥ 0. Finally, the headquarters adopts the NPV rule
for investment, and it excludes project and shuts down effort simultaneously when
θt ≤ 0.12
3.4 The Optimal Dynamic Mechanism
In this section, we characterize the optimal dynamic mechanism under the assump-
tion that both the project types and effort choices are the manager’s private informa-
tion. To solve the model, we adopt the Myersonian approach in continuous time.13
First, we obtain a relaxed program by replacing the global incentive constraints with
the local incentive constraints using a dynamic envelope condition. The envelope
condition is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility and it summarizes the
marginal impact of the initial signal on the manager’s equilibrium payoff. Then we
express the objective of the headquarters as the dynamic virtual surplus. Maximiza-
tion of the dynamic virtual surplus yields the optimal allocation. Lastly, we identify
conditions on the primitives that guarantee the solution to the relaxed program also
satisfies the global incentive constraints.
12Note that the first-order condition requires the headquarters invests up to αet + θt = kt. That
is, the marginal product of capital equals the marginal cost of capital.
13The approach is a dynamic extension of Myerson’s (1981) classic approach to static mechanism
design problems. The discrete-time extension is due to Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014). We follow
the continuous-time approach proposed by Bergemann and Strack (2015).
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3.4.1 Dynamic Information Rent
Given any incentive compatible mechanism Γ, define the equilibrium payoff of the
division manager associated with each initial signal when she follows the obedient
effort choice as
V Γ(ϑ) ≡ Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt (wt − h(et) dt
]
(3.6)
Proposition 3.2 characterizes the derivative of the value function.
Proposition 3.2. In any incentive compatible mechanism Γ, the value function (3.6)
of the manager is Lipschitz continuous and its derivative with respect to the initial
signal ϑ is given by
∂V Γ(ϑ)
∂ϑ
= Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtφϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)
et(ϑ, (θs)s≤t)
α
dt
]
(3.7)
when the division manager reports truthfully and employs an obedient effort choice.
The manager earns information rent because she is privately informed about
the initial signal ϑ and subsequent project types (θt)t≥0. Consider a manager who
privately observes θt at time t. This manager will be able to mimic any lower types
θ˜t < θt by producing the same cash flows as a type-θ˜t manager. She can achieve
this by shirking, that is, by providing less effort, in which case she saves certain
effort costs et/α. The disutility saved contributes to the flow of information rent
φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)
et(ϑ,(θs)s≤t)
α
in (3.8).
The total information rent can be obtained by integrating the dynamic envelope
condition (3.7)
V Γ(ϑ) = V Γ(ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
ϑ
Eϑ˜
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtφϑ(t, ϑ˜, Zt)
et(ϑ˜, (θs)s≤t)
α
dt
]
dϑ˜ (3.8)
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In the dynamic environment, the critical feature of (3.8) is that the total in-
formation rent incorporates the effect of a manager’s initial signal on all future
project types. Thus the initial signal reported at time 0 affects all future alloca-
tions and hence future rents. The total information rent is the expected discounted
and weighted sum of rent at each point in time, with the weights given by stochastic
flows.
To derive (3.7) as a necessary condition for incentive compatibility, we follow
Bergemann and Strack (2015) by focusing on a small class of deviations called con-
sistent deviations. Intuitively, a manager who deviates and reports an initial signal
ϑ
′ will continue to misreport as if all the future project types are generated by ϑ′ .
Formally,
Definition (Consistent deviation). A manager with initial signal ϑ and type
θ0 = φ(0, ϑ, Z0) consistently deviates if she misreports θˆ0 = φ(0, ϑ
′
, Z0) at time 0
and continues to misreport θˆt = φ(t, ϑ
′
, z(t, ϑ, θt)) instead for the true type θt for all
t > 0. The function z is implicitly defined by θt = φ(t, ϑ, z(t, ϑ, θt)) for all t and ϑ.14
Consistent deviation requires a manager with a true initial signal ϑ to report
truthfully the shocks z(t, ϑ, θt) at each point in time after she misreports ϑ
′ initially.
Because of the independence Zt and ϑ, the smaller class of deviation implies that
changes in the initial signal cause no variation in the continuation reporting strategy.
This helps to establish the differentiability of the manager’s payoff.15 Together with
the effort concealment argument as in Laffont and Tirole (1986), we can turn the
manager’s reporting problem into a one-dimensional problem. Then the Envelope
Theorem allows us to derive the condition (3.7) as a necessary condition for incentive
14z is well-defined because φ is strictly increasing in the value of contemporaneous shock zi.
15Eso and Szentes (2007) first use this class of deviations. Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) apply
it to identify the sufficient conditions for the infinite-horizon version of the envelope condition in
discrete time. For more discussions on consistent deviation, see Bergemann and Strack (2015).
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compatibility.
3.4.2 The Optimal Allocation
We now use the dynamic information rent equation (3.8) to eliminate the wage in
the headquarters’s expected discounted profits (3.3). The resulting expression (3.9)
below is the dynamic virtual surplus of the headquarters. As only the local incentive
constraints are embedded in the dynamic virtual surplus, it is the objective function
of the relaxed program. In the problem, the headquarters chooses capital allocations
and effort recommendations (kt, et)t≥0 to maximize (3.9) subject to the participation
constraint. The following proposition provides the dynamic virtual surplus and the
solution to the relaxed program.
Proposition 3.3. In any incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism
Γ, the headquarters’s expected discounted profits is given by the dynamic virtual sur-
plus
∫
Θ
Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
pit − c(kt)− h(et)− etα φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ)
)
dt
]
dG(ϑ)− V Γ(ϑ)
(3.9)
In the optimal mechanism, the investment and effort are given by
kt(ϑ, θt) =
1
1− α2 (θt − φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ)) (3.10)
et(ϑ, θt) =
α
1− α2
(
θt − 1
α2
φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ)
)
(3.11)
whenever all are positive. For some time t and states (ϑ, θt), distortions may shut
down effort provisions: When et(ϑ, θt) = 0, then kt(ϑ, θt) = θt. The optimal mecha-
nism delivers V Γ(ϑ) = 0.
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The dynamic virtual surplus (3.9) is the expected discounted sum of the head-
quarters’s flow virtual surplus, which contains two components: The first one is
the social value of the capital investment and productive effort, given by the terms
pit − c(kt) − h(et). The second component etα φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ) represents the time-t
information rent that the headquarters must deliver to a division manager with type
θt to truthfully reveal her time-t private information. The last term V Γ(θ) is the
total value assigned to the division manager with the lowest initial signal ϑ in order
to induce her to participate in the mechanism. As usual, V Γ(ϑ) = 0 in the optimum.
The dynamic capital allocations and effort choices that solve the relaxed program
are stated in the second part of the proposition. Two features of the optimal alloca-
tion are noteworthy. First, the time-t optimal allocation depends only on the reports
about the initial signal ϑ and the time-t project type θt. This is because of the time
separability of the investment problem: The cash flows generated by the project
at time t only depend on the current project quality, and indirectly on the initial
signal through its effect on the current type. More importantly, the initial private
information affects information rents through its the stochastic flow. Therefore, the
presence of privately-known initial signal and future types affect the headquarters’s
cost of choosing allocations.
Second, there are under-investment and under-provision of efforts, due to the
headquarters’ incentive to economize information rents φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ). When will
the headquarters stop incentivizing the manager or stop funding a project? Because
the marginal productivity of efforts is proportional to capital, efforts provided to
a project with kt(ϑ, θt) ≤ 0 must be 0. This implies an allocation “pecking-order”:
As the project types “deteriorate”, efforts are shut down first.16 Moverover, when
16Proposition 3.3 says nothing regarding the monotonicity of the optimal allocation. Proposition
3.6 establishes monotonicity under extra conditions. In that case, projects can be ranked according
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et(ϑ, θt) = 0, we can easily show that kt(ϑ, θt) = max{θt, 0}. When the time-t
quality of a project is negative, the headquarters stops investing in the project (at
least temporarily).17 Therefore, in our model, the project exclusion policy is identical
to the efficient one.
We now discuss the implementability of the optimal allocation. First, we identify
conditions on the primitives that ensure the monotonicity of the optimal allocation
with respect to the initial signal and the project type. This parallel static mechanism
designs analysis in which the envelope condition and the monotonicity of the allo-
cation are sufficient conditions for the global incentive compatibility. Then in the
next section, we find wage compensation that implements the optimal allocation.
Following Bergemann and Strack (2015), we use the following conditions.
Assumption 3.4. (Decreasing influence of initial signal) The relative impact
of the initial signal on the type: φϑ(t,ϑ,z)
φ(t,ϑ,z)
is decreasing in z for all (t, ϑ, z).
Assumption 3.5. (Decreasing influence of initial signal vs. contemporane-
ous shock) The ratio of the marginal impact of initial signal and contemporaneous
shocks: φϑ(t,ϑ,z)
φz(t,ϑ,z)
is decreasing in ϑ for all (t, ϑ, z).
Following a modification of the proofs in Bergemann and Strack (2015), we can
show the desired monotonicity of optimal allocations in initial signals ϑ and project
type θt, as stated in Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.6. Under Assumption 3.4 and 3.5, the time-t optimal allocation
kt(ϑ, θt) and et(ϑ, θt) are increasing in ϑ and θt for all t ≥ 0.
to (ϑ, θt) and “deterioration” means a decline in the project type θt.
17From (3.11), the effort binds at 0 at a critical type θct =
1
α2φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ). Using this to
eliminate φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ) in (3.10) can verify that kt(ϑ, θt) is continuous at the critical type θct that
shut down the own effort. In addition, regularity condition implies that θt, generated by (3.2), is
continuous in Zt. So as long as Zt has continuous paths, say a Brownian motion, then the optimal
allocation will have a continuous path. This facilitates the interpretation of capital as project scale
or firm size.
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3.4.3 Managerial Compensation
With the optimal allocation being monotonic, we can now construct wage payments
that guarantee the incentives for the division manager to truthfully reveal her project
types and follow the recommended effort choices obediently.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose Assumption 3.4 and 3.5 hold. There exists a sequence of
linear contracts (wt(ϑ, (θs)s≤t; (pis)s≤t))t≥0 with
wt(ϑ, θt, pit) = Bt(ϑ, θt) + St(ϑ, θt)pit
where to manager, Bt(ϑ, θt) is the base salary, St(ϑ, θt) is her share of the division’s
cash flows such that in the mechanism Γ, the manager reports her initial signal ϑ and
project type θt truthfully for all t ≥ 0, regardless of the past reports ϑˆ and (θˆs)s<t.
Intuitively, a sequence of linear contracts is optimal because everyone is risk
neutral and equally patient. As we do not consider an inefficient termination option,
the linear contracts with per-period settlemen out-performs a deferred compensation
scheme. In addition, risk-neutrality implies that the optimality of linear contracts is
robust to the introduction of a mean zero noise in the accounting measure of project
cash flows.18
Corollary 3.8. (i) When et(ϑ, θt) = 0, wt(ϑ, θt, pit) = β(ϑ); (ii) St(ϑ, θt) is increas-
ing in θt and Bt(ϑ, θt) is decreasing in θt.
Corollary 1 can be interpreted as follows. First, when effort is shut down, wage is
independent of the current type and current cash flow. This follows the basic intuition
that the optimal wage is set as the lowest possible constant when effort incentives
18Say the cash flow rate is pit + t for a mean-zero accounting errors t distributed on (, ).
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are not necessary. Note that the lowest constant β(ϑ) comes from spreading over
the information rent for reporting the initial signal. Second, when θt increases, the
manager is granted a larger fraction of performance-based pay, at the cost of base
salary. This is simply because as θt increases, there is less effort distortion and hence
greater need to incentivize effort.
The Power of Incentives. In our framework, the marginal productivity of ef-
fort is multiplicative with capital, and the quantity St(ϑ, θt)kt(ϑ, θt) is an appropriate
measure of the power of incentives. In other words, we can interpret St(ϑ, θt)kt(ϑ, θt)
as the manager’s bonus and equity stake in the firm. The performance-based com-
pensation St(ϑ, θt) = ∂wt(ϑ,θt)∂pit then measures the dollar-to-dollar pay-performance
sensitivity (PPS). From the discussion above, the PPS satisfies St(ϑ, θt) = et(ϑ,θt)αkt(ϑ,θt) ,
and the novel feature of PPS is that it is driven by the dynamic nature of private
information and possibly time-varying over the managerial tenure.
Limited Liability. Note that, although the manager always gets nonnegative
utility on the equilibrium path, the linear contract of Proposition 3.7 can violate
limited liability. For some initial signals and project types, the payment made to a
manager is negative. We choose not to incorporate the limited liability constraints
into our problem, as it will significantly complicate the analysis. But we can argue
that when the cost of indivertible effort is large, the limited liability problem is
alleviated. This is because the additional cost born by the manager leaves the optimal
allocation unchanged, while shifting the wage compensation upward uniformly.
Corollary 3.9. If the fixed component of effort cost χ is sufficiently high, then the
linear compensation schemes as in Proposition 3.7 entail non-negative payments to
the managers.
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3.4.4 Implementation by A Simple Mechanism
The optimal direct mechanism discussed above requires continuous communication
between the headquarters and the manager. We can show it is equivalent to a mecha-
nism with finitely many reports, similar to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Boleslavsky
and Said (2013). In particular, the proposition below describes an equivalent sim-
ple mechanism that the manager only reports once at the beginning. Assume the
manager invests optimally for the headquarters, whenever she is indifferent.
Proposition 3.10. If the optimal allocations are strictly increasing in ϑ and θt
whenever positive for all t ≥ 0, the optimal direct mechanism is equivalent to the
mechanism with limited-time report described as follows:
1. The manager reports the initial signal ϑ at time 0.
2. At time t, the manager chooses capital k from the menu (k, Bˆt(ϑ, k), Sˆt(ϑ, k))k≥0
and receives Bˆt(ϑ, k) as the base salary and Sˆt(ϑ, k) as the equity share. Specifically,
Bˆt(ϑ, k) = Bt(ϑ, ξt(ϑ, k)), Sˆt(ϑ, k) = St(ϑ, ξt(ϑ, k)) and ξt(ϑ, k) ≡ max{0, θ > 0 :
kt(ϑ, θ) = k}. Based on kt and wˆt(ϑ, kt, pit), the manager is free to choose effort
et ≥ 0.
Several features of the mechanism with limited-time report are worth noting.
First, the manager only need to communicate with the headquarters once at the
beginning, reporting the initial signal of the project. Second, all investment decisions
and effort choices are delegated to the manager. Third, the manager is assigned
an unlimited capital account with pre-specified relationship between the amount of
investment and the compensation scheme in a deterministic and time-varying fashion,
based on the reported initial signal.
For a fixed moment in time, if investment is below certain threshold, the min-
imum effort is required and the manager is compensated by the base salary only.
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But if the manager requests capital above the threshold, performance-based pay
is used to incentivize effort. Moreover, the larger the investment she chooses, the
more performance-based pay is granted at the cost of base salary. As a result, the
manager’s incentive is more aligned with the headquarters’ and the information rent
is effectively curtailed. When the initial signal is better, the threshold of positive
performance-based pay drops and, above the threshold, the fraction of performance-
based pay increases, meaning the manager is provided more effort incentive.
Our simple mechanism is different from the budget mechanism in Malenko (2016).
There, the headquarters assigns a spending account to a division which gradually re-
plenishes over time. Small projects are financed from the account and large projects
are passed to the headquarters. Fu (2016) also obtains a spending account but de-
pletes over time. The headquarters injects additional capital whenever a project
arrives. In their implementation, the budget account tracks the manager’s contin-
uation value as in other DeMarzo-Sannikov-type models. In contrast, our optimal
contract does not use the continuation value as a state variable. Thus, the headquar-
ters does not assign a budget account but instead provides the necessary capital to
the division whenever the manager requests it.
3.5 Model Analysis
In this section, we explore and analyze the model implications when the project
type follows an arithmetic Brownian motion or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. The
analysis illustrates the tractability of the model: In each case, we obtain a closed-
form expression for the stochastic flow and distortion, and derive analytical properties
of the optimal allocation and performance-based compensation. In appendix B, we
provide an additional example of type process, geometric Brownian, that features
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proportional distortion.
3.5.1 Brownian Motion with Drift
Suppose the project type (θt)t≥0 follows an arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM)
dθt = µdt+ σdZt (3.12)
where µ > 0 is the drift, σ > 0 is the volatility, and Zt is a standard Brownian
motion. The solution to the stochastic differential equation (3.12) is
θt = θ0 + µt+ σZt
for an initial value θ0. Hence the aggregator for the type process φ(t, ϑ, Zt) = θ0 +
µt+σZt, where the initial signal ϑ can be the initial value, the drift, or the volatility.
Privately-known Drift. Suppose the manager privately observes the drift rate.
The initial signal ϑ = µ and the stochastic flow φµ(t, µ, Zt) = t. The interior solution
for investment (3.10) and effort (3.11) become
kt(µ, θt) =
1
1− α2 (θt − tψ(µ)) and et(µ, θt) =
α
1− α2
(
θt − 1
α2
tψ(µ)
)
As the stochastic flow is strictly increasing in time, the distortion induced by the
privately-known drift is deterministically increasing in time for any type. This im-
plies that the headquarters shuts down effort and provides no effort incentives when-
ever θt < 1α2 tψ(µ). As θt is stochastic, the suspension of effort is temporarily and
incentives resume when the project becomes sufficiently profitable.
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Ito’s lemma implies the dynamics of capital is
dkt(µ, θt) =
1
1− α2 (µdt+ σdZt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to project characteristics
− ψ(µ)
1− α2dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
driven by private information
The first term of the law of motion of the capital comes from the nature of the type
process (3.12). Observe that the dynamics of capital in the first-best dkFBt (µ, θt) =
1
1−α2 (µdt+ σdZt) is exactly the first term. This implies that the information-driven
dynamics is all captured in the second term. The downward distortion does not only
implies the level of capital is lower, but it reduces the growth of the capital as well.
In particular, for two long-term projects with µG > µB, ψ(µG) < ψ(µB) by monotone
hazard rate and thus the reduction of the capital growth is smaller for projects with
a higher drift. On expectation, Et [dkt(µ, θt)] = 11−α2 (µ− ψ(µ)) dt is increasing in µ,
and the project scale grows faster for projects with a higher drift.19
As for the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), it becomes
St(µ, θt) =
θt − 1α2 tψ(µ)
θt − tψ(µ)
The performance-based compensation is, therefore, stochastic evolvingg over the
managerial tenure. We note below that the volatility of the incentive is higher for the
manager of bad projects. This stems from the effort-capital pecking order: Distortion
makes the optimal effort more sensitive to the project types.
Figure 1 presents an example that illustrates the impact of the growth rate.
The left panel shows the dynamics of capital. Consistent with the prediction of the
model, the good project (blue, µG = 0.8) grows faster in the project scale than the
bad project (red, µB = 0.3). This leads to eventual divergence in the project scale.
19However, they still grow slower than the first-best.
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Figure 3.1: Dynamics of capital and incentives with an ABM type process.
The initial value is drawn from a uniform distribution on (0, 1) and we set θ0 = 1 in
the example. The two paths share the same shocks Zt. The blue path has µG = 0.8
and the red path has µB = 0.3. Other parameters: α = 0.8, σ = 17.68%.
The right panel shows the dynamics of incentives. The PPS for the manager of a
good project is fairly stable over time. In contrast, the PPS for the manager of a bad
project is more volatile. The incentives vanish when effort is shut down at around
time 360 to time 460, and effort incentives resume afterward. Notice that, with this
period of time, headquarters still invests capital in the project even the manager is
not providing effort.
Privately-known initial value. Suppose the manager privately observes the
initial value ϑ = θ0 of the project. In this case, the stochastic flow is φθ0(t, θ0, Zt) = 1
because an increase in θ0 causes uniform upward shifts of all the paths of project
types, holding the shocks Zt constant. The distortion is then independent of time
and the project types. Therefore, the drift rates of the capital and effort dynamics
are independent of the private information.
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3.5.2 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
Suppose the project type follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dθt = η(θ¯ − θt)dt+ σdZt
where η > 0 is the mean reversion speed, θ¯ is the long-run average, and σ > 0 is
the volatility. As usual, Zt is a standard Brownian motion. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process is a continuous-time analogy of the discrete-time AR(1) process. The solution
of the process is given by θt = θ0e−ηt + θ¯(1 − e−ηt) + e−ηt
∫ t
0
σeηsdZs for an initial
condition θ0. Define Bηt = Z˜ e2ηt−1
2η
as a time-changed Brownian motion,20 the solution
can be written as
θt = φ(t, ϑ, B
η
t ) = θ0e
−ηt + θ¯(1− e−ηt) + σe−ηtBηt (3.13)
and the project type at any point in time is normally distributed.
Privately-known initial value. If the manager privately observes the initial
value, ϑ = θ0, and the stochastic flow is given by φθ0(t, θ0, B
η
t ) = e
−ηt. The distortion
is decreasing over time deterministically. This is because the project type is mean-
reverting and the initial value has declining impact on the future project types. The
interior solution for investment (3.10) and effort (3.11) are
kt(θ0, θt) =
1
1− α2
(
θt − e−ηtψ(θ0)
)
and et(θ0, θt) =
α
1− α2
(
θt − e
−ηt
α2
ψ(θ0)
)
(3.14)
There are a few implications. First, decreasing distortion implies that effort may be
20Bηt is a weak solution to the stochastic differential equation dMt = eηtdZt. The quadratic
variation of M is 〈M〉t = 12η (e2ηt − 1) and so by Dambis, Dubins-Schwarz theorem, Z˜ e2ηt−1
2η
is a
Brownian motion equals Mt. See, theorem 4.6 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991).
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Figure 3.2: Comparative dynamics of capital and incentives with the per-
sistence parameter η. Both paths share the same shocks Zt, the initial value
is θ0 = 0.3 and is drawn from a uniform distribution on (0, 1). The blue line has
η = 0.05 and the red line has η = 0.01. Other parameters: α = 0.5 and σ = 17.68%,
and θ¯ = 5. The horizontal dotted line on the left panel is the long-run average of
the capital.
shut down stochastically at the early life of the project. Second, as the project type
converges to a stationary distribution, both the capital and effort will mean-revert
to their respective long-run average. To see this, note
Et [kt(θ0, θt)] =
1
1− α2
(
θ¯ + e−ηt(θ0 − θ¯)− e−ηtψ(θ0)
)
Thus Et [kt(θ0, θt)] → 11−α2 θ¯, and similarly for effort Et [et(θ0, θt)] → α1−α2 θ¯. Taken
together, the PPS
St(θ0, θt) =
θt − e−ηtα2 ψ(θ0)
θt − e−ηtψ(θ0) → 1 as t→∞
This result implies that the manager’s private information regarding the initial
project type has declining impact of capital and incentive. Eventually, the head-
quarters will provide the maximal incentive in order to motivate the manager.
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Third, the optimal investment implies the following law of motion:
dkt(θ0, θt) =
1
1− α2
(
η
(
θ¯ − θt
)
dt+ σdZt
)
with distorted initial condition θ0−ψ(θ0)
In terms of the dynamics, the distortion impacts the initial capital investment.21
Note that the dynamics of capital is equivalent to the efficient one, except for the
difference in the initial condition. This implies that the headquarters will become
more permissive over time as the impact of the distorted initial investment declines
over the life of the project.
The distortion in the initial investment is small under two different scenarios.
First, consider two projects with different initial values, θ0 > θ
′
0, then the claim
follows from the monotone hazard rate, ψ(θ0) < ψ(θ
′
0). Moreover, for project types
with lower persistence, that is, a higher η, the effect of distortion in the initial
investment will disappear quickly. It follows that both the project scale and PPS will
converge to their long-run expected value, Et [kt(θ0, θt)] = 11−α2 θ¯ and Et [St(θ0, θt)] =
1, as a slower speed with higher persistence (lower η). Figure 2 provides an example
that illustrates the effect of the persistence parameter on the dynamics of capital
and incentive.
Privately-known long-run average. When the manager is privately informed
about the long-run average of the project type, ϑ = θ¯, and the stochastic flow is given
by φθ¯(t, θ¯, B
η
t ) = 1 − e−ηt. The distortion is increasing over time. This is because
the long-run average of the type process becomes a more important determinant of
realized project types as time unfolds. The interior solution for investment (3.10)
21Substituting (3.13) into (3.14), we have kt(ϑ, θt) =
1
1−α2
(
(θ0 − ψ(θ0))e−ηt + θ¯(1− e−ηt) + σe−ηtBηt
)
. Thus the capital admits the same law of
motion as (3.13) with an initial condition θ0 − ψ(θ0).
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and effort (3.11) are
kt(θ¯, θt) =
1
1− α2
(
θt −
(
1− e−ηt)ψ(θ¯)) and et(θ¯, θt) = α
1− α2
(
θt − 1− e
−ηt
α2
ψ(θ¯)
)
(3.15)
As opposed to the case with privately-informed initial value, increasing distortion
implies that temporary effort exclusion tends to occur in the latter stages of the
project. This is illustrated in the right panel of figure 3, in which the PPS hits zero
for sometimes for a project with lower long-run average (θL = 6). Moreover, observe
that the stochastic flow increases over time to 1. Hence, under-investment increases
over time: For capital, kFBt (θ¯, θt) − kt(θ¯, θt) = 11−α2 (1− e−ηt)ψ(θ¯) increases in t.
This reflects the headquarters screen the manager’s type progressively in order to
extract the private information regarding the long-term prospect of the project.
Figure 3.3: Dynamics of capital and incentive under OU processes with
privately-informed long-run average. The initial signal is the long-run average:
blue line (θH = 8) and red line (θL = 6). It is drawn from a uniform distribution on
(0, 10). Both paths share the same shocks Zt. Other parameters: η = 0.01, θ0 = 0.6,
α = 0.85, and σ = 8.84%. The dotted lines are the long-run average of the respective
quantity.
As project type is mean-reverting, both capital and effort converge to a sta-
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tionary distribution in the long run. In particular, Et
[
kt(θ¯, θt)
] → 1
1−α2
(
θ¯ − ψ(θ¯))
and Et
[
et(θ¯, θt)
] → α
1−α2
(
θ¯ − 1
α2
ψ(θ¯)
)
as t → ∞. This immediately implies that
the performance-based compensation St(θ¯, θt) → θ¯−
1
α2
ψ(θ¯)
θ¯−ψ(θ¯) if the long-run effort is
positive. In addition, the long-run expected values of the allocation contain the dis-
tortion, thus the virtual quality is moving to a distorted target. This can also be
seen from the law of motion of the project scale:
dkt(θ¯, θt) =
1
1− α2
η
 θ¯ − ψ(θ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
distorted long-run average
− θt
 dt+ σdZt

Private information effectively reduces the long-run average of capital from θ¯ to
θ¯ − ψ(θ¯).22 The effect remains in the long run because the distortion persists in the
limit. Such a distortion is small when projects have a higher long-run average θ¯,
and the claim follows from the assumption of monotone hazard rate: For long-run
average θH > θL, ψ(θH) < ψ(θL). Figure 3 provides an example that illustrated the
dynamics of capital and incentive with two different long-run averages, and similar
to the ABM example with privately-known drift, the PPS for the manager of bad
projects displays higher volatility.
3.6 Model Implications and Discussions
This section summarizes a number of implications generated by our model, regarding
the dynamics of capital and incentive in stand-alone firms.
Implication 1: Investment and returns are persistent. Moreover, investment is
positively related to past performance.
22As in the previous footnote, we have kt(ϑ, θt) = 11−α2
(
θ0e
−ηt + (θ¯ − ψ(θ¯))(1− e−ηt) + σe−ηtBηt
)
by substituting (3.13) into (3.15). Thus the capital follows the OU dynamics with a drift
η
(
θ¯ − ψ(θ¯)− θt
)
dt term.
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Our model produces time-series correlation of investment. The headquarters
favors initially better projects in the sense that these projects receive larger capital
at any point in time after controlling any other characteristics. This investment
pattern emerges because the headquarters with full commitment wants to induce
the manager to identify promising projects at the beginning. Observe that with a
higher project type, the headquarters increases investment and the division is able
to produce more cash flows. The past performance and the expected investment are
positively related, since they are both increasing in the initial signal ϑ.
The implication is consistent with Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015). They sur-
vey more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers
(CFOs). The data shows that more than 71% of U.S. CEOs rely on manager’s rep-
utation as criteria for capital allocation. Obviously, division manager’s reputation
and past cash flows are highly correlated. A more direct, although a weaker, piece
of evidence is that 51% of U.S. CEOs and 64% of U.S. CFOs indicate historical re-
turn is an important decision criterion for capital allocation. Meanwhile, more than
75% of non-U.S. CFOs agree divisional return is very important. Overall, the survey
indicates divisional investment is positively correlated with the past performance of
the divisional manager.
Note that some other works in dynamic agency also predict a positive correla-
tion between investment and past cash flows. However, our mechanism is different
from theirs. For example, DeMarzo et al. (2012) generate this correlation from de-
ferred compensation and inefficient liquidation. While our model has no liquidation
and compensation is settled period-by-period, the correlation results from persistent
private information.
Implication 2: As the managerial ability or project quality becomes more per-
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sistent, differentials in investment and project performance are more pronounced.
Moreover, the manager is compensated more by performance-based pay.
When the private information is more persistent, the manager has a stronger
incentive to withhold the initial signal. Thus the screening device becomes more
aggressive, reflected as larger differentials in allocations. This also drives the differ-
entials in cash flows greater. In terms of implementation, to induce more effort from
the manager, she is compensated by more performance-based pay.
Implication 3: The distorton in investment level and pay-performance sensitiv-
ity may diminish, expand or persist at a constant level, depending on the impact of
the initial signal on future qualities.
Implication 3 says that conditional on different properties of the initial private
information, the long-run efficiency may or may not be achievable. For example, if
the project quality is mean-reverting to the same level, the initial good performance
is simply a transitory shock. Apparently, the distortion used to screen initial signal
is not important in the long run. The investment and pay-performance sensitivity
converge to the efficient level. Screening is regressive and the headquarters backloads
incentives. This corresponds to the example of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process when the
initial signal is ϑ = θ0 in Section 5.2.
If the mean-reverting project quality converges to different levels, meaning that
the innate managerial ability matters, then constant long-run distortions are useful to
screen initial information on ability. The investment and pay-performance sensitivity
converge to constants below the efficient level. This corresponds to the example of
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process when the initial signal is ϑ = θ¯ in Section 5.2.
Finally, if the project quality is growing over time and managerial ability in-
fluences the growth rate, then the initial information on managerial ability has an
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increasing impact on future qualities. As a result, the headquarters wants to screen
more aggressively along the path to induce the truthful private information at the
beginning. In this case, the headquarters frontloads incentives. This is in line with
the example of Brownian motion with a privately-known drift in Section 5.1. It is
worth noting that the scenario of increasing impact of initial signal can also incor-
porate the learning-by-doing effect. We can assume the manager productivity is θ0
initially, and becomes θt = θ0 +
∫ t
0
e−κ(t−s)esds at time t. Because a higher θ0 leads to
a higher e0, which in turn makes θt and et higher. Thus θ0 has an increasing impact
on θt over time and we can expect expanding distortions and more differentiated
performance as time goes on.
Our result also adds to the discussion of the dynamics of PPS. Empirical evidence
shows that PPS typically decreases with firm size. Baker and Hall (2004) and He
(2011) generate this result by assuming that both the marginal product and cost
of effort scale with firm size, then it is more costly for a large firm to incentivize
the manager. Our implication matches the stylized fact when private information
produces decreasing distortion. As an example, figure 3 shows that over the life cycle
of a particular project (given a fixed ϑ), we may observe a growing firm size together
with a declining PPS.
3.6.1 Further Discussions
Empire-building Preferences. Suppose the division manager has empire-building
preferences as in Harris and Raviv (1996, 1998) and BCL (2001). Let the manager’s
flow utility be wt + ηθtkt − h(et) where η > 0. In this case she obtains more utility
when operating a large and profitable project. Under this setup, the manager derives
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information rents from her the desire to build empire, and (3.7) becomes
∂V Γ(ϑ)
∂ϑ
= Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtφϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)
(
ηkt(ϑ, (θs)s≤t + et(ϑ, (θs)s≤t)
1
α
)
dt
]
The resulting optimal capital is kt(ϑ, θt) = 1+η1−α2 (θt − φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ)) when et(ϑ, θt) >
0; and kt(ϑ, θt) = θt − ηφϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ) otherwise. Therefore, the project exclusion
policy will be inefficient: Projects may be rejected even when it is profitable in
the first-best. This is because private information is directly payoff-relevant to the
manager, and further the headquarters distorts investment further in order to dy-
namically screen the project types. The investment hurdle increases (decreases) over
time if the initial signal has a diminishing (increasing) impact on project types. As
the private information becomes more persistent, overexclusion of projects becomes
more severe. Nevertheless, given that the stochastic flow affects the optimal allo-
cation with empire-building in a similar manner as in (3.10) and (3.11), our main
qualitative results remain unchanged in such an extension.
Investment and Incentives: Substitute or Complement? Our model pre-
dicts that a complementarity between capital and incentive: as the initial signal ϑ or
the current type θt increases, capital kt(ϑ, θt) and incentive St(ϑ, θt) increase. This
is implied from the strong complementarity between capital and effort in (3.1). The
empirical literature shows that capital and incentive are substitutes. For example,
Alok and Gopalan (2016) and Wulf (2002). We hold no prior view on whether invest-
ment and the firm-level compensation for the division manager should be substitutes
or complements; rather we assume (3.1) mainly for tractability and highlights the
impact of private information in the design of the optimal mechanism. In a broader
framework, one can embed the substituability between effort and capital in a more
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general production technology as in Garcia (2014).23 We believe that our solution
method is applicable in that setting.
Multidivisional Firms. The internal capital allocation across divisions is an
important problem. See empirical studies by Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998),
Wulf (2002) and more recently by Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2008). Our framework
permits the introduction of an extra division.24 In the spirit of BCL (2004), suppose
there are two divisions, i = A,B, each run by a manager that privately observes an
initial signal and project type in their own division. Consider a cash flow process for
division i:
piit = (αeit + θit + vθjt) kit
where the parameter v captures project spillover, which can be positive (production
synergy) or negative. In this case, we require the mechanism to satisfy perfect
Bayesian incentive compatibility. That is, a truthful and obedient strategy profile
and a belief system forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We can show that
the optimal allocation in division i is
kit(ϑ, θt) =
1
1− α2
((
θit − φiϑ(t, ϑi, Zit)ψi(ϑi)
)
+ v
(
θjt − φjϑ(t, ϑj, Zjt)ψj(ϑj)
))
(3.16)
eit(ϑ, θt) =
α
1− α2
((
θit − 1
α2o
φiϑ(t, ϑi, Zit)ψi(ϑi)
)
+ v
(
θjt − φjϑ(t, ϑj, Zjt)ψj(ϑj)
))
(3.17)
23In connecting with BCL, Garcia (2014) assume (closest to our notations) pi = γ(θ)e +
(δ(θ) + α(θ)e) k. He shows that (i) if α(θ) = 0, then incentives and investment are substitutes;
and (ii) if γ(θ) = 0, δ′ = 0, the incentives and investment are substitutes for certain parameter
values. See his Corollary 1 and 2.
24It is difficult to study one principal and many agents models with the recursive approach be-
cause multiple state variables are needed to keep track of the performance of each agent. This ren-
ders the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the principal a partial differential equation (PDE).
Moreover, in the typical environment with risk-neutral agent protected by limited liability and con-
tract termination, it is often unclear how to specify the boundary conditions for the PDE when the
agents perform poorly. The Myersonian approach is easily applicable in a team production setup.
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The key implication from (3.16) and (3.17) is that the initial private information in
one division will affect the project scale through the spillover channel. In particular,
with production synergy, the dynamics of capital invested in division i will have a
higher drift if the other division’s project has a better initial signal. The optimal
allocation (3.16) and (3.17) can also be implemented by a linear contract as stated
in Proposition 3.7.25 Interestingly, under the ex-post monotonicity condition, the
linear contract implements the optimal allocation in an ex-post equilibrium. That
is, at each point in time, truthful revelation of θit, and at time 0, truthful revelation
of ϑi, are dominant strategy for manager i.26
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how dynamic private information and moral hazard shape
the capital budgeting process and managerial compensation. Taking advantage of
the recent development in dynamic mechanism design, we analyze a continuous-time
headquarters-manager model and characterize the optimal long-term mechanism. In
the mechanism, the investment decision is largely delegated to the manager and
performance-based pay applies automatically when the investment level (or project
scale) is above certain threshold. Our model delivers a number of implications con-
25In an early draft of our paper, we include moral hazard in team and managers can exert help
effort to improve the performance of the other project. In that case with a suitably extended ex-
post monotonicity condition, a linear contract wit(ϑ, θt, pit) = Bit(ϑ, θt) +SFirmit (ϑ, θt) (piit + pijt) +
SDivisionit (ϑ, θt)piit, with the terms SFirmit (ϑ, θt) and SDivisionit (ϑ, θt) being the firm-level compen-
sation and division-level compensations respectively, implements the optimal allocation. When
both projects have types following the mean-reverting process and the managers privately observe
the initial values of the project, the firm-level incentive grows stronger (to 1) over time and the
division-level incentive converges to 0. Details are available upon request.
26This result is reminiscent of Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992). They show that in a static
quasilinear environment with independent types, a Bayesian incentive compatible allocation satis-
fying a one-period monotonicity condition can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies.
Hence, dominant strategy implementation can be obtained for free in static optimal Bayesian mech-
anism design problems.
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cerning investment and pay-performance sensitivity.
At a practical level, our analysis suggests that when the headquarters is designing
its capital budgeting process, it should take into account the nature of manager’s
private information. Private information regarding the initial profitability or the
growth rate of a project requires different mechanism design. In general, when the
informational distortion is increasing over time, the headquarters should design a
mechanism to progressively screen project types and front-load incentives; and when
the initial private information has declining impact over time, a regressive screening
mechanism with back-load incentives is profit-maximizing.
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3.8 Appendices
3.8.1 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Maximizing (3.5) gives the first-order necessary condi-
tions αet − kt + θt = 0 and αkt − et = 0. And the second-order sufficient condition
requires the Hessian determinant H = 1 − α2 > 0. Thus, it suffices to assume
1 > α.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Suppose the manager with an initial signal ϑ reports
ϑˆ at time 0 and consistently misreports in subsequent times. At each point in time,
the manager will have to hide her lies by choosing effort in such a way that the cash
flows are same as if her reported type coincides with the true one The concealment
effort must satisfy
αet(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t) + θˆt = αeˆt + θt
This is because the headquarters recommends effort et(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t) based on the past
reports of the manager and it expects the productivity contributed by her to be
αet(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t) + θˆt. Otherwise, it knows that the manager has lied about her infor-
mation or has not followed the recommended effort choice, and hence it will impose a
heavy penalty. Thus, the above equation specifies possible efforts that the manager
can choose to maker her reports consistent. It follows that
eˆt =et(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t) +
1
αo
(
θˆt − θt
)
(3.18)
Note that (3.18) implies that manager who reports truthfully at time t, θˆt = θt, must
follow the headquarters’ recommended effort choices.
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At time t, for any past reports (ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t), the headquarters expects to observe
cash flows
piit
(
(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t)
)
=
(
αeit(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t) + θˆit
)
kit(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s<t)
from the division under the concealment efforts (3.18). Note that this expected cash
flows is independent of the true type. Now let U(ϑ; ϑˆ) be the payoff of manager i
with an initial signal ϑ but reports ϑˆ at time 0 and consistently misreports afterward.
We can write it as
U(ϑ; ϑˆ) = Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
wt
(
ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t, (pit(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t))s≤t
)
− h(eˆt)
)
dt
]
(3.19)
Using the aggregator (3.2),θt = φ(t, ϑ, Zt), the partial derivative of U(ϑ; ϑˆ) with
respect to ϑ is
∂
∂ϑ
U(ϑ; ϑˆ) =
∂
∂ϑ
Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
wt
(
ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t, (pit(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t))s≤t
)
− h(eˆt)
)
dt
]
=Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
− ∂
∂ϑ
h(eˆt)
)
dt
]
=Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtφϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)
et(ϑˆ, (θˆs)s≤t)
α
dt
]
By finite expected impact of initial signal, and with appropriate boundedness condi-
tion on e, ∂
∂ϑ
U(ϑ; ϑˆ) is bounded and U(ϑ; ϑˆ) is absolutely continuous in ϑ. Note that
V Γ(ϑ) = supϑˆ U(ϑ; ϑˆ). Then application of theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002)
delivers the envelope condition (3.7).
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. By definition of the value function,
Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtwtdt
]
= V Γ(ϑ) + Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rth(et)dt
]
Using this, we can eliminate the wages in the headquarter’s expected discounted
profits (3.3),
∫
Θ2
Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt (pit − c(kt)− h(et)) dt
]
dG(ϑ)−
∫
Θ
V Γ(ϑ)dG(ϑ) (3.20)
Evaluating the second term in (3.20),
∫
Θ
V Γ(ϑ)dG(ϑ) =V Γ(ϑ¯)−
∫ ϑ¯
ϑ
∂V Γ(ϑ)
∂ϑ
G(ϑ)dϑ
=
∫ ϑ¯
ϑ
∂V Γ(ϑ)
∂ϑ
1−G(ϑ)
g(ϑ)
g(ϑ)dϑ+ V Γ(ϑ)
where the first equality uses integration by parts, and the second equality uses the
fundamental theorem of calculus. Substituting (3.7) into this expression, then (3.20)
becomes the dynamic virtual surplus (3.9).
Point-wise maximization of (3.9) leads to the following system of first-order con-
ditions with respect to capital and effort
αet + θt = kt and αkt = et +
1
α
φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)ψ(ϑ)
The solution to the system is the interior optimal allocation (3.10) and (3.11). Setting
et = 0 in the system gives kt(ϑ, θt) = θt. The second-order sufficient condition for
maximization is still H = 1− α2.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Fix an optimal allocation (kt(ϑ, θt), et(ϑ, θt))t≥0.
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Since the allocation depends only on the initial signals ϑ and time-t type θt. The
proof consists of two steps.
Step 1. Incentives to report θt for all t > 0. Let the flow wages be linear in cash
flows, that is, let w¯t(ϑ, θt, pit) = bt(ϑ, θt)+St(ϑ, θt)pit, where the share term is defined
as
St(ϑ, θt) =

et(ϑ,θt)
αkt(ϑ,θt)
if kt(ϑ, θt) > 0
0 otherwise
(3.21)
and choose bt(ϑ, θt) such that the division manager’s time-t payoff equals her time-t
information rent under the optimal allocation:
bt(ϑ, θt) =h (et(ϑ, θt))− St(ϑ, θt)pit(θt; θt) +
∫ θt
θ
et(ϑ, θ˜t)
α
dθ˜t (3.22)
where pit(θt; θˆt) =
(
αet(ϑ, θˆt) + θt
)
kt(ϑ, θˆt) is the time-t cash flows when the manager
reports θˆt, given the true project type is θt. In what follows, we drop the notation ϑ.
Let ut(θt; θˆt) be a type-θt manager’s time-t payoff if she reports θˆt. Given the above
linear contract and allocation,
ut(θt; θˆt) = bt(θˆt) + St(θˆt)pit(θt, θˆt; θˆt) (3.23)
Incentive compatibility, therefore, requires that for all t > 0 and θt, θˆt,
ut(θt; θt) ≥ ut(θt; θˆt) (3.24)
when the other manager j is truthful. Now we verify (3.24) under the linear wage
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contract.
ut(θt; θt) ≥ut(θt; θt) +
∫ θt
θ
1
α
(
et(θˆt)− et(θ˜t)
)
dθ˜t
=
∫ θt
θˆt
et(θˆt)
α
dθ˜t +
∫ θˆt
θ
et(θ˜t)
α
dθ˜t
=
et(θˆt)
α
(θt − θˆt) + ut(θˆt; θˆt)
=St(θˆt)(θt − θˆt)kt(θˆt) + ut(θˆt; θˆt) = ut(θt; θˆt)
In the first line, the second term on the right-hand side is negative by the monotonic-
ity of the allocation in θˆt. This implies the first inequality. The second and third
equalities use the definition of the bonus payment (3.22) and the time-t payoff (3.23).
The second last line uses the definition of share St(ϑ, θt) in (3.21), and observe that
using (3.23) again, the last line follows.
Step 2. Incentives to report the initial signal ϑ. Define a lump sum payment
β(ϑ) as
β(ϑ) =
∫ ϑ
ϑ
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtφϑ(t, ϑ˜, Zt)
et(ϑ˜, θt)
α
dt
]
dϑ˜− E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
(∫ θt
θ
et(ϑ, θ˜t)
α
dθ˜t
)
dt
]
(3.25)
Then set Bt(ϑ, θt) ≡ bt(ϑ, θt) + β(ϑ), and wt(ϑ, θt, pit) ≡ w¯t(ϑ, θt, pit) + β(ϑ). Let
u0(ϑ; ϑˆ) be the expected discounted payoff of a manager, under the contract in step 1,
who has an initial signal ϑ but reports ϑˆ at time 0 and continue to report truthfully
her type θt in the future times. Now we show that under the linear contract, it is
incentive compatible for the manager to report truthfully her initial signal ϑ. To do
this, we use a variant of Proposition 3.6 in Bergemann and Strack (2015):
Proposition (Bergemann and Strack, 2015). Let Θ ⊂ R and u0 : Θ×Θ→ R
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be absolutely continuous in the first variable with weak derivative ∂u0(ϑ,ϑˆ)
∂ϑ
. Also, let
∂u0(ϑ,ϑˆ)
∂ϑ
be increasing in the second variable. Then the payment
P (ϑ) =
∫ ϑ
ϑ
∂u0(ϑ˜, ϑ˜)
∂ϑ
dϑ˜− u0(ϑ, ϑ)
ensures that truth-telling is optimal.
Given the flow wages wt in step 1, the manager has incentives to report truthfully
her project types θt at all times. By definition of u0(ϑ; ϑˆ), we have
u0(ϑ; ϑˆ) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
w¯t(ϑˆ, θt, pit)− h(et(ϑˆ, θt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ut(φ(t,ϑ,Zt);θt)
 dt
 (3.26)
As the manager reports truthfully for all t > 0, the envelope theorem applies to
ut(φ(t, ϑ, Zt); θt) and allows us to compute ∂ut∂θt , so
∂ut
∂θt
∂θt
∂ϑ
=St(ϑˆ, θt)kt(ϑˆ, θt)φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt) = φϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)
et(ϑˆ, θt)
αo
(3.27)
where the first equality holds because a change in ϑ affects θt through its effect on
the aggregator φ, which in turns affect the time-t cash flows. The second equality
uses the shares (3.21). Differentiating (3.26) with respect to ϑ and applies (3.27), we
have
∂u0(ϑ; ϑˆ)
∂ϑ
=E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtφϑ(t, ϑ, Zt)
et(ϑˆ, θt)
α
dt
]
By ex-post monotonicity, the term inside the expectation operator is increasing in ϑˆ,
as a result ∂u0(ϑ;ϑˆ)
∂ϑ
is increasing in the second variable. Note that ut(φ(t, ϑ, Zt); θt) =∫ θt
θ
et(ϑ,θ˜t)
αo
dθ˜t by (3.22) and (3.23). Then proposition (BS, 2015) implies that the
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payment P (ϑ) = β(ϑ)
r
will ensure the incentive for the manager to truthfully report
the initial signal. Observe that β(ϑ) does not depend on the future types θt, thus it
does not affect the manager’s incentive to report her types at all subsequent times.
Proof of Corollary 2. Limited liability requires wt(ϑ, θt) ≥ 0 for all ϑ, θt.
Under the linear contracts of Proposition 3.7, at ϑ = ϑ and θt = θ and if effort is
zero at time t, then
wt = −Eϑ
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
∫ θt
θ
et(ϑ, θ˜t)
α
dθ˜tdt
]
≤ 0
A sufficient condition for limited liability to hold is to assume there is a flow of fixed
effort cost χ not too low:
χ ≥ Eϑ¯
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
∫ θt
θ
et(ϑ¯, θ˜t)
α
dθ˜tdt
]
To satisfy the managers’ participation constraint, the headquarters needs to shift wt
in Proposition 3.7 upward uniformly by χ.
Proof of Proposition 3.10. We have shown in the proof of Proposition 3.7 that
the sequence of wt(ϑ, θt, pit) implements the optimal truth-telling direct mechanism.
Fix t and suppose manager truthfully reports ϑ. Then we are in a static problem
the same as Mussa and Rosen (1978).
By Proposition 3.6, kt(ϑ, θ) is strictly increasing in θ whenever positive. Define
ξt(ϑ, k) ≡ max{θ : kt(ϑ, θ) = k}. Suppose θt ≤ 0 and manager chooses kt > 0, then
it is equivalent to reporting ξt(ϑ, kt) > 0 in the direct mechanism, a contradiction.
Thus the manager chooses kt = 0 whenever θt ≤ 0. When θt > 0, choosing kt(ϑ, θˆt)
is equivalent to reporting θˆt = ξt(ϑ, kt(ϑ, θˆt)). Therefore, manager has incentive to
choose kt(ϑ, θt) whenever θt > 0.
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By changing the time-t direct mechanism to indirect mechanism, manager’s ex-
pected information rent of reporting ϑ at time-0 remains the same, and hence she
has the same incentive to truthfully report ϑ.
The volatility of St(ϑ, θt) for Section 3.5. As the distortions in the examples
are independent of ϑ and Zt, we take omit these arguments and write φϑ(t). From
Ito’s lemma, the stochastic term of St is ∂St(ϑ,θt)∂θt σdZt. Differentiating the PPS, and
using 1 > α
∂St(ϑ, θt)
∂θt
=
1
(θt − φϑ(t)ψ(ϑ))2
(
1
α2
− 1
)
φϑ(t)ψ(ϑ) > 0
and observe that by monotone hazard rate, the denominator of this expression is
increasing in ϑ; and the numerator is decreasing in ϑ. This implies ∂
2St(ϑ,θt)
∂ϑ,∂θt
< 0. We
conclude that the volatility of the PPS is decreasing in ϑ.
3.8.2 Appendix B
This appendix provides an additional example of type process. Suppose (θt)t≥0 fol-
lows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM), dθt = θt (µdt+ σdZt), where µ is the drift
rate, σ > 0 is the volatility, and Zt is a standard Brownian motion. The solution to
the stochastic differential equation is θt = θ0 exp
((
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t+ σZt
)
for an initial
value θ0. Hence the aggregator for the project types is
φ(t, ϑ, Zt) = θ0 exp
((
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t+ σZt
)
When the manager is privately informed about the initial value, ϑ = θ0, and the
stochastic flow is φθ0(t, θ0, Zt) = θt/θ0; and when the manager knows the growth
rate, ϑ = µ, and the stochastic flow is φµ(t, µ, Zt) = tθt/θ0. In both cases, the
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distortion term at any point in time is proportional to the current project type θt.
This is because the GBM models the relative increments of θt, and thus the impact
of the initial signal on the future project types scale with the project type itself. We
briefly discuss the implications of proportional distortion on the dynamics of capital
and incentive.
Privately-known initial value. With φθ0(t, θ0, Zt) =
θt
θ0
, the optimal invest-
ment and effort are:
kt(θ0, θt) =
θt
1− α2
(
1− ψ(θ0)
θ0
)
and et(θ0, θt) =
αθt
1− α2
(
1− 1
α2
ψ(θ0)
θ0
)
As distortion is proportional to the current type, both investment and effort are
proportional to the type as well. Because of this scaling feature, the PPS becomes
constant:
St(θ0, θt) =
1− 1
α2
ψ(θ0)
θ0
1− ψ(θ0)
θ0
Note that the stochastic flow is time-invariant. It means that the distortion induced
by the initial type θ0 is long-lasting, and there are always under-investment. More-
over, under our regularity assumptions, a project with a better initial value receives
more investment, and the headquarters provides a stronger incentive to its manager,
holding the shocks Zt constant. Proportional distortion also affects the dynamics of
capital and effort. For capital, Ito’s lemma delivers:
dkt(θ0, θt) =
µθt
1− α2
(
1− ψ(θ0)
θ0
)
dt+
σθt
1− α2
(
1− ψ(θ0)
θ0
)
dZt ⇒ dkt(θ0, θt)
kt(θ0, θt)
= µdt+ σdZt
(3.28)
From the law of motion (3.28), the initial signal distorts both the drift and volatility.
Specifically, a higher initial signal implies a higher growth and a higher volatility
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in the project scale. Note that this is in sharp contrast with the ABM example
in which the volatility remains unaffected by the initial signal. In terms of the
relative increment of the project scale, it is equivalent to the efficient mechanism:
dkFBt (θ0,θt)
kFBt (θ0,θt)
= µdt+ σdZt.
Privately-known drift. With φµ(t, µ, Zt) = t θtθ0 , the optimal investment and
effort are: φiµ(t, µi, Zit) = t,
kt(µ, θt) =
θt
1− α2
(
1− tψ(µ)
µ
)
and et(µ, θt) =
αθt
1− α2
(
1− t
α2
ψ(µ)
µ
)
As the distortion is increasing over time, the optimal allocation becomes more and
more inefficient. At a deterministic time t∗ = α
2µ
ψ(µ)
, effort hits the non-negativity
constraint and is shut down forever. That is, for any t ≥ t∗, et(µ, θt) = 0 and
kt(µ, θt) = θt. It follows that incentives will vanish as well. This can be seen from
the PPS:
St(µ, θt) =
1− t
α2
ψ(µ)
µ
1− tψ(µ)
µ
The incentive is then decreasing over time deterministically because of ∂St(µ,θt)
∂t
∝
ψ(θ0)
θ0
(
1− 1
α2
)
< 0. The dynamics of capital
dkt(θ0, θt) =
µθt
1− α2
(
1− ψ(µ)
µ
− ψ(µ)
µ
t
)
dt+
σθt
1− α2
(
1− ψ(µ)
µ
t
)
dZt (3.29)
Compare to the law of motion (3.28), the drift in (3.29) contains an additional term
tψ(µ)/µ that captures the increasing distortion. This implies that both the drift rate
and volatility are decreasing over time. Similarly, the drift of the dynamics of effort
can be easily computed as 1− ψ(µ)
α2µ
− ψ(µ)
α2µ
t. At time t∗, the effort drift is −ψ(θ0)
α2θ0
< 0.
Continuity of the drift in time then implies that the path of effort might be increasing
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initially (say for projects with high growth µ) but eventually it drifts downward to
zero.
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